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THE COIMBRA JESUIT COURSE AS A SOURCE OF THE SEMIOTIC LOGIC OF CHARLES S. PEIRCE

Tese no âmbito do Doutoramento em Filosofia orientada pelos Professores Doutores Mário Santiago de Carvalho, António Manuel Martins e Simone Guidi, apresentada ao Departamento de Filosofia, Comunicação e Informação da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra.

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Abstract

The literature is abundant with definitions of semiotics. First and foremost, semiotics has to do with signs. Charles S. Peirce (†1914) is often referred to as the founder of contemporary semiotics. Peirce provided the community of inquiry with a very convincing explanation of what a sign is. Peirce's definition of the sign bears a striking resemblance to that proposed in the 1606 volume of the CJC, the Coimbra Jesuit Course, authored by Sebastião do Couto (†1639). Can it be the case that Peirce drew from the writings of Couto to arrive at his conception of the sign? Our ultimate purpose here is to provide an adequate answer to such a question. The first part takes a closer look at the state of the question. To this end, an overall picture of the case and an insight into the Peirce-CJC relation in the context of the scholarly literature are provided. The second part deals with the CJC and Peirce's *doctrinæ signorum*, the latter's references to the CJC, and the corresponding background. It has been evidenced that the impact of the CJC on Peirce reaches far beyond the definition of the sign, for Peirce relied on the CJC also to work out what is the knowledge that befits abstraction, the locus of logic amidst art and science, the definition of fallacies, the ways

in which predication occurs, how to approach logical quantities, as well as how to interpret Nominalism, Scotism, and Thomism, along with the relatedness between them all. In retrospect, looking back at the work that was accomplished here and all it is rooted in, what we bring from Coimbra is a laconic expression of a renewed understanding of the Peirce-CJC relation. As we stare intently out of the rear window, we can tell that the community of inquiry has only just begun the quest of understanding the significance and niceties of the Peirce-CJC relation.

Keywords: Abstraction; Fallacy; Knowledge; Logic; Nominalism; Predication; Quantity; Scotism; Sign; Thomism.

Resumo

Definições de semiótica encontram-se em abundância na literatura. A semiótica prende-se, primeiro que tudo, com sinais. Charles S. Peirce é amiúde apontado como o fundador da semiótica contemporânea. Peirce explicou muito convincentemente à comunidade de investigação aquilo que é um sinal. A definição de sinal que Peirce propõe assemelha-se marcadamente àquela que é apresentada no volume de 1606 do CJC, o Curso Jesuíta Conimbricense, da autoria de Sebastião do Couto. Será que Peirce recorreu aos escritos de Couto para chegar à sua noção de sinal? A nossa finalidade derradeira aqui é responder de forma adequada a esta questão. Na primeira parte, observa-se cuidadosamente o estado da questão. Para o efeito, proporciona-se uma panorâmica da situação e uma apreciação da relação Peirce-CJC no quadro da literatura erudita. Na segunda parte, são abordadas as *doctrinæ signorum* do CJC e de Peirce, as referências deste ao CJC, e a correspondente bagagem contextual. Ficou patente que o impacto do CJC em Peirce extravasa consideravelmente a definição do sinal, pois Peirce valeu-se do CJC também para determinar qual é o conhecimento condizente com a abstração, o lugar da lógica entre a arte

e a ciência, a definição das falácias, quais são as modalidades de predicação, como tratar as quantidades lógicas, além de como interpretar o nominalismo, o escotismo e o tomismo, a par dos laços entre os mesmos. Em retrospetiva, observando o trabalho que foi concretizado aqui e as suas raízes, o que trazemos de Coimbra é a expressão lacónica de um renovado entendimento da relação Peirce-CJC. Olhando atentamente pelo retrovisor, constatamos que a comunidade de investigação mal começou o seu caminho para compreender o significado e os pormenores da relação Peirce-CJC.

Palavras-chave: Abstração; Conhecimento; Escotismo; Falácia; Lógica; Nominalismo; Predicação; Quantidade; Sinal; Tomismo.

Introduction

What Is Covered

A Doctrine

Nowadays, it is hardly surprising to observe that whatever the access to reality, it will inevitably occur in a semiotic sense, that is, by way of signs. However, back when the sixteenth century was passing and the seventeenth was beginning, this affair was a bit less agreed upon. Take for example Pedro da Fonseca (†1599), who had some very good reasons to abandon all trust in the direction to which semiotics or the doctrine of signs led the community of inquiry until the late sixteenth century.[1] Looking back at the history of semiotics, it seems evident that the significance of semiotics in our understanding of reality has grown exponentially over the

[1] See John Deely, *Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age: The Development of Cenoscopic Science, AD354 to 1644 (From the Birth of Augustine to the Death of Poinsot)* (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2016), 355.

centuries. From the skeptical stances voiced in the late sixteenth century to the widespread adherence enjoyed today, the semiotic approximation to reality has been absorbed by our body of reasoned practices. The transition observed is more than just academic, for it profoundly affects the way humans relate to reality, most notably but not exclusively in the fields of science. The effect of semiotics transcends the realm of scholarly discourse and penetrates all practical dealings in our everyday lives. The sciences, like the remaining human activities, are conditioned and driven by the action of signs (i.e., semiosis) of this or that kind, both impacting and being affected by the general studies on signs, that is, semiotic studies.[2] The growing clout of semiotics will be further explored through the lenses of Charles S. Peirce, the Peircean tradition, the CJC, the Coimbra school, and the *impulsus Conimbricensis* on Peirce's works and Peircean semiotics.

[2]Ibid., xxiii-xxxix.

The CJC and Peirce

What the CJC has brought to the history of science and particularly semiotics is, as we will see, of a portentous magnitude, not only crossing inner and outer scientific boundaries but covering all the dimensions of human experience with its luminous reach. Indeed, the worth of the CJC would not be less were it not read by Peirce, yet its effect on Peirce has magnified and further developed to a wholly radical degree the worldwide propagation of the insights encapsulated in the CJC, irrespective of whether those of us who are heirs of the CJC during the post-Peircean era happen to be knowledgeable about it or not. But did Peirce really drew from Couto's teachings and thus managed to reach his understanding of the sign? Just how far did the CJC have a bearing on Peirce's semiotic logic? Finding a satisfying answer to such puzzling questions is the key challenge we had to tackle through our doctoral journey. As in the case of each of the authors of the CJC[3], Peirce's lifetime brought with it, apart from other vestiges, his writings, the

[3]We are—and naming them is definitely part of our job here—speaking of Couto, Manuel de Góis (†1597), Cosme de Magalhães (†1624), and Baltasar Álvares (†1630).

kind of genetic data that can be put to the test in the laboratory of philosophical historiography. Tests are admittedly not infallible. However, such a genealogical tie exists, and it has been possible to prove it beyond reproach.

The Present State of Affairs

The first part of this study focuses on the state of the art, for while the Peirce-CJC relation is as yet not recognized on the basis of an in-depth examination of the matter, it has nevertheless been somehow recognized, so it could not be left unexamined insofar as it is both appropriate and meaningful for the sake of arriving at the most comprehensive contextual awareness available regarding the Peirce-CJC relation. Even though some may be more valuable than others, the scholarly references to the Peirce-CJC relation have been mentioned and the most relevant among them have been briefly reviewed here so as to establish thoroughly where the community of inquiry stands on this particular issue. In Chapter 1, we drew an overall picture of what is under discussion as fully as we could. In Chapter 2, we attended to the Peirce-CJC relation, a gap to be covered in philosophical historiography due to the lack of an advanced

study such as the one we have designed here, despite the best efforts of John Deely (†2017). It is necessary to pay tribute to John, since no scholar has to this day done more than him for an inquiry such as the one we undertook here to be carried out.[4] All this (part I) took place so as to be suitably positioned to tackle the primary sources in the second part, which is devoted to His Glassy Essence proper, or rather what is left of him and his personal circumstances.

His Glassy *Who?!*

We borrow this way of referring to Peirce from a *biography* of Peirce.[5] It is transparent that Peirce uses the wording "glassy essence" to refer to humans in a paper published in 1892.[6] Richard Rorty (†2007)

[4]See, for example, John Deely, "Why Investigate the Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot?", in *Semiotics 1994*, ed. John Deely and C. W. Spinks (New York: Peter Lang Verlag, 1996), 34–50.

[5]Kenneth Laine Ketner, *His Glassy Essence: An Autobiography of Charles Sanders Peirce* (Vanderbilt University Press, 1998).

On Ketner's biography of Peirce, a well-informed criticism can be found in Joseph Brent, "Review of *His Glassy Essence: An Autobiography of Charles Sanders Peirce*, by Kenneth Laine Ketner", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 35, no. 1 (1999): 177–87.

[6]Charles S. Peirce, "Man's Glassy Essence", *The Monist* 3, no. 1 (1892): 1–22.

claims[7] that this was the first invocation of the phrase "man's glassy essence" in the whole history of philosophy, whereas the expression "his glassy essence" (also as a form of referring to humankind) is older, having been employed—and reportedly with originality—by none other than William Shakespeare (†1616) in 1603 or 1604's *Measure for Measure*, first performed in 1604 and published for the first time in 1623.[8] It is worth noting that Peirce used the phrase "his glassy essence" as early as 1868, long before the text of *The Monist*, quoting Shakespeare without mentioning him.[9] For a deeper understanding of Peirce's "glassy essence"—not just an intellectual mirror-like soul, as we read in the previously mentioned text written by Rorty, but most of all a breath longing for discoveries, a self acknowledging one's vulnerability when cut off from one's convivial surroundings, and a heart abiding peacefully in the

[7]See 1979's Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009), 42.

[8]As part of *Mr. William Shakespeare's Comedies, Histories, and Tragedies*; a relatively fresh edition is William Shakespeare, *Mr. William Shakespeare's Comedies, Histories & Tragedies: A Facsimile of the First Folio*, 1623, ed. Doug Moston (New York: Routledge, 1998).

[9]See Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks, vol. 5 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-1958), par. 317.

awareness of its own ignorance—it might be worth reading a bit more in the future.[10]

Peirce and What Mattered to Him

Initially (Chapter 3), we assessed the factors that led to the establishment of the Peirce-CJC relation, especially given the fact that Peirce did indeed have access to at least some of the CJC volumes early on in life. We looked at some singular aspects of the reception of the CJC in North America and in particular in the Northeastern United States of America (most notably in Greater Boston, Massachusetts), focusing on the particulars of Peirce's access to the CJC. Then (Chapter 4) we considered Peirce's references to the CJC, also considering the pages of the CJC, the rest of Peirce's corpus, and whatever ancillary evidence that happened to be of use. In listing Peirce's references to the CJC, we have followed a chronological order, not to imply that diachronic consideration of Peirce's references to the CJC constitute the one and only possible avenue for so doing. We did not split the references thematically into those that

[10]E.g., John Patrick Diggins, *The Promise of Pragmatism: Modernism and the Crisis of Knowledge and Authority* (University of Chicago Press, 1995), 158-164.

concern the systematic or synchronic proceedings of Peirce's semiotic logic and those that pertain to its historical or diachronic background. This distinction, of course, is not meant to signify that both strands are cut off from each other. Both systematicity and historicity constitute keystones for the fine-tuning of human understanding and are ultimately intertwined, for "synchrony as a temporal reality is a one-way movement into a limited future" and diachrony "arises from within synchrony", also invading it "from a past before the synchrony in question began in the first place", extending "beyond that synchrony into a future accessible only to those who «come after» into the «land of the living»".[11] Finally (Chapter 5), we examined the telltale signs of the Peirce-CJC relation, that is to say, the dimension that goes beyond Peirce's references to the CJC. At this point, we moved forward into summarizing and comparing key aspects of the CJC and Peirce's doctrines of signs, rendering the doctrinal kinship of both significantly easier to understand. So, in the last two chapters of the second part, we provided—on a historically layered, methodical, and careful discussion—an account of

[11]John Deely, "Semiotics Seen Synchronically: The View as of 2010", *Chinese Semiotic Studies* 4, no. 2 (2010): 15.

Peirce's references to the CJC and an appreciation of the common ground between their general semiotic teachings. Then, we proceed to the conclusion.

Why It Is So

Couto's Success

It has never been our aim to engender a relation between Peirce and the CJC, but rather to lay down its recognition reliably among the community of inquirers to the extent that the circumstances and our powers so allowed. The point here is also by no means to suggest that there might have been a kind of conceptual transplant from the CJC to Peirce. To begin with, we are aiming at a far more modest goal: to bring forth evidence that the CJC decisively shaped Peirce's triadic semiotic logic. The CJC did indeed play such a role in impacting Peirce and through him a countless number of thinkers over the last fifteen or so decades. This fact is anything but in line with one of the purposes behind the CJC. Indeed, the overarching purpose of Couto's *doctrina signorum* was "to make reality, as a

whole, semiotically accessible to humans".[12]

Strategic Priority

As already mentioned, the first part focuses on the state of the art. The objective is to arrive at the most comprehensive contextual awareness available regarding the Peirce-CJC relation and establish where the community of inquiry stands on this particular issue. This has proven to be enough to shine a spotlight into a gap in mainstream philosophical historiography and thus kick off an enterprise destined to help bridge it. We believe it also helped frame our inquiry properly before heading out into our primary body of literature. The second part addresses the specifics of the Peirce-CJC relation. The objective is to clarify what enabled the establishment of the Peirce-CJC relation, how Peirce's references to the CJC are brought into play, and the extent to which the CJC and Peirce's doctrines of signs overlap. In so doing, we hope to have contributed to the understanding of the substance and minutiae of Peirce's recep-

[12]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Couto, Sebastião do", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019).

tion of the CJC. Thereby, the page is turned to gauge some of the retrospective and prospective insights that can be drawn from the results of our study. So it should be plain to see that we first and most importantly seeked to settle the doubt about whether Peirce could have worked out his way around signs by drawing from the CJC. As it will be seen below, Peirce never mentions the CJC in relation to his general doctrine of signs. Still, it is relative to such a doctrine that the impact of the CJC on Peirce is being taken as a matter of conviction among scholars.

Extended Awareness

To provide a more complete picture of the details of the Peirce-CJC relation, we have embarked on a search for eventual uses that Peirce made of the CJC, albeit sticking to his references to it. It is a fact that, after this study, not only does the impact of the CJC on Peirce on a variety of themes other than the doctrine of signs remains to be thoroughly examined—and our work can be invoked as no more than a springboard for such a purpose—but there is also an inkling that the impact of the CJC on Peirce may stretch far past the range of themes we have noted so far, raising the prospect of a fairly de-

manding investigative workload concerning the Peirce-CJC relation. Our findings suited the purpose of pointing out that Peirce made abundant use of the CJC from very early on in his life. Besides, we learned that the CJC informed Peirce's tenets across a diversified range of topics. These findings reinforced the common belief—mostly predicated on the logical affinity between the CJC and Peirce's definitions of the sign—that the impact of the CJC on Peirce has to do with the doctrine of signs. The same findings also brought us to the realization that the common belief about the Peirce-CJC relation is rather narrow, for the impact of the CJC on Peirce extends significantly beyond that. The Peirce-CJC relation was once real, and so it was whether someone is now aware of it or not: it had an awareness-independent dimension, this much is certain. Yet, that a relation is or has been awareness-independently real at all is one thing, and that it is acknowledged and understood is another, especially now that the reality of such a relation depends on there being some kind of awareness of it. As with people, also with relations being recognized means a step forward in terms of the dignity of their existence, above all when those involved in the relation are long since exiled far away from their worldly subjectivities.

A Brighter Past

Not merely but also to fuel the recognition of the Peirce-CJC relation, our hypothesis has been put to the test in a doctoral setting. We say "not merely" since, above all, what matters is that science proceeds in the direction of a constantly improved understanding of reality, and this is of course the primary thrust of our inquiry; yet this is not what differentiates our work from any other serious piece of research. This study is meant to mark a significant transition in terms of the recognition of the relevance of the once intersubjective, now purely objective Peirce-CJC relation in the scholarly ecossystem. As it happens that our hypothesis has been confirmed, there is a reasonable enough window of opportunity for the community of inquiry to derive the due consequences, most of all in improving historiographical accounts. So it follows, and the matter should come to the fore in the annals of the history of philosophy. Studies among other things on how far American pragmatism and contemporary semiotics are genetically rooted in Coimbra will have to be brought forth. This, however, while partly reliant on the successful results of our project, does not belong here and now. The important thing now is to contribute to achieving a more comprehensive un-

derstanding of the Peirce-CJC relation and pave the way for further research.

How It Works

According to a Jesuit

> "The two main functions of science are the framing and testing of conjectures [i.e. hypotheses]. The scientist puts questions to nature, attempts an answer [i.e. hypothesizes], and then examines nature to see how closely the conjectured answer agrees with nature. (...) It [Science] is, therefore, distinct from the thoroughly established truths, which a scientist may use or apply".[13]

How we shall proceed as far as our inquiry is concerned can be found succinctly expressed in Francis Reilly, S. J. (†2018) excerpt above. Yet, such is the scientific approach; why extend it to

[13]Francis E. Reilly, S. J. , *Charles Peirce's Theory of Scientific Method*, The Orestes Brownson Series on Contemporary Thought and Affairs 7 (New York: Fordham University Press, 1970), 31.

philosophical historiography? This is no extension since the field in which we are working is no less a significant segment of the economy of inquiry—the one that in 1902 Peirce considered to be "of all the branches of economy, (...) perhaps the most profitable" in terms of knowledge[14]—than any other area of our "complex and evolving scientific ecosystem".[15] A suitable answer to whether Peirce has at all derived his understanding of signs from the one of Couto cannot be other than scientific, so let us translate the above quotation (Reilly's) into our particular case. We framed our hypothesis in the first part and tested it in the second. In addition, some consequences of the results obtained have been drawn in the conclusion. The natural phenomenon on which we are focusing, though we were cautious not to succumb to the temptation of treating it as isolated from the rest of nature, is a textual corpus upon which we have called in a question, from which we have cast a hypothesis, and

[14]Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks, 8 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-1958), v. 7 par. 161.

See also Robert Junqueira, "China Historical Christian Database: Mapeamento Do Passado Cristão Da China", preprint (June 7, 2021), 2.

[15]Tom E. Hardwicke et al., "Calibrating the Scientific Ecosystem Through Meta-Research", *Annual Review of Statistics and Its Application* 7, no. 1 (2020): 3.

based on which we determined how much the hypothesis agrees with what we could find in nature. This proceeded with due respect, we should insist, to the relations of this corpus to the rest of nature, primarily literary and specifically scholarly, and therefore we have also resorted to a range of ancillary sources, some of which have surfaced along the way while others had already emerged as early as the design stage of our present work. So in order to address the general question regarding our methodology, we will simply state that it is scientific.

Drawing on Sources

Now let us turn our attention to the materials without which it would have been impossible to test our hypothesis, that is, our primary sources, which are the CJC and Peirce's writings. We will start with Peirce.

Peirce's Remains

To be sure, the fact that Peirce did not publish a single book throughout his entire life may suggest that he was not a prolific writer. However, the entire Peircean corpus amounts to nearly one hundred

thousand pages of verbal and non-verbal documents. After Peirce's death, in Milford, PA, his wife Juliette Peirce (†1934) offered his unpublished documents to the Department of Philosophy at Harvard University. Approximately eighty thousand pages of unimaginable complexity were packed in crates and shipped to Josiah Royce's (†1916) office. Josiah Royce, who is said to have friendly battled with William James (†1910) at Harvard over pragmatism and idealism, belonged to a second generation of pragmatists.[16] Differently from the former pragmatists, the second-phase pragmatists are said to have valued the "twin themes of historicity and enculturation".[17] This may be true of some of Peirce's contemporaries who also happen to be classified as pragmatists (such as James), but is it true of Peirce? Legitimate reservations may be raised in light

[16]See Cheryl Misak, *Cambridge Pragmatism: From Peirce and James to Ramsey and Wittgenstein*, First edition (Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press, 2016), 50 and Tiziana Cocchieri, "O signo e a experiência : a lógica semiótica de Charles Sanders Peirce" (Ph.D., Porto Alegre, RS, Pontifícia Universidade Católica do Rio Grande do Sul, 2018), 28.

[17]Joseph Margolis, *Pragmatism's Advantage: American and European Philosophy at the End of the Twentieth Century* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 2010), 68.

of Tullio Viola.[18] According to Margolis[19] "[p]ragmatism will simply expire if it fails to pursue the 'new' lines of inquiry just mentioned", i.e., enculturation and historicity. This is to the credit of the second pragmatists, like Royce, who understand that major authors, like Peirce, should be given a proper burial by preparing the ground for their historiographical assessment. Since 1915, Harvard University had the chance to take good care of such an immense treasure, but Royce's death, among other contingencies, slowed the ongoing workload.

Collected Papers

It was not until 1931-1935 that "a landmark event in American Philosophy" occurred: the publication of vols. 1-6 of the *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce* by the Harvard University Press, edited by Charles Hartshorne (†2000) and Paul Weiss (†2002). Volumes 7 and 8 of the *Collected Papers* appeared in 1958, edited by Arthur Walter Burks (†2008) completing the entirety of an anthology that "had an enormously stimulating influence on the study

[18] Read his *Peirce on the Uses of History, Peirceana* 4 (Berlim and Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2020).

[19] *Ut supra*, p. 36.

of Peirce's thought, and are still the standard source for Peirce's philosophical writings".[20] This holds true up to this day, for many of Peirce's late writings can be found published nowhere else but there. Therefore, the first source worth mentioning for accessing what is left of Peirce is found in the nearly 4000 pages of the *Collected Papers*. Yet, "as a dependable resource for the critical study of Peirce's thought as a whole", the *Collected Papers* are "notoriously inadequate", due to "an unwise principle of organization". Let us read on from the same source:

> "It was decided that Peirce's writings (except for most of his scientific and mathematical writings, which, though voluminous and important, were hardly considered at all) would be organized thematically according to Peirce's classification of the sciences, and to further that end chronological and textual considerations were given low priority. Lecture series were broken apart and published in separate volumes, single papers were

[20]Nathan Houser, "The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Peirce Papers", in *Signs of Humanity / L'homme et Ses Signes: Proceedings of the IVth International Congress / Actes Du IVe Congrès Mondial. International Association for Semiotic Studies / Association Internationale de Sémiotique. Barcelona/Perpignan, March 30-April 6, 1989*, ed. Gérard Deledalle, Michel Balat, and Janice Deledalle-Rhodes (Mouton de Gruyter, 1992), para. 1-12.

> cut in two, and under a single title might appear excerpts from writings composed more than thirty years apart".[21]

Nevertheless, the *Collected Papers* will be an invaluable source for our inquiry into Peirce's semiotic logic, for Peirce's last years are no less critical to our research that his earlier ones. So it is, for "[a]lthough Peirce's work in the theory of signs began as early as 1867, he devoted increasing attention to the subject in his later years".[22]

A Pouring Body of Manuscripts

There are a few scanned manuscripts available online; while these are worth looking at, the ones in Harvard University's Houghton Library seem not to be worth looking for yet, as they are said to

[21]Nathan Houser, "The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Peirce Papers", in *Signs of Humanity / L'homme et Ses Signes: Proceedings of the IVth International Congress / Actes Du IVe Congrès Mondial. International Association for Semiotic Studies / Association Internationale de Sémiotique. Barcelona/Perpignan, March 30-April 6, 1989*, ed. Gérard Deledalle, Michel Balat, and Janice Deledalle-Rhodes (Mouton de Gruyter, 1992), para. 12.

[22]Charles S. Hardwick and James Cook, eds., "Introduction", in *Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Lady Victoria Welby*, by Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Welby (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), xxviii.

be "still in substantial disarray" and face "significant restrictions on space".[23] Harvard University is not to blame exclusively, for the task it faces is no easy ride. The Peirce Edition Project also finds it rather arduous to handle Peirce's writings, and there are grounds why so much of the material written by Peirce after 1890 still has yet to be made public. In the literature, a line of criticism is to be found against Peirce himself. What we read is that what Peirce wrote is, to begin with, "far from being well established", and also that

> "Peirce himself acknowledged several times the state of confusion of his papers, scattered in various places around his house, on the floor, on bookshelves, in boxes, on his desk, everywhere in piles which may have known at some point some kind of order, but an order that was bound to disappear through the sheer accumulation of it all. We can get a fair representation of Peirce the man by imagining him as what he himself called a 'papyrobite', a person born with a pen in hand and whose whole destiny was to put down his own mind on paper. Peirce simply could not help it: he was driven to write, all

[23] Cornelis de Waal, "Preface", in *Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words: 100 Years of Semiotics, Communication and Cognition*, ed. Torkild Thellefsen and Bent Sørensen, Semiotics, Communication and Cognition, v. 14 (Boston: De Gruyter Mouton, 2014), xi.

the time, and the beauty, or the genius, of it was that he never wrote anything simply for the sake of blackening paper—but always for the sake of furthering human thought, whatever the topic was".[24]

X Peircean Achievements

We will also take full advantage of some other compilations of Peirce's writings that have been published throughout the last seven decades or so, namely:

— *Philosophical Writings of Peirce*, edited by Justus Buchler (†1991);[25] This selection, also not organized chronologically, was intended to contain "Peirce's best work" and be "thoroughly representative of his philosophy as a whole". In addition, "[t]he order of the chapters has been determined partly by Peirce's classification of the sciences, but more largely by appropriateness in the unfolding of his views (or in baldly subjective terms, by my [Buchler's] own sense of consecutiveness)".[26]

[24]André De Tienne, "The Peirce Papers: How to Pick up Manuscripts That Fell to the Floor", *Text* 10 (1997): 260.

[25]Charles S. Peirce, *Philosophical Writings of Peirce*, ed. Justus Buchler (New York: Dover Publications, 1955).

[26]Id., "Preface", in the work just mentioned above, vii–viii.

— *Charles Sanders Peirce: Contributions to "The Nation"*, *Part One: 1869-1893*, *Part Two: 1894-1900*, and *Part Three: 1901-1908*, edited Kenneth Laine Ketner and James Edwards Cook; *Part Four* is an index that may turn out to be useful;[27]

— *Semiotic and significs: the correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Lady Victoria Welby*, edited by Charles S. Hardwick and J. E. Cook;[28] This book covers the entire correspondence (1903-11) between Peirce and Lady Victoria Welby-Gregory (†1912). The correspondence between Victoria and Charles "presents an ongoing chronicle of developing thought"; such a continuity, according to the former president of the Metaphysical Society of America (1996), "speaks to the beginning student of Peirce but also to the established scholar; to the reader looking for technical insights into Peirce's philosophy,

[27]Charles S. Peirce, *Charles Sanders Peirce: Contributions to "The Nation", Part One: 1869-1893*, ed. Kenneth Laine Ketner and James E. Cook (Texas: Texas Tech University Press, 1975); Charles S. Peirce, *Charles Sanders Peirce: Contributions to "The Nation", Part Two: 1894-1900*, ed. Kenneth L. Ketner and James E. Cook (Texas: Texas Tech University Press, 1978); Charles S. Peirce, *Charles Sanders Peirce: Contributions to "The Nation", Part Three: 1901-1908*, ed. Kenneth Laine Ketner and James E. Cook (Texas: Texas Tech University Press, 1979); Kenneth L. Ketner, *Charles Sanders Peirce: Contributions to "The Nation", Part Four: Index* (Texas: Texas Tech University Press, 1987).

[28]Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Welby, *Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Lady Victoria Welby*, ed. Charles S. Hardwick and James Cook (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977).

as well as to the reader wanting to gain a 'feel' not for Peirce the philosopher but for Peirce the individual. Further, it speaks not only to those interested in semiotic; for the philosophic contents of Peirce's letters reflect a characteristic of his philosophic thought in general: individual ideas emerge within the context of a continuity of interrelating and interwoven themes".[29]

— *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1: 1857-1866, Volume 2: 1867-1871, Volume 3: 1872–1878, Volume 4: 1879-1884, Volume 5: 1884-1886, Volume 6: 1886-1890, Volume 8: 1890-1892*, edited by the Peirce Edition Project;[30] for some reason, Volume

[29]Sandra B. Rosenthal, "Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Lady Victoria Welby (Review)", *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 17, no. 4 (1979): 487.

[30]Charles S. Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 1: 1857-1866*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982); Charles S. Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 2: 1867-1871*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984); Charles S. Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 3: 1872–1878*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986); Charles S. Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 4: 1879–1884*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989); Charles S. Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 5: 1884-1886*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); Charles S. Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 6: 1886-1890*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000); Charles S. Peirce,

7 remains unpublished. As to the pace of the Peirce Edition Project, especially in recent years, a few questions have already been asked of its current Director.[31] Volume 7 will be consecrated to the nearly six thousand definitions written by Peirce for the *Century Dictionary* (CD), one of the most extensive encyclopedic dictionaries of the English language.[32] Although still *in fieri*, the Peirce Edition Project intends to provide, through the *Writings*, a chronologically arranged, reliable critical edition of the broadest selection of Peirce's writings to date. We are assured that the Peirce Project has developed its editorial policies in such a way as to guarantee that "the desired scholarly standard is achieved"; so "the Project hopes to produce an edition of about thirty volumes which will include numerous previously unpublished writings, exhibit the development and coherence of Peirce's thought, provide a context that will give new meaning and,

Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 8: 1890–1892, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington ; Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2010).

[31]See "What Is Happening to the Peirce Project? Interview with André De Tienne, Director of the Peirce Edition Project, Indiana and Purdue University at Indianapolis, by Michelle Bella and Giovanni Maddalena", *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy* VIII, no. 2 (2016).

[32]On the Peirce-CD relation see Orin Hargraves, "The Century Dictionary Definitions of Charles Sanders Peirce", *Dictionaries: Journal of the Dictionary Society of North America* 40, no. 2 (2019): 31–53.

perhaps, importance to previously known works, and, overall, provide the authoritative Peirce text for years to come".[33] Sadly, though relying on the already published volumes will be imperative to our research, the publication of the whole *Writings* series will not happen as soon as we would need it to fulfill the requirements of our research plan, and perhaps it will not happen during our time on earth. We hoped that we would have been allowed to rely at least on volume 9, as its publication seemed likely to be in its final countdown when our project began. By the way, it should have already happened by then. Indeed, it was announced that it would "be out at the end of 2017".[34]

— *Peirce on Signs: Writings on Semiotic by Charles Sanders Peirce*, edited by James Hoopes;[35] This anthology was meant to provide us with a

[33]Nathan Houser, "The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Peirce Papers", in *Signs of Humanity / L'homme et Ses Signes: Proceedings of the IVth International Congress / Actes Du IVe Congrès Mondial. International Association for Semiotic Studies / Association Internationale de Sémiotique. Barcelona/Perpignan, March 30-April 6, 1989*, ed. Gérard Deledalle, Michel Balat, and Janice Deledalle-Rhodes (Mouton de Gruyter, 1992), para. 17.

[34]Michelle Bella, Giovanni Maddalena, and André De Tienne, "What Is Happening to the Peirce Project? Interview with André De Tienne, Director of the Peirce Edition Project, Indiana and Purdue University at Indianapolis, by Michelle Bella and Giovanni Maddalena", *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy* VIII, no. 2 (2016), 2.

[35]Charles S. Peirce, *Peirce on Signs: Writings on Semiotic by Charles Sanders*

broad survey of Peirce's writings on semiotics, and aimed at showing that semiotics is at the center of Peirce's philosophical legacy. Accordingly, "Readers well acquainted with Peirce's writings on signs will recognize how limited in scope this edition is. But no single volume could provide an entirely comprehensive survey of Peirce's intricate analyses of the various types and divisions of signs. The object of this volume is to offer a general overview of his semiotic theory".[36]

— *The essential Peirce: selected philosophical writings, Volume 1: 1867-1893* and *Volume 2: 1893-1913*, edited by the Peirce Edition Project;[37] Volume 2 is of particular interest to the community of inquiry for identical reasons to the ones mentioned above in relation to the *Collected Papers*. It exceeds the number of five hundred pages, of which just nearly fifty were written in the (late) nineteenth century; the remaining pages are part of Peirce's twentieth-century output.

Peirce, ed. James Hoopes (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1991).

[36]James Hoopes, "Introduction", in *ibid.*, 5.

[37]Charles S. Peirce, *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 1: 1867-1893*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992); Charles S. Peirce, *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2: 1893-1913*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998).

The documents selected for this volume belong to the period when Peirce produced "his most fully developed theory of signs and many of his subtle and refined metaphysical theories". As the Peirce Edition Project appended, "[i]t was also during these later years that his interest in pragmatism was rekindled and that, in an attempt to work out a proof of his pragmatism, he put into service his unique system of graphical logic (his Existential Graphs) alongside his categories and his theory of signs".[38] In the first volume, we can find the curtain-raiser to both volumes; though, as can be read in the second one, "no attempt was made [there] to represent Peirce's intellectual development during his last two decades".[39] According to Houser and Christian Kloesel (†2006), the first volume "as a whole may be considered reliable from a textual point of view", and presents a particularity in that it includes six manuscripts and typescripts that had not yet been published; additionally, we are forewarned that "Peirce was fifty-three years old when the final paper in this volume was published in 1893. He would live for another twenty-one years and, during that time, would produce his most fully developed theory of signs and many of his most subtle and profound metaphysical theories. (...) As the present volume ends, Peirce has not yet arrived

[38]Peirce Edition Project, "Preface", in the second volume just mentioned, xi–xii.

[39]Nathan Houser, "Introduction" in the second volume just referred to, xvii.

at many of the views described in the Introduction".[40]

— Incidentally, in the same year that the second volume of the *Essential Peirce* was printed (1998), a clastic edition of Peirce's writings translated to Portuguese by António Machuco Rosa was published in Portugal.[41] According to Rosa, "... once the inevitably subjective selection of the texts was made, we followed the principle of publishing the texts as integrally as possible (... *seguiu-se a política de, feita a inevitavelmente subjectiva escolha de textos, os publicar tão integralmente quanto possível*)".[42] It is far from manifest which principle did Rosa use to organize the selected texts, as the chronological order was not respected after the fourth (out of twelve) translated text(s) incorporated into the anthology. Nevertheless, Rosa's nearly three hundred pages-long work symbolizes a landmark in the reception of Peirce in Portugal, containing texts ranging from 1867 to 1907. The four decades embraced by Rosa's anthology supersede the thirty-five years (1857-1892) comprehended by the seven already published volumes of the *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition*.

[40]Nathan Houser and Christian J. W. Kloesel, "Foreword", in volume one documented above, xiii–xiv.

[41]Charles S. Peirce, *Antologia Filosófica*, ed. and trans. António Machuco Rosa (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 1998).

[42]António Machuco Rosa, "Prefácio", in *Ibid.*, 14.

— *Prolegomena to a Science of Reasoning: Phaneroscopy, Semeiotic, Logic*, edited by Elize Bisanz;[43] Here is yet another pearl for the community of inquiry in this list of treasures, some certainly more critical than others as far as our study is concerned. This book aggregates seventeen pieces of Peirce's mature thought, of which fifteen were previously unpublished manuscripts. Peirce's late manuscripts are at the core of this collection. The only two texts which had been previously published are certainly relevant on their own, though, in this set such texts "also serve as a concise summary and preview of the key points that are handled in the manuscripts [*fungieren zugleich als eine kurze Zusammenfassung und Vorschau für die in den Manuskripten behandelten Schwerpunkte]*".[44] Late Peirce's unpublished manuscripts may play a decisive role in future inquiries on all matters related to Peirce, including the Peirce-CJC relation, so efforts such as Bisanz's (as well as others') are to be wholeheartedly lauded. In 2009, for the first time in history, a collection of Peirce's writings published in *The Monist* appeared. The work was organized by none other than Bisanz under the auspices of the now-extinct

[43]Charles S. Peirce, *Prolegomena to a Science of Reasoning: Phaneroscopy, Semeiotic, Logic*, ed. Elize Bisanz (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang GmbH, 2016).

[44]Elize Bisanz, "Phaneroscopy, Semeiotik, Logik. Eine Einführung", in the mentioned book, 22. Our translation.

Akademie Verlag; the title is *The Logic of Interdisciplinarity.* The Monist-*Series*. A significant body of Peirce's writings with widespread resonance up to the present day were published in *The Monist*, among them "The Architecture of Theories" (1891), "The Law of Mind" (1892), and "Evolutionary Love" (1893). We were unable to access the 2009 volume edited by Bisanz, but Peirce's writings listed above and some others are available on the Web.[45] The journal *The Monist*, by the way, is alive and kicking to this very day.[46]

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[45]Check https://archive.org/details/C.S.Peirces5FamousTheMonistPapers.

[46]Visit https://academic.oup.com/monist). According to what Kermit Snelson shared with us via email on January 14, 2023, the Peircean cultural movement known to us as 'semiotics' has its roots in Chicago, originating in the editorial venues of *The Monist* in which, since the 1890s, a number of Peirce's writings were published. In light of the extraordinary convergence of intellectual trends in both the city and the University of Chicago throughout the twentieth century, one can safely suggest that John Deely, who was born in Chicago, grew up in a golden cradle. Snelson brought the situation into focus very vividly when he drew our attention to the fact that, also in the 1890s, two very well-known students of Peirce—to wit, Thorstein Veblen (†1929) and John Dewey (†1952)—were recruited to the University of Chicago, plus that throughout the 1930s and 1950s, there were figures in Chicago such as Walter Pitts (†1969) working on cybernetics, Rudolf Carnap (†1970) on logic, Nicolas Rashevsky (†1972) on mathematical biology, Ludwig von Bertalanffy (†1972) on general systems theory, and Thomas Sebeok (†2001), first on linguistics and later more broadly on semiotics. Names highly praised in Coimbra such as Roderick McKenzie (†1940), Robert Park (†1944), and Ernest Burgess (†1966), who strove to incorporate the principles of ecology into the social sciences, most notably in the case of urban space studies, could perchance be added to Snelson's list. See, for example, Vítor Manuel

— *Charles S. Peirce. Selected Writings on Semiotics, 1894–1912*, edited by Francesco Bellucci;[47] We should at this point thank Professor Doctor Robert Lane, for it was through an email received from him on January 11 (2023) that we became aware of the outstanding achieve-

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da Cruz Durães Vilas Boas, "A Música como Estratégia Didática em Geografia para Aprendizagens dos Problemas Urbanos" (Mestrado, Coimbra, Portugal, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra, 2020), 9. At the time that Sebeok was a student there, according to Snelson, the University of Chicago was the institutional shelter of two philosophical trends that were in sharp opposition: the movement for the unity of the sciences as organized by Charles Morris (†1979), Sebeok's mentor, and the neo-Aristotelian and neo-Thomistic movement represented by Deely's master, Mortimer Adler (†2001). Were it not for this patchwork of influxes at the University of Chicago at the time Sebeok was studying there, Snelson argued conclusively, Deely as we know him would not have emerged. During the course of this study, some of the topics touched upon by Snelson will be further developed. Snelson is one of the names that should have been included in the acknowledgments above, had we not been forced—by the countless number of debts we have contracted—to avoid mentioning any names there. Snelson served, alongside Bisanz, as a member of the Scientific Council of the *IO2S Deely - International Open Seminar on Semiotics: a Tribute to John Deely on the Fifth Anniversary of His Passing* (https://www.uc.pt/fluc/uidief/act/io2s), and he was also one of the *IO2S Deely* lecturers. See Kermit Snelson, "The Role of Mnemosemiotics in Deely's 'Grand Vision'", *IO2S Deely*, 2022. Also, be sure to read Id., "The Throne of Mnemosyne: Pragmatism and Emergence as Aspects of Organic Memory", *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy* XI, no. 2 (2019) and Id., "Why Things Have Outlines: Steps to a Logic of Borders", in *Semiotics 2019: New Frontiers in Semiotics* (Semiotic Society of America, 2020), 15–29.

[47]Charles S. Peirce, *Charles S. Peirce. Selected Writings on Semiotics, 1894–1912*, ed. Francesco Bellucci (De Gruyter, 2020).

ment of the editor of this work, apart from his merits as an author, of which we were already aware.[48]

— *Logic of the future: writings on existential graphs. Volume 1: History*

[48]Anyone wishing to read Bellucci may begin by reading: Francesco Bellucci, "Peirce and the Unity of the Proposition", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 50, no. 2 (2014): 201-2019; Francesco Bellucci, "Inferences from Signs: Peirce and the Recovery of the Σημεῖον", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 52, no. 2 (2016): 259–84; Francesco Bellucci, "Philosophy of Notation in the 19th Century. Peirce, Husserl, and All the Others on Inclusion and Assertion", in *Peirce and Husserl: Mutual Insights on Logic, Mathematics and Cognition*, ed. Mohammad Shafiei and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019), 61–75. The aforementioned man, to whom we are grateful—while also being most grateful to Bellucci and Shafiei for their respective contributions to the *IO2S Deely*; to the latter we owe an unbounded additional sense of indebtedness due to the edition "His Glassy Essence in Relation" of the Charles S. Peirce Society's *10-Minute Thesis Initiative* (18 Fev. 2023), an edition jointly organized in an institutional capacity of course by the Charles S. Peirce Society but also by the Coimbra Institute for Philosophical Studies and Shahid Beheshti University, represented by Aaron Wilson, António Manuel Martins, Mohammad Shafiei, Richard Kenneth Atkins, and Robert Junqueira, the second, the third, and the last all having presented papers, while the first one having presided over the proceedings and the second to last been responsible for creating the bridge that enabled it all to take place—, is the author, *inter alia*, of: Robert Lane, "Persons, Signs, Animals: A Peircean Account of Personhood", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 45, no. 1 (2009): 1-26 and "Peircean Semiotic Indeterminacy and Its Relevance for Biosemiotics", in *Peirce and Biosemiotics: A Guess at the Riddle of Life*, ed. Vinícius Romanini and Eliseo Fernández, Biosemiotics 11 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 51–78.

and applications and *Volume 2 Part 1: The Logical Tracts* and *Part 2: The 1903 Lowell Lectures*, edited by Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen.[49] It is worth noting that the editor authored far more than 300 monumental pages in these three volumes, primarily concerned with introducing them, and it is beyond apparent that what Pietarinen and Bellucci are doing with respect to the Peirceana series has just begun and is already an epoch-making enterprise.

The CJC

As we will see, in his studies, Peirce relied on more than one volume of the CJC: the *De Anima*[50] and the *Dialectica*.[51] Part of the *De Anima* has been recently published in a bilingual Latin-Portuguese

[49]Charles S. Peirce, *Logic of the Future: Writings on Existential Graphs. Volume 1: History and Applications*, ed. Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Peirceana, Volume 1 (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2020); Charles S. Peirce, *Logic of the Future: Writings on Existential Graphs. Part 1: The Logical Tracts*, ed. Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Peirceana, Volume 2 (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2021); Charles S. Peirce, *Logic of the Future: Writings on Existential Graphs. Part 2: The 1903 Lowell Lectures*, ed. Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Peirceana, Volume 2 (Berlin and Boston: De Gruyter, 2021).

[50]Manuel de Góis, Baltasar Álvares, and Cosme de Magalhães, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis S. J. In Tres Libros de Anima Aristotelis Stagiritæ* (Coimbra: A. Mariz, 1598).

[51]Sebastião do Couto, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritæ* (Coimbra: D. G. Loureyro, 1606).

edition.[52] Part of the *Dialectica* has been translated and published in English and Portuguese, as will be detailed later. The eight volumes of the CJC[53] all received our careful regard, but only the ones explicitly referred to by Peirce were used as primary sources, along with the *Parva Naturalia*—irrespective of how necessary this volume has turned out to be for the sake of bringing this project to completion—, due to reasons that will become transparent below. The *Parva Naturalia*, the *Ethica*, and the first part of the volume *On the Heavens* were recently published in bilingual Latin-Portuguese

[52]Manuel de Góis, *Curso Aristotélico Jesuíta Conimbricense. Tomo IV: De Anima - Parte I*, trans. Maria da Conceição Camps, Coimbra University Press, Classica Digitalia: Portugaliæ Monumenta Neolatina (Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2022).

[53]Apart from the two we have already mentioned above, the CJC volumes are: Manuel de Góis, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis S. J. In Octo Libros Physicorum Aristotelis Stagiritæ* (Coimbra: A. Mariz, 1592); Manuel de Góis, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis S. J. In Libros Aristotelis, Qui Parva Naturalia Appellantur* (Lisboa: S. Lopes, 1593); Manuel de Góis, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis S. J. In Quatuor Libros de Cœlo Aristotelis Stagiritæ* (Lisboa: S. Lopes, 1593); Manuel de Góis, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu In Libros Meteororum Aristotelis* (Lisboa: S. Lopes, 1593); Manuel de Góis, *In Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis Ad Nicomachum, Aliquot Conimbricensis Cursus Disputationes in Quibus Praecipua Quaedam Ethicæ Disciplinæ Capita Continentur* (Lisboa: S. Lopes, 1593); Manuel de Góis, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis S. J. In Duos Libros De Generatione et Corruptione Aristotelis Stagiritæ* (Coimbra: A. Mariz, 1597).

editions.[54]

Fonseca's *Instructions*

Had we had the opportunity to have other works at even greater use than what we had, it would really have been excellent. Beyond—albeit in deep relation to—the corpus of the CJC, we are referring above all to Fonseca's *Dialectical Instructions*,[55] which is of high relevance to the study of the logic of the CJC. The Lusophone readership can have access to detailed research on Fonseca.[56] An

[54]Manuel de Góis, *Curso Aristotélico Jesuíta Conimbricense. Tomo I: Comentários Aos Livros Denominados 'Parva Naturalia'*, trans. Bernardino Fernando da Costa Marques, Classica Digitalia: Portugaliae Monumenta Neolatina (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2020); Manuel de Góis, *Curso Aristotélico Jesuíta Conimbricense. Tomo II: Ethica*, trans. Mário Santiago de Carvalho, Classica Digitalia: Portugaliae Monumenta Neolatina (Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2020); Manuel de Góis, *Curso Aristotélico Jesuíta Conimbricense. Tomo III: De Caelo - Parte I*, trans. António Guimarães Pinto, Classica Digitalia: Portugaliae Monumenta Neolatina (Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2021).

[55]Pedro da Fonseca, *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo* (Lisboa: Ioannis Blauij, 1564). This work has been translated into Portuguese: Pedro da Fonseca, *Instituições Dialécticas*, trans. Joaquim Ferreira Gomes, 2 vols., Cultura Portuguesa (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 1964).

[56]See first and foremost António Manuel Martins, *Lógica e Ontologia Em Pedro da Fonseca* (Lisboa: Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian and Junta Nacional de Investigação Científica e Tecnológica, 1994).

English-language introductory reading on Fonseca is openly accessible.[57]. The same readership will also find it worthwhile to read the first-ever English-language collection of essays devoted to Pedro da Fonseca, featuring some of the most respected active members of the scholarly world.[58] Since Fonseca's *Instructions* are not prima facie and technically CJC volumes, we are going to provide some explanatory words. The mentioned complementarity is owed to the fact that, presumably to avoid going on for many more pages and because he recognized in Fonseca's work a solid source of knowledge, Couto ended up at times[59] suggesting to those interested in deepening this or that matter that they should do so in Fonseca's *Dialectical Instructions*. Peirce seems to have failed to read Fonseca, but relying as he did on the CJC, he was necessarily well acquainted with Fonseca's name and worth. Resorting to Fonseca may once and again serve to clarify the origin of one or another the-

[57]See Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Fonseca, Pedro da", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2020)

[58]We mean Simone Guidi and Mário Santiago de Carvalho's, eds., *Pedro da Fonseca. Humanism and Metaphysics* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2023).

[59]E.g. Sebastião do Couto, *The Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs*, trans. John P. Doyle, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 38 (Milwaukee, Wis: Marquette University Press, 2001), 56-57.

oretical stance, as well as to further examine the views of the CJC; for when Couto instructs the reader to go to Fonseca's pages in order to find more information on a particular topic, then Fonseca's perspective on the matter should be interpreted as prolonging or being prolonged by the pages of the CJC.

Three CJC Volumes

Three volumes of the CJC have been included at the outset in our basic literary corpus:

— the *Parva Naturalia*, published in 1593, Lisbon, by the Printer Simão Lopes and written by Góis. The *Parva Naturalia* was the first of the Portuguese translations of the CJC to be printed by the Coimbra University Press (see above). This publication inaugurated the twenty-first-century translation and printing—bilingual Latin-Portuguese editions—in Coimbra of the whole CJC. The "psycho and physiological matters" of the one hundred and four pages-long *Parva Naturalia* should always be studied "as an appendix to the *De Anima*",[60] meaning that, when dealing for example with the impact of *On the Soul* on

[60]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Cursus Conimbricensis", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019).

Peirce, it may not be feasible to handle some details of the rational psychology of the CJC without taking this "appendix" into account;

— the *De Anima*, published in Coimbra by the Printer António de Mariz in 1598 and written by Góis, Álvares, and Magalhães. The five hundred and ninety pages-long volume *On the Soul* is the third largest volume of the CJC. Both Peirce and the Peirce Edition Project referred to the *De Anima*,[61] the second most significant primary source for our inquiry in terms of the volumes of the CJC, the first being the one that follows now;

— the *Dialectica*, composed by Couto. This handbook on logic was published in two tomes in 1606, in Coimbra's Printing House of the *Universitatis Architypographus* Dias Gomes Loureiro. The one thousand and fifty-nine (four hundred and thirty-one plus six hundred and twenty-eight) pages-long volume was kept as minute as possible due to pedagogical concerns, as Couto was aware of writing *pro schola libellum*.[62] The *Dialectica* includes a central piece for our project:

[61] Charles S. Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 2: 1867-1871*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 117 and 635 plus Charles S. Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 4: 1879–1884*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 596 and 687.

[62] Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritæ. Editorial History", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de

Couto's *doctrina signorum*.

While acknowledging that some treatment of signs in dealing with Aristotle's (†322 BCE) *De Interpretatione* was habitual among Scholastic philosophers—particularly in addressing the first chapter, "a preliminary chapter" in the internal order of the *De Interpretatione*, devoted to "signification and different ways of signifying"[63]—, John Doyle (†2016) considered the treatise on signs contained in Couto's *On the Whole of Dialectics* to stand as "the first really major seventeenth-century treatise on signs", as well as to "display an understanding of the breadth and scope of semiotics itself".[64]

Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2018).

[63]Henri DuLac, "The *Peri Hermeneias:* Its Place in Logic and Its Order", *Laval Théologique et Philosophique* 5, no. 2 (1949): 163.

[64]John P. Doyle, "Introduction", in *The Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs*, by Sebastião do Couto, trans. John P. Doyle, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 38 (Milwaukee, Wis: Marquette University Press, 2001), 17–18.

State of the Art

Overall Picture

General Sign Studies

At the center of our focus is Peirce, an extraordinary American thinker. Peirce taught Logic at Johns Hopkins University between 1879 and 1884, when he occupied his only academic position. During this period, outstanding thinkers like Veblen, Christine Ladd-Franklin (†1930), and Dewey were his students. The merits given to Peirce are far from insignificant. It remains the case today that Peirce—of whom Roman Jakobson (†1982) is reported to have declared verbatim to think he was "much too good" for Harvard University[65]—is "something of a cult figure, with his bearded portrait occasionally decorating T-shirts".[66] Peirce, who many consider hav-

[65]Thomas A. Sebeok, "Foreword", in *Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life*, by Joseph Brent (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), x.

[66]Ibid., xii.

ing founded philosophical pragmatism[67], is often referred to as the pioneer behind semiotics as it is understood and practiced nowadays.[68] Of course, semiotics has no shortage of definitions to be found in the scholarly literature. We can find all kinds of definitions[69] and then there are a couple more. "It is impossible to establish a consensus among all semioticians on what semiotics is all

[67]E.g., Donald N. Levine, "Dialogues of the Nations: Revisiting Visions and Its Critics", *The Sociological Quarterly* 42, no. 1 (January 1, 2001): 113; Husein Inusah, "Epistemology under the Pen of Rorty: A Critical Study of Rorty's Pragmatism" (Master's Thesis, University of Cape Coast, 2010), 44; Nate Jackson, "Common Sense and Pragmatism: Reid and Peirce on the Justification of First Principles", *Journal of Scottish Philosophy* 12, no. 2 (2014): 169; and Kenneth W. Jacobs, "A Pragmatic Sign Theory of Truth for the Behavioral Sciences", *Journal of Contextual Behavioral Science* 16 (2020): 173.

[68]E.g., António Manuel Martins, "De Peirce a Habermas. Sobre a(s) Teoria(s) Intersubjectiva(s) Da Verdade", *Biblos* LV (1979): 434; Mauricio Beuchot and John Deely, "Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot", *The Review of Metaphysics* 48, no. 3 (1995): 541; Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio, "Semioethics as a Vocation of Semiotics. In the Wake of Welby, Morris, Sebeok, Rossi-Landi", in *Semiotics and Its Masters*, ed. Kristian Bankov and Paul Cobley, Semiotics, Communication and Cognition, volume 18 (Boston and Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2017), 29; Pedro Atã and João Queiroz, "Emergent Sign-Action", *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy* 11, no. 2 (2019): 2; and László Blutman, "The Language and Logic of Inquiry: Some Basic Problems", *SSRN Scholarly Paper* (Rochester, NY, 2021): 14.

[69]See Kalevi Kull et al., "A Hundred Introductions to Semiotics, for a Million Students: Survey of Semiotics Textbooks and Primers in the World", *Sign Systems Studies* 43, no. 2/3 (2015): 281–346.

about".[70] Sonesson (†2023) was probably right, but it is worth noting a few fine instances here in which quite a bit of common ground emerges, despite the specificities of each particular example:

> "Semiotics is (...) the theoretical accounting for signs and what they do";[71]
>
> "Semiotics is both a *science*, with its own corpus of findings and its theories, and a *technique* for studying anything that produces signs";[72]
>
> "Semiotics is the field devoted to the study of signs – what they are, how they are used, and what must be true of a world in which signification, interpretation and meaning are possible";[73]

[70]Göran Sonesson, "Beyond Methods and Models. Semiotics as a Distinctive Discipline and an Intellectual Tradition", *Signs - International Journal of Semiotics* 2 (2008): 319.

[71]John Deely, *Basics of Semiotics*, Advances in Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 105.

[72]Thomas A. Sebeok, *Signs: An Introduction to Semiotics*, 2nd ed, Toronto Studies in Semiotics and Communication (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 5.

[73]Andrew Robinson, *God and the World of Signs: Trinity, Evolution, and the Metaphysical Semiotics of C.S. Peirce*, Philosophical Studies in Science and Religion, v. 2 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 15.

> "While semiotics is concerned with signs, which is directly similar to code, semantics is concerned with its message, sense and meaning";[74]
>
> "Semiotics focuses on signs, or signifying systems...";[75]
>
> "Semiotics is an inclusive term for various research efforts, but all versions of semiotics concern signs";[76]
>
> "Semiotics is the study of signs, sign systems and meaning";[77]
>
> "Basically, semiotics deals with signs".[78]

Semiotics, Peircean or not, revolves around signs. All human activities are conditioned to be driven by the action of signs of this or that kind, and consequently all such activities are within the

[74]Peter Emmanuel A. Mara, "The Capable Human Being and the Role of Language in Paul Ricoeur's Hermeneutical Philosophical Anthropology", *KRITIKE: An Online Journal of Philosophy* 5, no. 1 (2011): 53.

[75]Rebekah Rousi, *From Cute to Content: User Experience from a Cognitive Semiotic Perspective* (Jyväskylä: Jyväskylän yliopisto, 2013), 39.

[76]Rachel Lawes, "Science and Semiotics: What's the Relationship?", *International Journal of Market Research* 60, no. 6 (2018): 575.

[77]Min Niu, "Semiotics and Semiosics: The Terminological Connotations and Conceptual Relations", *International Journal of New Developments in Education* 2, no. 3 (2020): 8.

[78]Mutia Apriyanti Hamsir, Ratna Ayu Damayanti, and Aini Indrijawati, "The Meaning of Triple Bottom Line in Sustainability Reporting", *International Journal of Innovative Science and Research Technology* 6, no. 1 (2021): 346.

purview of the general studies on signs, that is, semiotic studies, so it seems hardly surprising to observe that Peirce's definition of the sign constitutes one of his most critical inputs to the research community. Indeed, a vast body of research has been devoted to studying Peirce's account of signs,[79] i.e., the object of semiotics; or likewise "semiotic logic". For Peirce, to say semiotics is to mean

[79]E.g. Gary Sanders, "Peirce's Sixty-Six Signs?", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 6, no. 1 (1970): 3–16; Hanna Buczynska-Garewicz, "Peirce's Method of Triadic Analysis of Signs", *Semiotica* 26, no. 3–4 (1979); Richard J. Parmentier, "Signs' Place In Medias Res: Peirce's Concept of Semiotic Mediation", in *Semiotic Mediation* (Elsevier, 1985), 23–48; Robert G. Meyers, "Peirce's New Way of Signs", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 28, no. 3 (1992): 505–21; Floyd Merrell, *Peirce, Signs, and Meaning*, Toronto Studies in Semiotics (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1997); Gérard Deledalle, *Charles S. Peirce's Philosophy of Signs: Essays in Comparative Semiotics*, Advances in Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000); Albert Atkin, "Peirce's Final Account of Signs and the Philosophy of Language", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 44, no. 1 (2008): 63–85; Id., "Peirce's Theory of Signs", in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Edward N. Zalta, 2013 (Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, 2013); Mogens Kilstrup, "Naturalizing Semiotics: The Triadic Sign of Charles Sanders Peirce as a Systems Property", *Progress in Biophysics and Molecular Biology* 119, no. 3 (2015): 563–75; Tony Jappy, *Peirce's Twenty-Eight Classes of Signs and the Philosophy of Representation: Rhetoric, Interpretation and Hexadic Semiosis*, Bloomsbury Advances in Semiotics 1 (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, an imprint of Bloomsbury Publishing PIc, 2017); and James Liszka, "Reductionism in Peirce's Sign Classifications and Its Remedy", *Semiotica*, no. 228 (May 2019): 153–72.

logic in another fashion[80] and the other way around (see below). A number of distinguished experts in the field have embraced this formulation, i.e. "semiotic logic", in referring to Peirce's semiotics[81] and Peirce has indeed penned that logic is "synonymous with semeiotic [*sic*], the pure theory of signs in general",[82] and also that "in the present state of knowledge logic should be regarded as coëxtensive [*sic*] with General Semeiotic".[83] Logic means semiotics and semiotics means logic and can either be regarded as logic in general or general semiotics—pertaining to all 'sign-dependent' matters and therefore to interpretation beyond any possible exception—or as a liberal art or applied semiotics, pertaining to all matters involving

[80]See Gérard Deledalle, *Charles S. Peirce's Philosophy of Signs: Essays in Comparative Semiotics*, Advances in Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 78 and Martin Švantner, "Struggle of a Description: Peirce and His Late Semiotics", *Human Affairs* 24, no. 2 (2014): 204.

[81](E.g. Michael Hoffmann, "Problems with Peirce's Concept of Abduction", *Foundations of Science* 4, no. 3 (1999): 271–305; Dinda L. Gorlée, "Hints and Guesses: Legal Modes of Semio-Logical Reasoning", *Sign Systems Studies* 33, no. 2 (2005): 239–71; Donald Favareau, "Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Biosemiotics", *Biosemiotics* 14, no. 3 (2021): 603–15; André De Tienne, "Peirce on the Symbolical Foundation of Personhood", *Eidos. A Journal for Philosophy of Culture* 5, no. 4 (2022): 79–100.

[82]Charles S. Peirce, "Miscellaneous Fragments [R]" ([nd]): MS [R] S104.

[83]Charles S. Peirce, "Preface. MS [R] 634" (1909).

the interpretation of linguistic signs—independently of whether we have full control over a verbal language[84] (as it is possible in the use of artificial languages) or not (as happens when it comes to natural languages)—alone. In the former sense, semiotic logic, logic, or semiotics is nothing but the study of signs understood as signs over and above the divide between linguistic and non-linguistic signs; in the latter sense, it is the study of linguistic signs in their capacity as linguistic signs. An appealing, up-to-date view on semiotic logic rooted in studies devoted above all to Peirce can be read in Deely's posthumous opus:

> "... in the case of cognitive organisms, [logic *in general* or *as* semiotics is] a study of the means of knowledge and communication, a study of the role of signs in spinning the web of experience. *As a liberal art*, logic is the more limited study of the formal structures of natural reasoning, whereby that specifically intellectual component of the communication process as symbolized in human language is used effectively to persuade in a rational way and to construct arguments and proofs for

[84]We are borrowing the code from Sebeok, who also referred to linguistic communication as "grammar". Thomas A. Sebeok, *I Think I Am a Verb: More Contributions to the Doctrine of Signs* (Boston, MA: Springer US, 1986), 13.

> the purpose of establishing, evaluating, and advancing views in whatever area of human knowledge. In this sense, Logic [as applied or *within* semiotics] is *that part* of the doctrine of signs concerned with the character of valid consequences symbolically expressed".[85]

In page 31, Deely remarks that "[t]he first individual actively to set himself to explore the entire range of logic as semiotic was the American philosopher and logician, Charles Sanders Peirce".[86] By now it is clear that signs lie at the crux of the matter. So, how does Peirce define the sign? This is quite a challenging question, for Peirce does it in several dozens of ways. Interestingly enough, it turns out that Peirce always preserves the gist of a functional rationale. Peirce's understanding of the sign is multifarious and went through a nuanced evolution throughout the years, nevertheless preserving its fundamental three-dimensional quality. Let us turn to a very select sample of those definitions of sign that Peirce passed on to his readership:

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[85]John Deely, *Logic as a Liberal Art*, ed. Christopher S. Morrissey (Nanjing Shi: Nanjing Normal University Press, 2020), 25.

[86]About the distinction between logic *as* semiotics and logic *within* semiotics see *Ibid.*, 31-34.

A sign is "anything which represents something else, its *Object*, to any mind that can *Interpret* it so";[87]

"anything which being intelligently determined by an Object in its turn intelligently determines an Interpretant, which thus becomes mediately determined by the Object";[88]

"a Priman which is Secundan to an Object and is Tertian in determining an Interpretant into Secundanity to that Object";[89]

"something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought, C";[90]

"something which in some measure and in some respect makes its interpretant the sign of that of which it is itself the sign";[91]

"a thing which serves to convey knowledge of some other thing, which it is said to *stand for* or *represent*";[92]

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[87]Charles S. Peirce, "Meaning Preface. MS [R] 637" (1909): 36.

[88]Charles S. Peirce, "Pragmatism. MS [R] 318" (1907): 38.

[89]Charles S. Peirce, "The Logic Notebook. MS [R] 339" (1905): 247r.

[90]Charles S. Peirce, "Lowell Lectures on Some Topics of Logic Bearing on Questions Now Vexed. Part 1 of 3rd Draught of 3rd Lecture. MS [R] 464" (1903): 54.

[91]Charles S. Peirce, "Reason's Rules. MS [R] 599" (c 1902), 38.

[92]Charles S. Peirce [1895], *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2: 1893-1913*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 13.

> "an object which stands for another to some mind";[93]
>
> something that has "three references: first, it is a sign *to* some thought which interprets it; second, it is a sign *for* some object to which in that thought it is equivalent, third, it is a sign, *in* some respect or quality, which brings it into connection with its object".[94]

Peirce was constantly on the hunt for new ways to articulate his ever-evolving understanding of the sign. Peirce soldiered on and on until his last breath, in effect impelling the community of inquiry to move closer to a consensual understanding of the meaning of signs in general.

The Peirce-Poinsot Conundrum

Keeping in mind the variations in wording, as well as the maturity and development evident in Peirce's understanding of signs through

[93]Charles S. Peirce [1873], *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 3: 1872–1878*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 66.

[94]Charles S. Peirce [1867], *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 2: 1867-1871*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 223.

the years, his definition bears a close resemblance to that proposed by John Poinsot (†1644),[95] (also known as John of St. Thomas, the religious name he adopted in Alcalá de Henares, Madrid, on July 18, 1610).[96] Poinsot regarded the doctrine of signs to be of the utmost concern and defined the sign as "that which represents something other than itself to a knowing power (*id, quod repraesentat aliud a se potentiæ cognoscenti)*",[97] which is a paraphrase of an earlier definition requiring no different translation, to wit: "in general terms (*in communi)*", the sign is "*id, quod potentiæ cognoscitivæ aliquid al-*

[95]As to more than one possible scenario concerning the details of Poinsot's passing in 1644 in the province of Huesca, Aragon, see Pinharanda Gomes, *João de Santo Tomás Na Filosofia Do Século XVII* (Lisboa: Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa, 1985), 31.

[96]José Rafael Espírito Santo, *Arte e Prudência Em João Poinsot (João de São Tomás)* (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 2016), 26. For a recent rationale favorable to the employment of Poinsot's baptismal name see also ibid., 14-15. We adhere to the arguments presented by José Rafael Espírito Santo and credited to John Deely, and we also adhere to the renewed line of reasoning offered by the former. However, the first and main ground for employing the baptismal "Poinsot" is still the simple need to avoid the possibility of homonymy leading to a mix-up.

[97]John Poinsot [1632], *Tractatus de Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsot*, ed. and trans. John Deely, 1st ed (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 116.

iud a se repræsentat".[98] Poinsot claimed to have formulated the definition of the sign in such a "general (*communiter)*" fashion "so as to include all the kinds of signs (*ut complecteremur omnia signorum genera)*",[99] regardless of the relation taken into account *in the sign*. Irrespective of the relation being taken into account, signs should always fall under such a definition, no matter the angle, i.e., be it from that of the relation between *what signifies* and *what interprets*, be it from that of the relation between *what signifies* and *what is signified*.[100] We should also point out that the relation between *what interprets* (X) and *what is signified* (Y) is precisely what we are in fact studying when we study the relations between *what signifies* (Z), and the other two elements of the triadic sign-relation. The relations held between *Z* and non-*Z* (Z-X and Z-Y) are, to be sure, a whole new *Z* regarding the relation between X and Y. That a late Scholastic such as Poinsot cared so much for matters semiotic

[98]John Poinsot [1631], *Artis logicæ, prima pars. De dialecticis institutionibus, quas Summulas vocant* (Rome: Typographia Manelphi Manelphij, 1636), 4.

[99]John Poinsot, *Tractatus de Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsot*, ed. and trans. John Deely, 1st ed (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 116; see also 125.

[100]Refer to Mário Garcia, "Reflexão Sobre a Natureza e Divisão Do Sinal Na Lógica de João de S. Tomás, *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia* 31, no. 3 (1975): 301–4.

ought to be of little surprise, since in Late Scholasticism,

> "the sign and representation were regarded as a universal cognitive instrument (...) relevant for the analysis of natural causality, social institutions, artistic production, cognition, and communication. In other words, the doctrine of signs served as a philosophical method employed for understanding the human being in both natural and social aspects. On the one hand, it provided a key for understanding the relation between the intellect and reality; on the other, it was crucial to the understanding of the *esse morale*, of the moral life as being determined and structured by signs and meanings".[101]

No matter how significant the common ground between Peirce and Poinsot is,[102] it remains a fact that the former was wholly ig-

[101]Yulia Nikitenko, "The Coimbra Jesuit Course in 18th-19th Century Russia: Traces of Cross-cultural Connections", *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 31, no. 62 (2022): 241.

[102]Deely is read: "Peirce and Poinsot, in exactly the same way, distinguished between signs in the strict sense, which are triadic relations, and signs in the common or loose sense, which are rather that one of the three elements united in the sign relation which occupies the foreground role of representing what is other than itself to the one for whom the sign is here and now functioning existentially. To the foreground element Peirce gave the technical name 'representamen', but Poinsot himself gave to it no special name, other than to make it unmistakably

norant of the latter's writings.[103] John Deely kept on making this claim throughout his later career; and, as he went on finding commonalities between the doctrines of both authors, Deely felt compelled to further insist that the insights Peirce and Poinsot shared are to be understood as the result of an identically sound development of the doctrine of a common source. Again and again, Deely insisted on this point, including shortly before his passing.[104] It is of course a possibility that this is merely a coincidence. However, as will become abundantly clear throughout this study, Deely's suggestion proved to be an inspired and wise way to go about making sense of these things. Now, what on earth would be the common

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clear in the context of his usage that the sign in the loose or common sense is a *sign-vehicle* rather than a sign strictly, the *sign strictly* being, for Poinsot as for Peirce (though even more clearly in Poinsot's treatment), as for semiotics today generally, a triadic relation in its suprasubjective character *as* a relation". John Deely, "Semiosis and 'Meaning as Use': The Indispensability and Insufficiency of Subjectivity in the Action of Signs", *Sign Systems Studies* 43, no. 1 (2015): 11.

[103]See Mauricio Beuchot and John Deely, "Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot", *The Review of Metaphysics* 48, no. 3 (1995): 539–66 and John Deely, "Why Investigate the Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot?", in *Semiotics 1994*, ed. John Deely and C. W. Spinks (New York: Peter Lang Verlag, 1996), 34–50.

[104]Take for example John Deely, "Semiotic Entanglement: The Concepts of Environment, Umwelt, and Lebenswelt in Semiotic Perspective", *Semiotica* 2014, no. 199 (2014): 35.

ground between Poinsot and Peirce? Who or what conveyed something that had been part of Poinsot's mental depths to Peirce? Perhaps it was a legatee of Poinsot who brought the latter's teaching to Peirce? There are no signs of this in Peirce's work. But what if it happened to be the case, as suggested by Deely, that Peirce and Poinsot both drew from the same source? Here is a very sound hypothesis, considering that Poinsot and Peirce's definitions of the sign happen to thoroughly correspond to that of the CJC, to wit: "anything which represents something other than itself to a knowing power (*omne id, quod potentiae cognoscenti aliquid a se distinctum repraesentat)*".[105] Admittedly, it should also be borne in mind that, unlike Peirce, Poinsot read the Segovian Domingo de Soto (†1560), who provided the community of inquiry with a definition of the sign that, besides preceding that of the CJC by about 77 years (Soto's dates from 1529 and Couto's from 1606), corresponds to some degree to those of Poinsot and the CJC.[106] Poinsot was

[105]Sebastião do Couto, *The Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs*, trans. John P. Doyle, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 38 (Milwaukee, Wis: Marquette University Press, 2001), 56-57.

[106]See E. Jennifer Ashworth, "The Historical Origins of John Poinsot's Treatise on Signs", *Semiotica* 69, no. 1–2 (1988): 138-139.

quite conversant with Soto and all the more so with the CJC,[107] while Peirce was not acquainted either with Soto or Poinsot. Nor are there any signs that Peirce was familiar with the works of John Mair (†1550) and Pedro da Fonseca. While the former was the main scholar of the Parisian school that promoted a sophisticated understanding of signification as the rendering of something known to someone, the latter is perhaps the most distinguished scholar of the Coimbra school; Fonseca, like—though later than—Soto, was a pioneer and authoritative proponent of the triadic definition of the sign as developed by Couto, Poinsot, Peirce, and many others.[108]

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[107]See, for example, Ibid.; Pinharanda Gomes, *João de Santo Tomás Na Filosofia Do Século XVII* (Lisboa: Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa, 1985); Mauricio Beuchot and John Deely, "Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot", *The Review of Metaphysics* 48, no. 3 (1995): 539–66; and above all José Herculano de Carvalho, "Poinsot's Semiotics and the Conimbricenses", *Cruzeiro Semiótico: Ensaios Em Homenagem a/Essays in Honor of Thomas A. Sebeok* 22 (1995): 131 ff..

Regarding the place of the doctrine of signs in the teaching of logic and why Poinsot is critical of Soto in this regard, choosing instead to follow his teachers (i.e., the authors of the CJC and in particular Couto), see John Deely, *Logic as a Liberal Art*, ed. Christopher S. Morrissey (Nanjing Shi: Nanjing Normal University Press, 2020), 26-30.

[108]See Hélène Leblanc, "*Translatio Signorum :* Penser Les Signes à l'Age Classique à Partir de La Division *Signum Formale/ Signum Instrumentale*" (These de doctorat, Lille 3, 2015), 91-100; especially 96-97.

There is no ground whatsoever for assuming that Peirce knew Mair's or Fonseca's writings firsthand, but perhaps Peirce read the CJC?

A Major Piece in the Puzzle

"CJC" stands for a close cooperative inquiry among Portuguese Jesuit philosophers, a set of eight volumes written by Góis, Magalhães, Álvares, and Couto, the latter being the author of "the first systematic 17th-century treatise" on semiotics",[109] a 1606 treatise only recently translated by Doyle into English and by Amândio Coxito (†2017) into Portuguese.[110] Coxito was aware of Doyle's works on the CJC.[111] We should not trick ourselves into thinking that

[109]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Couto, Sebastião do", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019)

[110]Respectively Sebastião do Couto, *The Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs*, trans. John P. Doyle, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 38 (Milwaukee, Wis: Marquette University Press, 2001) and Sebastião do Couto, *Curso Conimbricense: Os Sinais*, ed. and trans. Amândio Coxito, Recursos Em Linha (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2011).

A bilingual edition of the latter was published a couple of years later: Sebastião do Couto, *Os Sinais. De Signis*, ed. and trans. Amândio Coxito (Porto: Edições Afrontamento, 2013).

[111]See Amândio Coxito, "Bibliografia", Ibid., 23–26.

the English language is ahead of schedule concerning the translation of the CJC into vernacular. As touched upon above, the whole CJC is being translated into Portuguese and the whole series is in the course of publication under the label of the Coimbra University Press. There are, however, no forthcoming translations into English we know of. To the English-speaking community of inquiry, we recommend speeding matters up: at the drop of a hat, get a translation project up and running. Deely rated Couto's *doctrina signorum*—although there are no qualms about the fact that Deely did not fail to widen such a rating to the entire CJC—as "one of the major pieces in the puzzle of how to see the Latin Age of philosophical development as a whole in its own right, not merely as a lengthy footnote to or development in function of the ancient Greek heritage".[112] "*Doctrina signorum*" is interchangeable with "semiotics". The latter is the name used after John Locke (†1704) and Peirce to refer to the subject area to which the medievals called, in their specialized jargon, "doctrine of signs" (*doctrina signorum).* The latter was "adopted by both Locke and Peirce as a synonymous amplifi-

[112]John Deely, *Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-First Century*, Toronto Studies in Semiotics (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 10.

cation of 'semiotics' as a proper name".[113] "Latin Age" stands for the Western scholarly Middle Ages, an expression made popular in philosophical historiography by Deely, who has employed it recurrently at least since 1981;[114] comprises the entire span from the mid-fourth century to the mid-seventeenth century;[115] and is said to be "the very Age that the moderns fell into error trying to bury".[116] The CJC is claimed to be among the finest examples of late Latin scholarly outputs.[117] The eight volumes of the CJC were published for the first time between 1592 and 1606 either in Coimbra or Lis-

[113]Ibid., 362.

[114]Particularly John Deely, "The Relation of Logic to Semiotics", *Semiotica* 35, no. 3–4 (1981): 193–265.

For an example of an earlier and different use see Edward Abiel Washburn, *Epochs in Church History and Other Essays* (New York: E. P. Dutton & Company, 1883), 49 ff.

[115]See John Deely, *Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age: The Development of Cenoscopic Science, AD354 to 1644 (From the Birth of Augustine to the Death of Poinsot)* (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2016).

[116]J. Raymond Zimmer, "A Comedy of Eras: Tiered Nested-Sign Diagrams of Cenoscopic and Ideoscopic Ways of Thought from Deely's Descartes and Poinsot", in *Semiotics* (Semiotic Society of America, 2009), 444. We will turn to this issue again below.

[117]John Deely makes this point insistently in *Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age: The Development of Cenoscopic Science, AD354 to 1644 (From the Birth of Augustine to the Death of Poinsot)* (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2016).

bon, summing up over three thousand pages, 73% of which are concerned with natural philosophy.[118] The CJC includes four volumes on the study of natural reality: (i) *In Octo Libros Physicorum*, (ii) *In Quatuor Libros de Cœlo*, (iii) *In Duos Libros De Generatione et Corruptione*, and (iv) *In Libros Meteororum*. Designed for the philosophy syllabi of the numerous colleges of the Society of Jesus throughout the globe[119] and having been edited no fewer than 112 times and almost invariably in territories outside of Portugal,[120] the CJC undividedly deals with philosophy, aiming at commenting on Aristotle's works. To produce philosophical commentaries is such

[118]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, *The Coimbra Jesuit Aristotelian Course*, 1st ed. (Coimbra University Press, 2018), 71.

[119]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Cursus Conimbricensis", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019).

In the same encyclopedia, there is a possibility of accessing for free a number of materials on the CJC-China relation and now also on the CJC-Russia relation. On the latter see also Yulia Nikitenko, "The Coimbra Jesuit Course in 18th-19th Century Russia: Traces of Cross-cultural Connections", *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 31, no. 62 (2022): 239–56.

On the relation between the latin-age Coimbra school and Japan, we eagerly await the results of the doctoral inquiry of Mitsutake Ikeda, a researcher who is a member of the Institute for Philosophical Studies of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University of Coimbra.

[120]José Rafael Espírito Santo, *Arte e Prudência Em João Poinsot (João de São Tomás)* (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 2016), 23.

a patently philosophical behavior that it can only in a rather "naïf or ignorant" way be mistaken for mere replication.[121] As a matter of fact, dissimilarly from solely restating previous philosophical works, manifold philosophical commentators perform analysis, engage in critical dialogue, provide explanations, and start brand-new discussions. Through the production of philosophical commentaries, according to Pinharanda Gomes (†2019), the Society of Jesus—which has its genesis in 1534, a time in relation to which we already hear mention of the existence of a Second Scholasticism, aimed at reinvigorating the older tradition[122]—was bound to update not only Thomism but also Aristotelianism in order to meet the challenges of an epoch of intense dynamism.[123] At the time Góis, Álvares, Magalhães, and Couto were composing the CJC, "to philosophize in the school of Aristotle was to have access to the most cutting-edge knowledge".[124] The CJC not only grows flesh on

[121]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, *The Coimbra Jesuit Aristotelian Course*, 1st ed. (Coimbra University Press, 2018), 157.

[122]José Rafael Espírito Santo, *Arte e Prudência Em João Poinsot (João de São Tomás)* (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 2016), 30-32.

[123]Pinharanda Gomes, *João de Santo Tomás Na Filosofia Do Século XVII* (Lisboa: Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa, 1985), 12.

[124]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Cursus Conimbricensis", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi

Aristotle's bones but it is also equipped with a whole arsenal of earlier Aristotelian commentaries, tapping into both the mainstream and shadowy voices of Arab, Greek, and Latin literary holdings.[125] It may be argued that to learn from the CJC is, even nowadays, to be *au courant* with the most sophisticated philosophical teachings.[126] Moreover, the acknowledgment of the value of the CJC is multifarious and crosses the centuries. Even in the heat of the Portuguese expulsion of the Society of Jesus in 1759 and its worldwide suppression in the ensuing decades[127] the CJC kept being openly eulogized, as exemplified by Luís António Verney (†1792). Indeed, in the fourth edition of Verney's *De Re Logica*, published in Naples in 1769 and translated into Portuguese by Coxito, the author—a sharp critic of Scholasticism[128] who is hardly famous for his affin-

(Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019).

[125]Pinharanda Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses* (Lisboa: Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa, 1992), 73-75.

[126]John Deely, *Purely Objective Reality*, Semiotics, Communication and Cognition 4 (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2009), 15.

[127]Some consideration of this and related topics may be found around Pinharanda Gomes, *João de Santo Tomás Na Filosofia Do Século XVII* (Lisboa: Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa, 1985), 13.

[128]See for example Luís António Verney [1st. ed. 1751], *Lógica*, trans. Amândio Coxito, Portugaliae Monumenta Neolatina, X (Coimbra: Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2010), 84-87.

ity with Jesuit education—declares that the Jesuits Pedro da Fonseca and the authors of the CJC are among the rare instances of didactic excellence he was aware of in the field of philosophy.[129] In our times some claim that special attention should be paid to the CJC due to the fact that it contains sound and highly topical theses—plus all that remains unresearched about the multitude of authors and traditions that have absorbed some of their most vibrant knowledge from the CJC, as is the case regarding the Poinsot-CJC relation[130]—, some of which have not yet been properly understood by the vast majority of the community of inquiry. Deely would firmly emphasize this particular example:

> "Once it becomes clear that 'all thought is in signs' (the realization first formulated by Poinsot's teachers, the Conimbricenses, but credit for which these days is assigned customarily to Peirce), it becomes further clear that all objects are objects signified, (...) all objects are significates. Not all *things* are

[129]Ibid., 570-571.

[130]See José Rafael Espírito Santo, *Arte e Prudência Em João Poinsot (João de São Tomás)* (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 2016), 22-23 and above all John Deely, *Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age: The Development of Cenoscopic Science, AD354 to 1644 (From the Birth of Augustine to the Death of Poinsot)* (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2016).

significates, but all *objects* are".[131]

Fonseca et al.

No matter how deep and far-reaching the pages of the CJC are, we should be significantly careful in case we ever feel tempted to attribute first occurrences in intellectual history to the authors of the CJC without first double-checking the works of preceding authors such as Fonseca or *los maestros* of the Salamanca School, particularly Soto.[132] The names of Fonseca and Soto should be emphasized, considering the prominence they achieved in and beyond the Iberian world. Deely argued that, after the latter, "the author who more tha[n] any other seems to have been responsible for bringing about the focus that led to the successful resolution of the problem of the sign as Augustine of Hippo (†430) had launched

[131]John Deely, "The Unmasking of Objectivity", in Person, Being, and History, ed. Michael Baur and Robert E. Wood (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 300-301.

[132]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, Personal communication (2020, April 28).

Besides, one can check John Deely, "A Sign Is *What?* A Dialogue between a Semiotist and a Would-Be Realist", *The American Journal of Semiotics* 20, no. 1/4 (2004): 42 and read E. Jennifer Ashworth, "The Historical Origins of John Poinsot's Treatise on Signs", *Semiotica* 69, no. 1–2 (1988): 129–47.

it was the Portuguese Jesuit Pedro da Fonseca".[133] The said "problem" has been pointed out at least since the thirteenth century, in light of the penetrating insights of none other than Thomas Aquinas (†1274)—who is credited for having grasped properly the importance of coming up with a definition of the *signum* broader than Augustine's[134]—, but also those of Robert Kilwardby (†1279), Roger Bacon (†1292), and others who stepped onto the scene later on.[135] In Deely's words, the problem here has to do with the fact that

> "... what is truly essential to the being and function of a sign is not that it be something perceived, as Augustine's definition would require, but merely that it be an element of aware-

[133]John Deely, *Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-First Century, Toronto Studies in Semiotics* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 441.

It may also be worth taking a look at Robert Junqueira, "Pedro da Fonseca in a Research Lead Dropped by John Deely", *Academia Letters*, 2021, not least to switch over thematically to John Deely, *Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age: The Development of Cenoscopic Science, AD354 to 1644 (From the Birth of Augustine to the Death of Poinsot)* (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2016).

[134]Carlos Frederico Gurgel Calvet da Silveira and Sergio de Souza Salles, "João de Santo Tomás, redenção e escatologia", *Synesis* 8, no. 1 (2016): 69.

[135]E. Jennifer Ashworth, "The Historical Origins of John Poinsot's Treatise on Signs", *Semiotica* 69, no. 1–2 (1988): 138.

> ness bringing into further awareness something besides itself, something that it itself in the awareness is not. Augustine's definition, in logical terms, is defective by reason of being too narrow. It leaves out a part [to wit: those signs that are conveyed over and above or without regard to structures that are tangible and as such accessible by means of sensation] of what is to be defined".[136]

Fonseca authored the *Dialectical Instructions* and the *Isagoge Philosophica*,[137] the former being a masterpiece flowing from an unconditional take on Aristotelianism[138] which had more than 50 editions as early as 1624[139] and has been translated—same as the *Isagoge*—into Portuguese by Joaquim Ferreira Gomes (†2002).[140]

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[136]John Deely, *Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-First Century*, Toronto Studies in Semiotics (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 223.

[137]Respectively Pedro da Fonseca, *Institutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo* (Lisboa: Ioannis Blauij, 1564) and Pedro da Fonseca, *Isagoge Philosophica* (Lisboa: A. Alvarez, 1591).

[138]Pinharanda Gomes, *Os Conimbricenses* (Lisboa: Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa, 1992), 71-72.

[139]John Deely, *Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age: The Development of Cenoscopic Science, AD354 to 1644 (From the Birth of Augustine to the Death of Poinsot)* (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2016), 348.

[140]Respectively Pedro da Fonseca, *Isagoge Filosófica*, trans. Joaquim Ferreira

Whether the writings and remaining activities of the "Portuguese Aristotle"—that is, Fonseca—had a significant impact or not on the community of inquiry entertains no debates. Fonseca was even considered the most relevant figure in the modest though underestimated philosophical tradition developing in the Portuguese geographical and cultural landscape.[141] Fonseca's status in the framework of the history of philosophy in Portugal is due to his profound doctrinal perusals, not solely to his remarkable productivity[142] nor primarily to his involvement in setting up the conditions for the CJC to come to light. Yet, it is worth highlighting here the leading role played by Fonseca in terms of the advent of the CJC. The CJC was thought of "to serve as a base for the Course in Philosophy in which the commentaries of the Aristotelian texts and connected questions prescribed by the statutes of the University of Coimbra would be adequately treated", so a commission was nominated, "and presided over by Pedro da Fonseca". Martins goes on, laying out pretty trans-

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Gomes, Cultura Portuguesa (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 1965) and Pedro da Fonseca, *Instituições Dialécticas*, trans. Joaquim Ferreira Gomes, 2 vols., Cultura Portuguesa (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 1964).

[141]Amândio Coxito, "Introdução", in *Estudos sobre filosofia em Portugal no século XVI* (Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 2005), 14.

[142]Ibid.

parently how Fonseca's involvement was instrumental to breaking the ground for the CJC to pop into being:

> "Pedro da Fonseca, with his demand for rigor, immediately proposed that the composition of the course should not begin without first making a detailed and up-to-date study of the most relevant works, as well as the most important difficulties effectively felt by the students and teachers in their pedagogic practice".[143]

Both the CJC and its authors, together with Fonseca, Poinsot, and many others, belong to the Scholastic tradition, i.e., what the Modern Age philosophers—on the heels of what has been referred to as "Descartes' madness"[144]—, pushed into the shadows of memory to such a degree that a whole, lengthy period of Western history has become infamous under the sign of darkness, a prejudice still hang-

[143]António Manuel Martins, "Introductory Note to the *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu*", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019).

[144]J. Raymond Zimmer, "A Comedy of Eras: Tiered Nested-Sign Diagrams of Cenoscopic and Ideoscopic Ways of Thought from Deely's Descartes and Poinsot", in *Semiotics* (Semiotic Society of America, 2009), 440.

ing over us.[145] A cliché about Western and particularly European medieval times is that "[l]ack of knowledge and lack of tolerance were some of the dark attitudes which prevailed in those days".[146] This is one illustration of the kind of modern construction that also taught that the Scholastic inquirers brought no benefit to the evolution of science, one example of the enfeebling teachings that have been rendering the history of science badly incomplete (a gap that only recently has begun to be bridged).[147] So the result was an at least partial blackout of historical consciousness, meaning that "folk-thought, superstition, ancient philosophy, mystical traditions,

[145]See, for example, Riaz Hussain, Asma Kashif Shahzad, and Muhammad Zeeshan Khan, "Multilingualism in Europe: Costs and Benefits", *Pakistan Languages and Humanities Review* 6, no. 1 (2022): 88.

[146]Ibid.

[147]A milestone in Portugal was the 2002 publication of the first edition of Mário Santiago de Carvalho, *A Síntese Frágil. Uma introdução à filosofia (da patrística aos conimbricenses)*, 2nd ed., Recursos em Linha (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2022.)

A notable example in another context was the 2010 first edition of John Deely, *Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age: The Development of Cenoscopic Science, AD354 to 1644 (From the Birth of Augustine to the Death of Poinsot)* (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2016).

Above all it is advisable to remember the names of the two authors, as they worked or have been working on the process of restoring the history of science for a considerable amount of time prior to the publication of the seminal works just mentioned.

scholasticism and other cogitations" were discredited wholesale, on the grounds that the thinkers associated with such labels cared, in their musings, for the noumenal world, the world of things as they are in themselves, or simply the "realm of uncertainty".[148] Different ways to refer to the noumenal world is to term it as the realm of that which is wholly unfamiliar, incognizable altogether, or "absolutely unknowable". Of several options that exist, the latter is the one that was used in the context of a defense of Peirce from the charges of self-contradiction due to his alleged espousal and simultaneous repudiation of the views of Immanuel Kant (†1804).[149] Among the expressions of modernity—an age gone haywire, overstating its own worth and the worthlessness of Latinity, an age in declension—were some relativist, evolutionist, and symbolist trends, as was Kantian

[148]J. Raymond Zimmer, "A Comedy of Eras: Tiered Nested-Sign Diagrams of Cenoscopic and Ideoscopic Ways of Thought from Deely's Descartes and Poinsot", in *Semiotics* (Semiotic Society of America, 2009), 443.

[149]See Rosa M. Calcaterra, "Testimony and the Self", in *Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words: 100 Years of Semiotics*, Communication and Cognition, ed. Torkild Thellefsen and Bent Sørensen, Semiotics, Communication and Cognition, vol. 14 (Boston: De Gruyter Mouton, 2014), 24.

See also Gabriele Gava, "What Is Wrong with Intuitions? An Assessment of a Peircean Criticism of Kant", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 50, no. 3 (2014): 340-359.

idealism, this latter having even remarkably affected professed admirers of Aquinas; these were all trends tendentially sharing a certain antipathy toward Scholasticism.[150]

Peirce's Background

Peirce "was well acquainted with the way modern philosophy worked"[151] and became proficient in the primary literature of Kantian idealism, the legacy of Immanuel Kant, quite early in his life.[152] So, is there any basis for believing that a person such as Peirce, a well-educated modern scientist (see below), would have ever cared to pay attention to the early modern Scholastic oeuvre of the Coimbra Jesuits? As

[150]For a reminder of how brittle most historical caesuras are read Mário Santiago de Carvalho, *Dicionário Do Curso Filosófico Conimbricense*, Skiagraphia's (Coimbra: Palimage, 2020), 32.

For a riveting take on a number of the various expressions of modernity read Pinharanda Gomes, *João de Santo Tomás Na Filosofia Do Século XVII* (Lisboa: Instituto de Cultura e Língua Portuguesa, 1985), 14-15.

[151]Jerold J. Abrams, "Philosophy After the Mirror of Nature: Rorty, Dewey, and Peirce on Pragmatism and Metaphor", *Metaphor and Symbol* 17, no. 3 (2002): 231.

[152]Kelly A. Parker, *The Continuity of Peirce's Thought*, 1st ed., The Vanderbilt Library of American Philosophy (Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1998), xi.

a matter of fact, one question should be raised prior to that, to wit: would Peirce even be in a position to access the CJC? The CJC has made its way around the world and it is not at all far-fetched to think that Peirce may have been able to access one or more of its volumes. Actually, right away we can say that Peirce was in such a position, but we also urge the reader wishing to find out more details to wait until (or jump straight to) the second part of this work, where a starting point to tackle this question is being provided to the community of inquiry for the very first time in history. Though the worldwide reach of the CJC is beyond dispute, such an inarguably vast global impact remains mostly unexamined,[153] and is furthermore rather tricky. A showcase example of this trickiness lies in logic-related topics. Both a genuine and a counterfeit version of the logic treatise of the CJC were widely circulated.[154]

[153]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, *The Coimbra Jesuit Aristotelian Course*, 1st ed. (Coimbra University Press, 2018), 155-157.

[154]Respectively Sebastião do Couto, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritæ* (Coimbra: D. G. Loureyro, 1606) and Unknown, *Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis IesuCommentarii Doctissimi In Universam Logicam Aristotelis* (Hamburg: Bibliopolo Frobeniano, 1604).

The latter, printed in Austria, Germany, and Italy,[155] possibly reproduces the 1584 lessons of the Jesuit University of Évora,[156] which in turn reproduce Francisco Cardoso's (†1604) lessons proffered in Coimbra in 1571.[157] Both versions "give us two different stages of the Logic, as taught in Coimbra, by the Jesuits, separated by at least thirty years".[158] Though some Jesuit may in fact have illegally sold the manuscript of the 1604 publication to the Hamburg editors—mentioning, by way of a slight stretch, the Coimbra origin of the volume—, it may as well be true that the source of the unauthorized and counterfeit CJC volume was, not a Jesuit, but a German or Italian junior who back then studied at Coimbra or Évora.[159] So,

[155]See both John Deely, *Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age: The Development of Cenoscopic Science, AD354 to 1644 (From the Birth of Augustine to the Death of Poinsot)*, 356 and Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Couto, Sebastião do" in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019).

[156]Ibid.

[157]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "*In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritæ*. Editorial History", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2018).

[158]Ibid.

[159]Armando Senra Martins, "Coimbra and Évora", in Conimbricenses.Org, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2020).

even if Peirce was indeed able to access the CJC and would have bothered to pay attention to Latin works, how to be sure that he did not rely on a counterfeit version, as far as logic is concerned, or even second-hand references? Pushing the point even further: would anyone actually expect Peirce to care about works such as the CJC, considering (i) that Peirce's mother tongue was English, (ii) that his activities took place from the nineteenth to the twentieth century after Latin, the native written language of the CJC, had been pretty much swept away into the seas of neglect, and (iii) that his background in the natural sciences and modern philosophy was quite substantial?[160] The standard of Peirce's background is beyond dispute. Peirce was a scientist trained primarily as a chemist, who spent many years doing geodetic research. While doing such research, Peirce based his work on the assumption that science is always conducted with both an eye on the data gathered by yesterday's community of inquiry; a second eye on what present-day active peers are up to; and an extra eye open to observing reality

[160]See both Francis E. Reilly, S. J. , *Charles Peirce's Theory of Scientific Method*, The Orestes Brownson Series on Contemporary Thought and Affairs 7 (New York: Fordham University Press, 1970), 1-7 and Joseph Brent, *Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 38 ff.

first hand.[161] Sure, Peirce's professional research occupations may well fail to make the case for the likelihood of him having studied the CJC, but what about Peirce's studies concerning semiotic logic and overall philosophy, not least the history of philosophy and science as a whole? Such occupations should also be factored in. Peirce labored a great deal on the history of philosophy, and was also insightful of and very much concerned with matters of historiographical methodology.[162] In light of this, it cannot possibly be substantiated that Peirce's background would trigger any person to become suspicious about the likelihood of him giving his attention or any serious thoughts to the CJC or any other major philosophical opus of the past. And what is more, the CJC has never failed to reach a far-and-wide readership. Peirce would neither have been quite the first nor would he have been the very last person to have learned from the CJC, all the more so in the latter case when we consider that a whole host of scholars working in the turn of the twentieth to the twenty-first century have benefited invaluably from their exposure to this benchmark of Coimbra's wealthy cultural heritage.

[161] See Tullio Viola, *Peirce on the Uses of History*, Peirceana 4 (Berlin and Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2020), 26.

[162] Ibid., 31.

Appendix: An Enlightening List

From all around the place and regardless of their particular thematic orientations, more and more scholars are now resorting to the CJC, either alluding to its volumes or its authors with high esteem, devoting entire sections of their research outputs to it, or even writing whole works about it. The list ahead of us represents but a tiny share of a vast array of such writings and people. Though a large part of the titles listed below are, as of early 2023, missing from Carvalho's list, it can be observed in such a list that there has been no shortage of scholars interpreting the CJC throughout the years[163] To prevent an endless number of footnotes, rather than merely referencing the titles and adding the full reference in the footnote, we will instead provide the full reference in the body of the text. Here is the list:

* John Deely

  - "The Relation of Logic to Semiotics", *Semiotica* 35, no. 3–4 (1981): 193–265;

[163]See Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "The Conimbricenses: A Bibliography", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, [nd]).

– "Editorial Afterword", in *Tractatus de Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsot*, by John Poinsot, ed. and trans. John Deely, 1st ed (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 391–514;

– *Basics of Semiotics*, Advances in Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990);

– "The Grand Vision", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 30, no. 2 (1994): 371–400;

– "Why Investigate the Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot?", in *Semiotics 1994*, ed. John Deely and C. W. Spinks (New York: Peter Lang Verlag, 1996), 34–50;

– *The Green Book. The Impact of Semiotics on Philosophy* (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 2000);

– *The Red Book. The Beginning of Postmodern Times, or: Charles S. Peirce and the Recovery of the* Signum (Helsinki: The Metaphysical Club of the University of Helsinki, 2000);

– "Foreword: A New Determination of the Middle Ages", in *The Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs*, by Sebastião do Couto, trans. John P. Doyle, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 38 (Milwaukee, Wis: Marquette University Press, 2001), 9–13;

– *Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-First Century*, Toronto Studies in Semiotics (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2001);

– "The Word Semiotics: Formation and Origins", *Semiotica*, no. 146 (2003): 1–49;

– "A Sign Is *What?* A Dialogue between a Semiotist and a Would-Be Realist", *The American Journal of Semiotics* 20, no. 1/4 (2004): 1–66;

– "The Role of Thomas Aquinas in the Development of Semiotic Consciousness", *Semiotica*, no. 152-1–4 (2004): 75–139;

– "On 'Semiotics' as Naming the Doctrine of Signs", *Semiotica*, no. 158 (2006): 1–33;

– "The Quo/Quod Fallacy in the Discussion of Realism", *Czlowiek w Kulturze*, no. 19/20 (2007/2008): 389-425/289-316;

– *Intentionality and Semiotics: A Story of Mutual Fecundation* (University of Scranton Press, 2007);

– *Purely Objective Reality*, Semiotics, Communication and Cognition 4 (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2009);

– *Realism for the 21st Century: A John Deely Reader*, ed. Paul Cobley (University of Scranton Press, 2010), and particularly

"'Evolution, Semiosis, and Ethics: Rethinking the Context o f Natural Law', with an Appendix on Immortality", in *Realism for the 21st Century: A John Deely Reader*, ed. Paul Cobley (University of Scranton Press, 2010), 74–90;

- *Medieval Philosophy Redefined: The Development of Cenoscopic Science, AD354 to 1644 (From the Birth of Augustine to the Death of Poinsot)* (University of Scranton Press, 2010), also published in St. Augustine's Press in 2016 and 2020;
- "Semiotics Seen Synchronically: The View as of 2010", *Chinese Semiotic Studies* 4, no. 2 (2010): 9–113;
- *Semiotic Animal: A Postmodern Definition of "Human Being" Transcending Patriarchy and Feminism* (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2010);
- "The Unmasking of Objectivity", in *Person, Being, and History*, ed. Michael Baur and Robert E. Wood (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 284–303;
- "The Tartu Synthesis in Semiotics Today Viewed from America", *Chinese Semiotic Studies* 8, no. 1 (2012);
- "Semiotic Entanglement: The Concepts of Environment, Umwelt, and Lebenswelt in Semiotic Perspective", *Semiotica*, no. 199 (2014);

- "What Semiotics Is", *Language and Semiotic Studies* 1, no. 1 (2015);
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* John P. Doyle

- "The Conimbricenses on the Relations Involved in Signs", in *Semiotics 1984*, ed. John Deely (Lanham, MD and London: University Press of America, 1985), 567–76;
- "The Conimbricenses on the Semiotic Character of Mirror Images", *The Modern Schoolman*, no. 76 (1998): 17–32;
- "Collegium Conimbricense", in *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 1st ed. (London: Routledge, 2016), first published in 1998;
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– "Hispanic Scholastic Philosophy", in *The Cambridge Companion to Renaissance Philosophy*, ed. James Hankins (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 250–69;

* E. Jennifer Ashworth

– "The Historical Origins of John Poinsot's Treatise on Signs", *Semiotica* 69, no. 1–2 (1988): 129–47;

– "Jesuit Logic", in *Jesuit Philosophy on the Eve of Modernity*, ed. Cristiano Casalini (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2019), 95–114;

– "Changes in British Logic Teaching During the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries", *History and Philosophy of Logic* 41, no. 4 (2020): 309–30;

* António Manuel Martins

– "Conimbricenses", in *Logos. Enciclopédia Luso-Brasileira de Filosofia*, vol. 1 (Lisboa, 1989);

– "O Conimbricense Manuel de Góis e a Eternidade Do Mundo", *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, no. 52 (1996): 487–99;

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de Philosophie Médiévale de La S.I.E.P.M. (Porto, Du 26 Au 31 Août 2002) (Turnhout, 2006), 101–17;

– "Introductory Note to the *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu*", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019);

* William R. Shea, *The Magic of Numbers and Motion: The Scientific Career of René Descartes* (Canton, MA: Science History Publications, U.S.A., 1991);

* António Lopes, "A educação em Portugal de D. João III à expulsão dos Jesuítas em 1759", *Lusitania Sacra*, no. 5 (1993): 13–41;

* Anabela Gradim, *Teoria do Sinal em João de São Tomás. O Projecto Semiótico do "Tratado dos Signos"* (Covilhã: Universidade da Beira Interior and Lusosofia, 1994);

* Mauricio Beuchot and John Deely, "Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot", *The Review of Metaphysics* 48, no. 3 (1995): 539–66;

* José Herculano de Carvalho, "Poinsot's Semiotics and the Conimbricenses', *Cruzeiro Semiótico: Ensaios Em Homenagem a/Essays in Honor of Thomas A. Sebeok* 22 (1995): 129–35;

* Jill Kraye ed., *Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts*, vol. 1. Moral philosophy (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997);

* Wilfrid Hodges, "The Laws of Distribution for Syllogisms", *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 39, no. 2 (1998);

* Mário Santiago de Carvalho

  – "Medieval Influences In The Coimbra Commentaries (An Inquiry Into The Foundations of Jesuit Education)", *Patristica et Mediaevalia*, no. 20 (1999): 19–37;

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– "Ciência Da Alma e Conhecimento de Si No Comentário Jesuíta Conimbricense a Aristóteles (1598)", in *Anais Do III Seminário Internacional Farias Brito* (Rio de Janeiro: Centro de Filosofia Brasileira, 2009);

– "A Questão Do Começo Do Saber Numa Introdução à Filosofia Do Século XVI Português", in *Razão e Liberdade. Homenagem a Manuel José do Carmo Ferreira* (Lisboa, 2010), 993–1009;

– "Imaginação, Pensamento e Conhecimento de Si No Comentário Jesuíta Conimbricense à Psicologia de Aristóteles", *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra*, no. 19 (2010): 25–52;

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Sobre Os Três Livros Da Alma de Aristóteles Estagirita, trans. Maria da Conceição Camps (Lisboa: [s.n.], 2010), 7–157;

– *Psicologia e Ética No Curso Jesuíta Conimbricense* (Lisboa: [s.n.], 2010);

– "Sulle Spalle Di Aristotele. Sul Non-Aristotelismo Del Primo Corso Aristotelico Dei Gesuiti Di Coimbra", trans. Jacopo Falà, *Lo Sguardo. Rivista Di Filosofia* 5, no. 1 (2011): 45–58;

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– "Beyond Psychology – The Philosophical Horizon of the Coimbra Commentary on Aristotle's 'De Anima' (1598)", in *Cognitive Psychology in Early Jesuit Scholasticism*, ed. Daniel Heider (Neunkirchen-Seelscheid: Editiones Scholasticae, 2016), 67–95;

- "Presenças Franciscanas No 'Curso Aristotélico Jesuíta Conimbricense'. Para Uma Cartografia Do Escotismo Português Moderno", *Itinerarium* 61, no. 215–216 (2016): 485–97;

! Carvalho's list of publications on the CJC is forever increasing, so here we just highlighted some of the texts that are not so noticeable for being not so recent, yet an up-to-date list of all of Carvalho's scholarly contributions (including his most recent ones, nearly all of them on the CJC) can be enjoyed in Academia.edu via the following link: https://www.academia.edu/94255641/Scholarly_Bibliography_2022_Edition;

* Antonio Clericuzio, *Elements, Principles and Corpuscles* (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2000);

* João José Alves Dias, "As Obras de Autores Portugueses Impressas Na Alemanha Durante o Séc. XVI - o Caso de Colónia", in *Portugal, Indien Und Deustchland/Portugal, Índia e Alemanha*. Akten Der V. Deutsch-Portugiesis-chen Arbeitsgespräche/Actas Do Vº Encontro Luso-Alemão (Köln / Colónia 1998), ed. Helmut Spiemann (Köln and Lisboa: Zentrum Portugiesischprachige Welt. Universität zu Köln and Centro de Estudos de História da Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2000);

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  - *Estudios Sobre Peirce y La Escolástica* (Pamplona, España: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2002);
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* José Esteves Pereira, "A 'Brotéria' e o pensamento filosófico português (1925-1964)", in *Fé, ciencia, cultura: Brotéria, 100 años*, ed. Hermínio Rico and José Eduardo Franco, 1. ed (Lisboa: Gradiva, 2003), 233–46;

* Dmitry Shmonin [Дмитрий Шмонин], "Вторая Схоластика, XVI - Начало XVII в.: Культурный Контекст, Метафизические Основания, Место в Истории Мысли [Second Scholasticism, XVIth – Early XVIIth Centuries: Cultural Context, Metaphysical Foundations, Place in the History of Thought]" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Russia, Saint Petersburg Mining University [Санкт-Петербургский горный университет], 2003);

* Florence Hsia, "Mathematical Martyrs, Mandarin Missionaries, and Apostolic Academicians: Telling Institutional Lives", in *Institutional Culture in Early Modern Society*, ed. Anne Goldgar and Robert Frost (BRILL, 2004), 3–34;

* Amândio Coxito, "Introdução", in *Estudos sobre filosofia em Portugal no século XVI* (Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 2005), 9–17;

* Benedict M. Ashley, *The Way Toward Wisdom: An Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Introduction to Metaphysics*, Thomistic Studies (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006);

* Paul Bains, *The Primacy of Semiosis: An Ontology of Relations*, Toronto Studies in Semiotics and Communication (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2006);

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* Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Filipa Medeiros, "Em Torno Do Paradigma Da Visão No Século XVI: Luz, Visão e Cores No Comentário Jesuíta

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* Maria de Fátima Nunes and Augusto da Silva, eds., *Da Europa para Évora e de Évora para o Mundo. A Universidade Jesuítica de Évora 1559-1759* (Instituto Superior Económico e Social de Évora, 2009), particularly Teresa Santos, "A Filosofia na Universidade de Évora (1559-1759). Um percurso interrompido; um percurso esquecido", in *Da Europa para Évora e de Évora para o Mundo. A Universidade Jesuítica de Évora 1559-1759*, ed. Maria de Fátima Nunes and Augusto da Silva (Instituto Superior Económico e Social de Évora, 2009), 111–36;

* Maria Teresa B. C. S. G. dos Santos, "A elite missionária e académica. O compromisso formador da universidade henriquina (1559-1759)", in *Formación de élites y educación superior en Iberoamérica: (ss. XVI-XXI)*, Vol. 1 ed. José María Hernández Díaz (Hergar Ediciones Antema, 2012), 235–244;

* Galina Vdovina [Галина Вдовина], Язык неочевидного. Учения о знаках в схоластике XVII века [Jazyk neočevidnogo: učenija o znakach v scholastike XVII veka | A linguagem daquilo que não é óbvio. A doutrina dos sinais na escolástica do século XVII | The language of the non-obvious. The doctrine of signs in 17th century scholasti-

cism], Bibliotheca Ignatiana Nauka (Moscow: Inst. filosofii, teologi i istorii sv. Fomy, 2009);

* Maria da Conceição Camps

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  - *Aristotele a Coimbra. Il Cursus Conimbricensis e l'educazione Nel Collegium Artium* (Roma: Anicia, 2012);
  - ed., *Jesuit Logic and Late Ming China: Lectures on the Cursus Conimbricensis* (Chestnut Hill: Institute for Jesuit Sources, 2019);
  - ed., *Jesuit Philosophy on the Eve of Modernity* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2019);

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* Catherine Jami, *The Emperor's New Mathematics: Western Learning and Imperial Authority during the Kangxi Reign (1662-1722)* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012);

* Cristóvão da Silva Marinheiro

  - "The Conimbricenses: The Last Scholastics, the First Moderns or Something in Between? The Impact of Geographical Discoveries on Late 16th-Century Jesuit Aristotelianism", in *Portuguese Humanism and the Republic of Letters*, ed. M. Berbara and K. A. E. Enenkel (Leiden and Boston, 2012), 395–424;
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* Simone Guidi

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  - *L'Angelo e La Macchina. Sulla Genesi Della 'Res Cogitans' Cartesiana* (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2018);

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- "Residência Institucional no Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra", report, Coimbra: Estudo Geral, 2021;
- "Areda, Diogo de (Silveira)", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia* (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2021);
- "Pedro Da Fonseca in a Research Lead Dropped by John Deely", *Academia Letters* (2021): Article 3086;
- "Mário Santiago de Carvalho, Falsafa. Breve introdução à filosofia arábico-islâmica (Coimbra: eQuodlibet, Instituto de Estudos

Filosóficos, 2020). 172 pp. ISBN: 978- 989- 54- 3285- 1", *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 30, no. 60 (October 29, 2021): 429–34;

- "IEF – Instituto de Estudios Filosóficos de Coimbra", *DEDiCA Revista de Educação e Humanidades*, no. 19 (2021): 453–63;
- "Contents at a Glance and Rationale for My Doctoral Inquiry Titled 'The Coimbra Jesuit Aristotelian Course as a Source of the Semiotic Logic of Charles S. Peirce"' (OSF Preprints, 2022);
- "Peirce and the Coimbra Jesuit Course: A Bond Far More Pervasive Than Commonly Believed", in *PhicaRe (Philosophy & Care Repository)* Coimbra: Institute for Philosophical Studies, 2023, 1–12 (Published as presented at the Charles S. Peirce Society's *10-Minute Thesis Initiative: His Glassy Essence in Relation*);

* Brian A. Kemple, *The Intersection of Semiotics and Phenomenology: Peirce and Heidegger in Dialogue*, Semiotics, Communication and Cognition, vol. 20 (Boston: De Gruyter Mouton, 2019);

* Nathan Lyons, *Signs in the Dust: A Theory of Natural Culture and Cultural Nature* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2019);

* José Filipe Silva, "Stop Making Sense(s): Some Late Medieval and Very Late Medieval Views on Faculty Psychology", in *The Internal*

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* Anna Tropia

  - "Three Jesuit Accounts of Cognition: Differences and Common Ground in the De Anima Commentaries by Maldonado, Toledo and Dandini (1564–1610)", in *Active Cognition*, ed. Véronique Decaix and Ana María Mora-Márquez, vol. 23 (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2020), 103–131;
  - "Jesuit Psychology, Early Modern", in *Encyclopedia of Early Modern Philosophy and the Sciences*, ed. D. Jalobeanu and C. T. Wolfe (Cham: Spring, 2020);

* Harald Braun, "Introduction", in *A Companion to the Spanish Scholastics*, ed. Harald Braun, Erik De Bom, and Paolo Astorri, Brill's Companions to the Christian Tradition 102 (Leiden: Brill, 2021), 3–28;

* Irene Caiazzo, ""Pythagoras' Mistake": The Transmigration of Souls in the Latin Middle Ages and Beyond", in *Brill's Companion to the Reception of Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, ed. Irene Caiazzo, Constantinos Macris, and Aurélien Robert (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2021), 322–49;

* Irene Caiazzo, Constantinos Macris, and Aurélien Robert, "Pythagoras, from Late Antiquity to Early Modernity. A Multicultural Approach", in Brill's Companion to the Reception of Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, ed. Irene Caiazzo, Constantinos Macris, and Aurélien Robert (Boston: Brill, 2021), 1–44;

* Luiz Alberto Cerqueira, "Aristotelismo no Brasil: A ideia de liberdade como princípio da ação moral", *Revista Apoena - Periódico dos Discentes de Filosofia da UFPA* 1, no. 1 (2021): 8–15;

* Petr Dvořák and Miroslav Hanke, "Logic", in *A Companion to the Spanish Scholastics*, ed. Harald Ernst Braun, Erik De Bom, and Paolo Astorri (Brill, 2021), 228–51;

* Giovanni Gellera, "Natural Philosophy", in *A Companion to the Spanish Scholastics*, ed. Harald Ernst Braun, Erik De Bom, and Paolo Astorri (Brill, 2021), 201–27;

* Robert Junqueira and Hadje Cresencio Sadje, "Dispatches from Portugal and the Philippines: Notes on Student Pandemic Life", *The Paris Institute for Critical Thinking: The Thinking Cap*, 2021;

* Hélène Leblanc and Claudio Majolino, eds., *Studia Philosophica. Sémiotique, Grammaire et Logique / Semiotik, Grammatik Und Logik: De*

La Scolastique Tardive à La Philosophie Austro-Allemande / Von Der Spätscholastik Bis Zur Österreichischen Philosophie, Schweizerische Zeitschrift Für Philosophie 80 (Basel: Schwabe Verlag, 2021);

* José Manuel Moreira and André Azevedo Alves, *Uma singular escola ibérica: de Salamanca a Coimbra e Évora* (Universidade Católica Editora, 2021);

* Thomas Pink, "Final Causation", in *A Companion to the Spanish Scholastics*, ed. Harald Ernst Braun, Erik De Bom, and Paolo Astorri (Brill, 2021), 277–305;

* Rafael Ramis-Barceló, "La recepción del pensamiento filosófico de Antonius Andreae («Doctor Dulcifluus») en el siglo XVI", *Anuario Filosófico* 55, no. 1 (2021): 79–104;

* Leen Spruit, "Psychology", in *A Companion to the Spanish Scholastics*, ed. Harald Ernst Braun, Erik De Bom, and Paolo Astorri (Brill, 2021), 252–74;

* Martine Bocquet, "Le triangle pré-sémiotique d'Aristote selon John Deely : l'erreur d'Aristote et de Saussure", *Revue française des sciences de l'information et de la communication*, no. 25 (2022);

* Noël Golvers and Carlota Simões, *1655 Escala em Coimbra: Um jovem Jesuíta entre o Ocidente e o Oriente*, 1.ª Edição (Imprensa da Univer-

sidade de Coimbra, 2022);

* Helen Hattab, "Renaissance Aristotelianism(s)", in *The Cambridge History of Philosophy of the Scientific Revolution*, ed. Dana Jalobeanu and David Marshall Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 58–74;

* Dmitri Levitin, "The Uses of Ancient Philosophy", in *The Cambridge History of Philosophy of the Scientific Revolution*, ed. Dana Jalobeanu and David Marshall Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022), 15–34;

* Armando Martins and Samuel Gessner, *Compreender, descrever, medir o mundo*, Imprensa da Universidade de Évora, 2022;

* Yulia Nikitenko

  - "The Coimbra Jesuit Course in 18th-19th Century Russia: Traces of Cross-cultural Connections", *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 31, no. 62 (2022): 239–56;
  - "The Coimbra Jesuit Course in 18th–19th Century Russia", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia* (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2023);

* Susana Pérez, "La Memoria Semiótica: Entre El Mundo Circundante (Umwelt) y La Cultura. Análisis Biosemiótico-Filosófico" (PhD The-

sis, Morelia, Michoacán, Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, 2022);

* Michal Karľa and Tuuli Pern, "Early-Modern Semiotics", in *Bloomsbury Semiotics Volume 1: History and Semiosis*, ed. Jamin Pelkey (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2023).

This list is the fruit of a time-consuming bibliographical exploration in the hunt for works that could refer to the Peirce-CJC relation; it also turned out to be among the most precious supplementary results (or 'deliverables', as it happened) of this doctoral project of ours. As we will see below, our search for references to the Peirce-CJC relation in the overwhelming majority of these titles was in vain, for either no such references exist or such references can be found but add naught to the *status quæstionis*. In some instances, even when we did not find references to the Peirce-CJC relation, we were still able to benefit a lot from our encounter with the work, a fact that has either already been reflected (above) or will still be so throughout this study (below). All the works listed that were not yet included in the bibliography devoted to the CJC on the website of the Conimbricenses.org project, numbering over a hundred, were digitized in RDF format (a BibTeX counterpart) and

sent via email to Simone Guidi and Mário Santiago de Carvalho on December 12, 2022. As of early March 2023 those titles had not yet been included on the site's bibliography, but they will certainly be, as there is no reason not to include them; besides, these titles will have represented an increment of around 30 percent in the total number of works listed in the bibliography dedicated to the CJC on the website of the Conimbricenses.org project.

The Peirce-CJC Relation

Peirce's Transgression

The missionary character of the Society of Jesus, together with the extension of the Portuguese empire, caused the Jesuit treatises to be read all over the planet since shortly after being published for the first time. Pivotal players of the Western philosophical, scholarly, and cultural scene, such as Clemens Timpler (†1624) René Descartes (†1650), Christoph Scheibler (†1653), Locke, Gottfried W. Leibniz (†1716), Karl Marx (†1883),[164] and many others did rely on one or multiple volumes of the CJC to inform their studies.[165]

[164]On the Marx-CJC relation see Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Karl Marx and Coimbra", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2020).

[165]See John P. Doyle, "The Conimbricenses on the Relations Involved in Signs", in *Semiotics 1984*, ed. John Deely (Lanham, MD and London: University Press of America, 1985), 575-576 and Mário Santiago de Carvalho, *The Coimbra Jesuit*

The tangible and intangible pages of the CJC are true international waters. Shortly after being published, these waters were already being eagerly sailed by Catholics from all over the place, as well as by the authoritative German Protestant tradition, both Calvinists and Lutherans, and they quickly became very popular across the English Channel as well, surely in Cambridge and quite probably in Oxford.[166] And Asia should not be overlooked, from the eve of modernity[167] up to our age, as is evident when considering all the treasures being salvaged from the bottomless ocean of history by the community of inquirers working closely in connection with the Con-

Aristotelian Course, 1st ed. (Coimbra University Press, 2018), 21-22.

[166]John P. Doyle, "The Conimbricenses on the Relations Involved in Signs", in *Semiotics 1984*, ed. John Deely (Lanham, MD and London: University Press of America, 1985), 576.

[167]Above we criticized philosophical modernity. One must be acutely unambiguous, though, that any such criticism refers exclusively to something along the lines of Western philosophical modernism. A very expressive manifestation of such criticism can be read as follows: "Modern philosophy is, from the semiotic viewpoint (and respecting the overall history of philosophy), like an insert that blocks you from the Latins to the ancients, and it blocks you yet more essentially from a knowledge of the world. (Of course the scientists are going about their business of reading the 'book of nature' anyway, while the philosophers are standing back, chuckling at those scientists' naïveté – ha ha ha! those poor scientists don't realize that the things of nature are actually unknowable in themselves.)". John Deely, "Objective Reality and the Physical World: Relation as Key to Understanding Semiosis", *Green Letters* 19, no. 3 (2015): 272.

imbricenses.org project.[168] None of the above indicates that Peirce also became involved with the CJC. Would Peirce be at all willing to spend his time studying the CJC? Strange or maybe not, Peirce had an open ear when it came to Scholasticism. The landscape of the Scholastic Latin scholarship's effect on Peirce encompasses and extends beyond late Scholasticism, for several Latin philosophers have been instrumental in bringing Peirce's monumental corpus well past the narrow margins of modernity.[169] Peirce is said to have "violated the cardinal commandment of modernity", to wit: "Thou shalt not learn from the Latins".[170] As a science-minded individual, one might wonder what led Peirce to break up with modernity and look deep into the history of philosophy. Two plausible reasons are

[168]See the section "Coimbra in Early Modern China" in Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi, eds., *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia* (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2018-).

[169]See above all John Deely, *Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age: The Development of Cenoscopic Science, AD354 to 1644 (From the Birth of Augustine to the Death of Poinsot)* (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2016) and Paniel Reyes Cárdenas, *Scholastic Realism: A Key to Understanding Peirce's Philosophy* (Oxford, UK: Peter Lang Verlag, 2018).

[170]John Deely, *Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-First Century*, Toronto Studies in Semiotics (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 612-613.

that he needed to find nutriment for the development of his semiotics, plus the fact that he considered "inquiry" to be "a collective enterprise",[171] not excluding from inquiry those already dead and those not yet living. Peirce did not consider inquiry to be a private affair, but "a social, cooperative, and cumulative process".[172] In Peircean terms, inquiry is a social venture comprising both the efforts to "settle opinion in the face of doubt" and the "move towards the truth that is approached in the long run",[173] as well as transcending the borders of the different scientific disciplines. So it is, and in a 1901 study titled "On the Logic of Drawing History from Ancient Documents, especially from Testimonies", Peirce declared that

> "... the different sciences deal with different kinds of truth; mathematical truth is one thing, ethical truth is another, the

[171]Marc Champagne, *Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs* (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2018), 4.

[172]Gérard Deledalle, *Charles S. Peirce's Philosophy of Signs: Essays in Comparative Semiotics*, Advances in Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 28.

[173]Andrew Robinson, *God and the World of Signs: Trinity, Evolution, and the Metaphysical Semiotics of C.S. Peirce*, Philosophical Studies in Science and Religion (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2010), 44 and 57.

> actually existing state of the universe is a third; but all these different conceptions have in common something very marked and clear. We all hope that the different scientific inquiries in which we are severally engaged are going ultimately to lead to some definitely established conclusion, which conclusion we endeavor to anticipate in some measure. Agreement with that ultimate proposition that we look forward to,—agreement with that, whatever it may turn out to be, is the scientific truth".[174]

From the early stages of his path, Peirce studied the Latins and profoundly respected the science-oriented spirit of Scholasticism. In an 1869 writing titled "The Spirit of Scholasticism", the "architect"[175] of the pragmaticist method maintained that the Schoolmen did not attribute much weight to the literary refinement of theories. In this aspect, Scholastics "resembled" modern scientists, who cannot be understood by people "not scientific", and admired theories due to their "minute, systematic, extensive, strict, scientific

[174]Charles S. Peirce, *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2: 1893-1913*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 87.

[175]To put it the way we read it in Ivo Assad Ibri, *Kósmos Noetós: The Metaphysical Architecture of Charles S. Peirce*, Philosophical Studies Series (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2017), 83.

researches". Peirce continued:

> "This same scientific spirit has been equally misunderstood as it is found in the schoolmen. They have been above all things found fault with because they do not write a literary style and do not 'study in a literary spirit'. The men who make this objection cannot possibly comprehend the real merits of modern science. If the words *quidditas*, *entitas*, and *haecceitas* are to excite our disgust, what shall we say of the Latin of the botanists, and the style of any technically scientific work? (...) But above all things it is the searching thoroughness of the schoolmen which affiliates them with men of science and separates them, world-wide, from modern so-called philosophers. The thoroughness I allude to consists in this, that in adopting any theory, they go about everywhere, they devote their whole energies and lives in putting it to tests *bona fide* – not such as shall merely add a new spangle to the glitter of their proofs but such as shall really go toward satisfying their restless insatiable impulse to put their opinions to the *test*".[176]

[176]Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks, 8 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-1958), vol. 1 par. 33.

Not only did Peirce respect the Schoolmen, he rooted his lifetime study of signs in the good old Latin writers. Reports tell us how "characteristically amazed" students customarily get when they realize that Peirce was remarkably sympathetic with medieval Scholasticism.[177] However, this hardly implies that Peirce was familiar with what we are concentrating on, i.e. the CJC, a collective body of scholarship that spread far beyond the geographical limits of its origins to become an exemplary work of internationalization in the domain of philosophy broadly construed.

Witnesses to the Relation

As far as Peirce is concerned, the case of the Portuguese theologian and philosopher Poinsot—a thinker philosophically trained in Coimbra under the umbrella of the pages of the CJC[178]—, is paradig-

[177]We are thinking here first of all of the testimony given by Rosa Maria Mayorga in James Campbell et al., "Teaching Peirce to Undergraduates", ed. James Campbell, Cornelis de Waal, and Richard Hart, *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 44, no. 2 (2008): 225.

[178]Mauricio Beuchot and John Deely, "Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot", *The Review of Metaphysics* 48, no. 3 (1995): 554; see also Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Cursus Conimbricensis", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi

matic; for even though Poinsot was ranked shoulder to shoulder with Suárez as one of the greatest authors of the Latin age,[179] there are no signs whatsoever of Peirce being conversant with Poinsot's works or, indeed, being aware of the very fact that the latter and his works ever existed. Even though we do realize that Peirce did not read Poinsot's treatise, there are signs that Peirce was acquainted with the CJC. Actually, Peirce is said to have been "very familiar" with the "Conimbricenses".[180] By "Conimbricenses", Doyle refers to the CJC or their authors. Admittedly it is true that the global community at times seems to be reducing Coimbra's cultural heritage to the CJC. Geographical designations such as "Conimbricenses" or "Coimbra Course" (*Cursus Conimbricensis)*—as well as "CJC" for that matter—, should be used with caution, considering that such designations include but are not limited to the CJC or their au-

(Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019).

[179]John Deely, *Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-First Century*, Toronto Studies in Semiotics (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 209.

[180]John P. Doyle, "Introduction", in *The Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs*, by Sebastião do Couto, trans. John P. Doyle, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 38 (Milwaukee, Wis: Marquette University Press, 2001), 21.

thors.[181] Nevertheless, such designations are still very commonly used, the first of which seems to be the closest to Peirce and the remaining English-speaking CJC readership's minds. Whether or not we use "Conimbricenses", the fact is that some references to the Peirce-CJC relation can be found in the scholarly literature, first and foremost owing to none other than Deely's zealous engagement with all matters philosophical as well as with those key atlases related to the history of philosophy understood as the diachronic breadth of the *doctrina signorum* or, in short, semiotics. Apart from Deely, a few other authors have noted the Peirce-CJC relation. Yet the bulk of such a handful of studies merely remarked in passing about the Peirce-CJC relation. Deely himself has addressed the matter only in a fairly superficial way. So, what has so far been reported by the community of inquiry on the Peirce-CJC relation? In a nutshell, all that is said about the Peirce-CJC relation is (i) that Peirce was very well acquainted with the CJC, most notably the treatise on logic in general and the doctrine of signs more particularly, (ii) that Peirce held its authors in high regard, and (iii)

[181]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Cursus Conimbricensis", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019).

that the CJC is the link rendering the Peirce-Poinsot relation more than a mere coincidence. Nearly all over the literature the same hypothesis is echoed, with virtually the entire community pointing towards Deely as the one behind the assumption, which the latter puts forth in one of his books in the following manner:

> "... the Conimbricenses, Poinsot's as well as Peirce's teachers in matters semiotic, whence he [Peirce] took up the expression 'doctrina signorum' or 'doctrine of signs', (...) and whence he took up, more importantly, the idea of the sign as necessarily involving three terms in a single relation".[182]

While Deely may be right that Couto's treatise provided a stepping stone for Peirce, as earlier for Poinsot, to arrive at the triadic definition of the sign understood as a sign-relation, the fact remains that no research exclusively focused on the Peirce-CJC relation has been undertaken up until now. Prior to this research, the community of inquiry will be unable to achieve growth in this particular respect, at least not to a sufficient extent. To achieve growth to a sufficient extent means that such growth is enough to grant researchers

[182]John Deely, *Purely Objective Reality*, Semiotics, Communication and Cognition 4 (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2009), 129.

a comfortable sense of soundness upon which to ease the "irritation of doubt" and attain belief. We are looking forward to attaining belief, but it is a fine fact that we are irritated by doubt. According to Deledalle, Peirce considered that the irritation of doubt is what "puts thought into action", as well as that it is possible to "dispel" it and ' reach belief", which is what "puts an end" to the irritation of doubt.[183] Admittedly, some hypotheses seem more promising than others, and the assumption that Peirce got his definition of the sign from the CJC is certainly worth serious consideration.

A Few Examples

Beyond the evidential degree of commonality between the CJC and Peirce's definitions of the sign and the fact that the latter was indeed in direct contact (see below) with the work in which such a definition is proposed,[184] the fact that those experts who endorse the hypothesis form a truly respectable roster should also be taken

[183]Gérard Deledalle, *Charles S. Peirce, 1839-1914: An Intellectual Biography*, trans. Susan Petrilli (Amsterdam and Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 1990), 28-30.

[184]We refer to Sebastião do Couto, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritæ* (Coimbra: D. G. Loureyro, 1606).

into account. To nobody's detriment, some of the most prominent among them are:

— Mauricio Beuchot and John Deely, "Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot", *The Review of Metaphysics* 48, no. 3 (1995): 539–66. This is the first published text to emphasize the need to consider the Peirce-CJC relation in a serious way.

— John Deely, "Why Investigate the Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot?", in *Semiotics 1994*, ed. John Deely and C. W. Spinks (New York: Peter Lang Verlag, 1996), 34–50. This text has been presented to the public even before the text listed above was published. On Saturday, the 22nd of October 1994, on the occasion of Deely's introduction to Richard L. Lanigan's Presidential Lecture at the Annual Meeting of the Semiotic Society of America, this paper provided the foundational document for the public life of the Peirce-CJC relation as it is known today.

— Wilfrid Hodges, "The Laws of Distribution for Syllogisms", *Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic* 39, no. 2 (1998). Hodges makes one of the few exceptions that does not touch upon the Peirce-CJC relation in light of the general definition of the sign-relation, which is why we are adding some information here. In discussing the "laws that a valid syllogism must obey", Hodges (p. 21) mentions the CJC as the

source where such laws had been found expressed partway through. As the author points out in the same paragraph, it seems that it was much later (in Peirce's work) that the history of logic witnessed the full expression of such laws. It goes without saying that the Peirce-CJC relation may prove to be helpful in understanding how the expression of such laws has evolved rather than simply arising by chance in quite distant places, times, and languages.

— John P. Doyle, "Introduction", in *The Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs*, by Sebastião do Couto, trans. John P. Doyle, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 38 (Milwaukee, Wis: Marquette University Press, 2001), 15–29. Here not only is the Peirce-CJC relation mentioned, focusing on the definition of the sign in general, but the doctrine of signs of the CJC is introduced[185] to the English-speaking readership right after a foreword by Deely in which the CJC is held up as an incontrovertible linchpin for assessing the philosophical worth of the Latin Age.[186] Both texts antecede the English

[185]And yet Doyle was already studying Couto's semiotics for at least a couple of decades. This is evidenced, for instance, by John P. Doyle, "The Conimbricenses on the Relations Involved in Signs", in *Semiotics 1984*, ed. John Deely (Lanham, MD and London: University Press of America, 1985), 567–76 and John P. Doyle, "The Conimbricenses on the Semiotic Character of Mirror Images", *The Modern Schoolman*, no. 76 (1998): 17–32.

[186]We refer to John Deely, "Foreword: A New Determination of the Middle Ages",

translation of the *doctrina signorum* of the CJC. As far as we know, this is the first-ever translation into vernacular of a Latin treatise of Coimbra semiotics. Apart from the scholarly credit that everywhere else can be acknowledged, Doyle and Deely have thus won an ageless seat in the collective memory of the city where the heart of Portuguese academic life is found.

— Mauricio Beuchot, *Estudios Sobre Peirce y La Escolástica* (Pamplona, España: Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad de Navarra, 2002). Here Beuchot takes the aforementioned joint work with Deely. Beuchot does not delve too deeply into the Peirce-CJC relation, but rather expands on the topic, concentrating on the far-reaching relations between Peirce and Scholasticism.

— Benedict M. Ashley, *The Way Toward Wisdom: An Interdisciplinary and Intercultural Introduction to Metaphysics*, Thomistic Studies (Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006). In this opus of striking proportions (about 800 pages), Ashley portrays the CJC as a surprising key to explaining Peirce's remarkable achievements in semiotics, a key that enables it to be unsurprising that Peirce "be-

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in *The Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs*, by Sebastião do Couto, trans. John P. Doyle, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 38 (Milwaukee, Wis: Marquette University Press, 2001), 9–13.

came the principal modern promoter of semiotics, and a key transitional figure in philosophy to the era of postmodern thought" (p. 69).

— John Deely, *Medieval Philosophy Redefined: The Development of Cenoscopic Science, AD354 to 1644 (From the Birth of Augustine to the Death of Poinsot)* (University of Scranton Press, 2010). This work, which met new editions with a slightly revised title (...*Redefined as the Latin Age*...) in 2016 and 2020 under the label of St. Augustine's Press, is a remarkable expansion of the part dealing with the Latin Age in Deely's 2001 over 1000 pages-long *Four ages of understanding: the first postmodern survey of philosophy from ancient times to the turn of the twenty-first century*. We are going to be moving out of this listing modality to devote a couple of paragraphs to this thread. We will be referring alternatively to the St. Augustine's Press 2016 edition. This is a first-rate edition, despite a minor shortcoming in the critical apparatus still found in the 2020 edition which in no way jeopardizes the validity of both editions.[187] Verily, we should point out that St. Augustine's Press is among the most reliable publishing houses operating in the world today, and that a book such as John's,

[187]On this see Robert Junqueira, "Medieval Philosophy Redefined: Plea for a Fourth and Revised Edition", *Academia Letters*, January 1, 2022, 2-3.

containing a profusion of diagrams, footnotes, and references should be of the utmost difficulty to revise. One can only conclude that, if not even St. Augustine's Press is immune to imperfection, then there can be no perfection beneath the sun and the moon.

Deely's Grand Narrative

In *Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age*, Deely presents a grand narrative of the history of philosophy as revolving around the history of the sign, a narrative that culminates in the works of João Poinsot. A grand narrative is one that purports to provide insight into a wide range of events in history and renders them meaningful by bringing them together with a variety of widespread phenomena that appeal to some common ground.[188] Because Poinsot's works

[188]In a text of two contemporary Ukrainian authors who claim to be loyal to Jean-François Lyotard (†1998), we read the following about the characteristics that differentiate "ordinary narratives" and "grand narratives". As the authors say, "1) they [grand narratives] are comprehensive and cover many various issues and areas; 2) there is a greater explanatory ability, in contrast to ordinary narratives, which are usually descriptive; 3) legitimation of claims within the scope of a grand narrative can be traced."

And the authors add: "Legitimation is the most important here due to the fact that with the help of grand narratives, ideological attitudes and political beliefs change social behavior". Oleksandr Horban and Mariia Maletska, "Space Age Grand Narratives in Videogames", *Philosophy and Cosmology* 28 (2022): 66.

have been largely left unexplored during modernity, the history of philosophy experiences a hiatus that is not brought to an end until the advent of semiotics in the wake of Peirce. In *Medieval Philosophy Redefined*, Deely grants an utterly central role to the CJC in his revision of the history of philosophy, not only as a basis for the merits of Poinsot and Peirce, but also because of the many important contributions of the CJC to the community of inquiry. Doctor Deely expects *Medieval Philosophy Redefined* to provide a historiographical laboratory for the sake of future research. The author gives his opening words a certain ring of ceremony. Dr. Deely's remarks convey the promise of an unprecedented retelling of the history of science. Strictly put, Deely assures the community of inquiry that the history of science has lacked a vast and meaningful share of the historical human understanding and experience of science, and this book is designed to overcome such an unbalanced picture. John Deely uses the term "science", we read on page x, to signify "critically controlled objectification", and he notes that over time the evolution of science has actually turned out to be far more invigorating and profound than suggested by its mainstream renditions. To unveil unmistakably the blind spot in the history of critically controlled objectification, dubbed by Deely as the 'Latin Age

of understanding', is bound to propitiate, in the author's opinion, a shift towards a new equilibrium at the heart of the community of inquiry, hitherto undermined by the disregard paid by the dominant modern mindset to nearly 1290 years of scholarship dating from the birth of Augustine of Hippo to the burial of João Poinsot. Apropos of a public discussion about Deely's *Medieval Philosophy Redefined*, Claus Asbjørn Andersen, an intellectual historian (University of South Bohemia), asked us the following in the first half of 2022: "How can the year of Poinsot's death be helpful for a redefinition of 'medieval philosophy', when the late-scholastic tradition he was a part of lasted well into the 18th century? This does not make sense to me." In brief, our answer was:

> "'Medieval Philosophy Redefined', which is a chapter devoted to the Latin Age that has grown independent of 'Four ages of Understanding', is a history of the signum, what Deely reasons is a trademark Latin inception, primarily Augustinian, and all too germane to the diachronic picture of general semiotics. According to John, the object of semiotics is the signum, meant as the result of an eclosion that lingered in the proceedings from Augustine to Poinsot. One learns further in various works by John Deely that the implications of the signum

that ecloded in Poinsot's treatise on signs, namely the signum understood as a sign-relation (an irreducibly triadic ontological relativity between vehicle [usually known as sign] - object - awareness), were not drawn out or laid dormant during modernity (until Peirce). In dealing with the oeuvre of Sebastião do Couto, Peirce superseded Couto's signum in a manner identical to that of Poinsot, but deriving from that all the implications and stumbling upon a brighter short-term future than Poinsot for the scholarly acknowledgement of his works among the research community. In such a way, Peirce is said to have ushered all of us in the history of semiotics proper, called at times by Deely the Semiotic Age, at other times the Postmodern Age, and then he even revealed personally to Gary Shank that this post-Peircean present should be seen as the Age of Relation. All will stand to reason if you will read John Deely, for he is nothing short of brilliant, and whether or not you agree with him, you will find him to be a craftsman of reasonableness when it comes to assuming his standpoints and furthering interests".[189]

[189]Because the online platform where the exchange took place did not allow text formatting, the titles and the word *signum* do not appear in italics, but the former are instead enclosed in single quotation marks and *signum* is assumed

Possibly we have been mistaken in some respect. Our question now is whether Peirce has in fact drawn all the implications of the ontological character of the triadic sign-relation (as a relation, and therefore suprasubjectively real; below we will delve further into this matter). Has Peirce really overcome Poinsot in this regard, other than in terms of the quantity of pages written on the subject? And has Deely not taken Poinsot as having gone further than Peirce in regard to these considerations? These questions remain to be settled in future studies. The fact is that it was as stated above that we responded to Andersen's stimulating question.[190] Were we to track down and interpret all the signs of the Coimbra school that permeate the universe of *Medieval Philosophy Redefined*, especially as regards the prominent places given to Pedro da Fonseca and the Coimbra student João Poinsot, we would be requiring the help of a whole team of researchers and a couple of years of activity working full-time. It will not be possible as well to explore in detail here, for similar reasons, the research avenues opened up by the traces

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as a non-foreign word.

[190]Andersen's reply was: "Dear Robert, thanks a lot for your reply to my (critical) question. I do now somewhat better understand what is meant with "redefinition" (it is not just about extension in time, but rather a new topical scope, it seems). Thanks too for the recommendation of Deely's works!".

of the CJC in this work of Deely. There are many such traces of deep relevance, but we will only refer to the most pronounced ones concerning the Peirce-CJC relation. In a section devoted to Duns Scotus (†1308), already in the ninth chapter of the work (titled, in short, "After Aquinas but Before Fonseca"), John provides an important reference to the CJC. It is on page 315 and in the first lines of the next one that the author asserts that Peirce "found more of value to the establishment of his semiotics among the Latins than in any single place"; to this, he adds that however much Peirce's "prodigious studies" ranged far and wide, some of the most precious contributions the Latin language offered to the community of inquiry were "so buried" that Peirce became aware of only a few of the countless names to be considered in the context of the Latin Age, such as Scotus and the authors of the CJC. John then goes on to suggest that Peirce remained ignorant, most notably, of the *doctrina signorum* of João Poinsot, which Deely claims to represent "the final answer to Augustine's question" to have emerged "in Latin thought". Or rather, with closer attuning to the more systematic concerns of the community of inquiry, one could simply say that Poinsot's *doctrina signorum* represented the decisive—or *culminating*, to accentuate more arrestingly the not wholly synchronic but

as well diachronic ethos of human understanding—step in the development of the proper understanding of *signum* as it has grown to be understood by countless contemporary semioticians from all around our planet. On page 339, Deely explains that the original version of Augustine's definition of the sign is made up of two basic ingredients: on the one hand, "that the genus of sign was a material structure accessible to sense";[191] on the other, Augustine's emphasis on the specificity of signs in that they convey to perception something other than the signs themselves.[192] Returning to pages

[191]According to Deely, medieval semiotics achieved its first significant breakthrough when it dismissed this particular aspect of Augustine's definition: "Medieval semiotics - the original florescence of semiotic consciousness, launched by Augustine's novel proposal of sign in general and culminating in Poinsot's demonstration that the formal being of every sign is an irreducibly triadic relation as suprasubjective - made its first advance by recognizing that not the subjectivity of a material structure made it be a sign[-vehicle, i.e., a sign not in the technical sense as a *sign-relation* but just the mediating element *within* such a relation] (or 'representamen'), but only the relation that material being exhibited to something other than itself in someone's awareness. Whence it could be seen that psychological realities, ideas and feelings, similarly performed the essential sign-function of making present in awareness something that, as other-representations, they themselves were not, namely, their objects". John Deely, "Semiosis and 'Meaning as Use': The Indispensability and Insufficiency of Subjectivity in the Action of Signs", *Sign Systems Studies* 43, no. 1 (2015): 15.

[192]Deely maintains that we are speaking here of a more than just terminological innovation Augustine has contributed to history: "The only notion of sign the-

315-316, it is plain to see that Deely deems Poinsot's solution to the problems arising from the efforts to properly define the *signum* to be wonderfully convincing, above all because of the high standard he recognizes in Poinsot's doctrine, but also due to the degree of over-

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matically pursued in ancient philosophy is what we after Augustine would call *natural signs*: you see smoke, you know that something's burning; you find milk in a woman's breasts, you know she is near childbirth; and so on. (...) There were of course anticipations of such a definition [Augustine's definition of the *signum*] among the ancient Greeks. But generally they distinguished signs ('δηυεὶα') in nature from the symbolic systems of culture dependent upon language ('δνυβολα') without thematizing any common ground underlying the two, any distinctive 'action' that provides the framework for both alike". And the author adds that "Augustine's point, however, once made, borders on 'self-evident': if a *sign* is *anything* that brings into our awareness something that it itself is not, clearly it makes no difference if that 'something' is a phenomenon of nature or an artifact of human culture. So throughout the so-called 'Middle Ages', Augustine's understanding of sign as a phenomenon transcending the nature/culture divide displaces the original Greek notion and becomes everywhere taken for granted". John Deely, "Why Life Presupposes Semiosis", *Chinese Semiotic Studies* 12, no. 2 (2016): 166.

The text in which Carvalho claims that, although Couto could not be aware of it, a semiotic understanding of his doctrine of signs would be instrumental for missionary service in enabling the overcoming of the nature/culture divide, is Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Philosophy at the Geopolitical Service of Mission: Coimbra Jesuits' 'Wirkungsgeographie' (1542-1730)", in *Engaging Sources: The Tradition and Future of Collecting History in the Society of Jesus*, ed. Cristiano Casalini, Emanuele Colombo, and Seth Meehan (Engaging Sources: The Tradition and Future of Collecting History in the Society of Jesus, Institute of Jesuit Sources, 2021).

lap that can be found "in the final conception of the being proper to signs" in both Poinsot and Peirce's doctrines of signs or semiotics. Such an overlap is explained, Deely says, not merely because of the "objective requirements of the sign that determine the final outcome or 'shape' of the fundamental doctrine to which the sources are but landmarks along the way", but also because both Peirce and Poinsot's minds were shaped under the auspices of the thinking of Duns Scotus and, of course, the authors of the CJC. As already mentioned above, one of the most significant insights that the CJC facilitated to semioticians was an understanding of the sign as a triadic relation, that is to say, as a kind of relation that is triadic and that Deely terms *sign-relation*. As Deely says on page 390, it was the textual universe of the Latin philosophical legacy, above all Duns Scotus and the CJC (but also very importantly Thomas Aquinas), that allowed Peirce to explore the significance of the theme of signs. This, according to the author, led Peirce to operate a philosophical revolution simultaneously post-medieval and post-modern, in the first case by pushing inquiry to every corner of nature, and in the second one by refusing to adhere to the differentiating blunders not of modern science but of modern epistemological approaches, which tended to rely and therefore concentrate on ideas alone and

thus to discredit meanings resulting from the senses, as well as to seek to establish "new foundations for the whole of human knowledge" out of the assumption that "our own ideas are in fact the first and only direct objects attained in awareness", leading the philosophical community of inquiry to isolate the human animal "within its own private world". As the author says on page 386, the authors of the CJC are to be credited with laying down, at the dawn of the seventeenth century, "the necessarily triadic fact that three terms are involved in the being of signs". In John's words, again on page 390, "what Peirce picked up from his reading of the Latins", including the CJC, was precisely "the trail of the sign", and reaffirms that "by reading the Conimbricenses in particular", the founder of contemporary semiotics[193] "came to share with Poinsot some common theoretical background" that led him to bequeath to us "some teachings in common" with João Poinsot. This was but a cursory

[193]There has been a suggestion to say that Peirce is not the founder but the founding father of contemporary semiotics, as it is believed that there is also a founding mother. The female head of this heterosexual household is Lady Victoria Welby-Gregory. Susan Petrilli and Augusto Ponzio, "Semioethics as a Vocation of Semiotics. In the Wake of Welby, Morris, Sebeok, Rossi-Landi", in *Semiotics and Its Masters*, ed. Kristian Bankov and Paul Cobley, Semiotics, Communication and Cognition, volume 18 (Boston and Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton, 2017), 29.

glance at Deely's work with regard to the Peirce-CJC relation. All that remains right now is to conclude that it is in the best interest of the community of inquiry at large to delve further into the impact of the CJC on Peirce, not least in order to have access to more comprehensive information on the role of the authors of the CJC in the history of philosophy and semiotics in particular beyond the formulation of the general definition of the sign-relation, and obviously also to be better equipped to triangulate the shared gene pool between Peirce and Poinsot.

One Rare Swan

We are not going to pursue the above listing any further. Other works that we could have listed are already included among the titles listed in the first part of our "State of the Art" (above). Indeed, many other works could have been mentioned, but nothing new of major import in relation to what is contributed by those already listed is involved as far as the Peirce-CJC relation is concerned. However, due to the fact that the works are of extreme prominence, we wish to highlight a few others referring to the Peirce-CJC relation, specifically: Paul Bains' *The Primacy of Semiosis: An Ontol-*

ogy of Relations;[194] Mauricio Beuchot's "Peirce y la escolástica hispánica";[195] Anderson Vinícius Romanini's "Semiótica minuta - especulações sobre a gramática dos signos e da comunicação a partir da obra de Charles S. Peirce"; [196] Susan Petrilli's "Working with Interpreters of the 'Meaning of Meaning': International Trends among 20th-Century Sign Theorists";[197] John Deely's "Toward a Postmodern Recovery of 'Person"';[198] and his, "Semiotic Entanglement: The Concepts of Environment, Umwelt, and Lebenswelt in Semiotic Perspective";[199] Carolin Behrmann's *Tyrann und Märtyrer: Bild und Ideengeschichte des Rechts um 1600*.[200] Deely's "What Semiotics Is"[201] and "Semiotics 'Today': The Twentieth-Century Founding and Twenty-First-Century Prospects";[202] Mário Santiago de Carvalho's,

[194]Toronto Studies in Semiotics and Communication (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2006).

[195]*Revista anthropos: Huellas del conocimiento*, no. 212 (2006): 160–67.

[196]Dissertação de Doutoramento, Universidade de São Paulo, 2006.

[197]*The American Journal of Semiotics* 24, no. 4 (2008): 49–88.

[198]*Espíritu: Cuadernos Del Instituto Filosófico de Balmesiana*, no. 143 (2012): 146–65

[199]*Semiotica*, no. 199 (2014): 7–42.

[200]De Gruyter, 2015.

[201]*Language and Semiotic Studies* 1, no. 1 (2015): 63–94

[202]In *International Handbook of Semiotics*, ed. Peter Pericles Trifonas (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2015), 29–113.

The Coimbra Jesuit Aristotelian Course;[203] Martine Bocquet's "Le triangle pré-sémiotique d'Aristote selon John Deely : l'erreur d'Aristote et de Saussure";[204]; Susana Pérez' "La Memoria Semiótica: Entre El Mundo Circundante (Umwelt) y La Cultura. Análisis Biosemiótico-Filosófico";[205] plus the most esteemed contribution to the remarkably fruitful series edited by Jamin Pelkey: Michal Karľa and Tuuli Pern's, "Early-Modern Semiotics".[206] By and large, Ashley, Petrilli, and most others do not amount to much more than merely mentioning the Peirce-CJC relation, in many cases under Deely's authority—but also under the aegis of "Coimbra as an International Institution", a section coordinated by Mário Santiago de Carvalho in the encyclopedia of the Conimbricenses.org project—, and usually only regarding the definition of the sign, which is maybe the most

[203]Coimbra University Press, 2018. This work is probably the single most important contribution to the tradition of CJC studies ever published, since it offers the global community of inquiry an accessible springboard for exploring the CJC, and its only failure is that it merely hints in passing at the Peirce-CJC relation.

[204]*Revue française des sciences de l'information et de la communication*, no. 25 (March 1, 2022).

[205]PhD Thesis, Morelia, Michoacán, Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo, 2022.

[206]In *Bloomsbury Semiotics Volume 1: History and Semiosis*, ed. Jamin Pelkey (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2023).

significant though the least well-grounded—not in light of the secondary literature (see above), but of Peirce's references to the CJC (see below)—of all the aspects of Peirce's semiotic logic that could be claimed, based on the current state of the art, to draw on the CJC. Of course, above we bypassed most of Deely's works in which the Peirce-CJC relation is brought up without going any deeper into the matter than in 'the historiographical black swan', where the author goes more in-depth about the CJC but still very little about the Peirce-CJC relation. We have assigned this nickname to Deely's *Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age*. The motivation behind the way we have named Deely's work? When we began this project, we were unable to find references to the Peirce-CJC relation in philosophical historiography's grand narratives. So when we came across Deely's work, we said: behold, a black swan. One might, of course, contend that the black swan is actually Deely himself, since in so many other works Deely primes the ground for *Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age* that it is probably fair not to single out just one of them. Bear in mind, for example, the *Four Ages of Understanding*. In several other respects is Deely a black swan, such as in his treatment of João Poinsot. Just think of

John Poinsot, *Tractatus de Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsot.*[207] It should be noted that black swans are a symbol of *rara avis*, but it should not be taken to mean there is but one single black swan, and so I do not wish to deify Deely, but merely to acknowledge the fact that it is unusual to locate works such as his on the bookseller's market or indeed in the depths of the World Wide Web. "Black swans are rare birds but they can be seen, they do exist" and, of course, "they make their presence felt".[208] They make their presence felt, indeed. Deely was a black swan who besides being aware of his condition (not only as regards the Peirce-CJC relation), also made his proud, noble voice heard about it and openly denounced the mainstream philosophical historiography, even in non-historiographical essays. It is worth reading:

> "In the currently standard histories of philosophy – which take as their backdrop the various periods in their contrast with the original Greek development – the Latin Age, by the time the formal/instrumental sign distinction becomes central, no

[207]Ed. and trans. John Deely, 1st ed (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

[208]Peter Goodrich, "Introduction: Un Cygne Noir", *Cardozo Law Review* 27 (2005): 543.

> longer is considered part of the mainstream development (...) So in the very period that Latin Age philosophers advanced beyond Augustine's general definition of sign as transcending the nature/culture divide by coming to recognize that signs *also* transcend the inner/outer (or subjective/objective) divide, the current standard histories direct students' attention away from that development. Instead, these currently standard histories shift attention toward Renaissance humanism and the Latin recovery of Plato's writings, then on to the "modern development" based on Descartes' advice to stop reading the Latins lest their errors continue to infect us, and to pursue rather a new "Way of Ideas" whereon all genuine *experience* of communication perforce turned out to be, in Kantian terms, a "transcendental illusion".[209]

Standard historiography distracts us from what Deely considered to be the main tradition in the development of semiotic consciousness, a tradition that culminates in the works of Poinsot, back in the Latin Age, and only becomes a major trend again in the wake of Peirce, now in the Age of Relation. As Deely says, the

[209]John Deely, "Why Life Presupposes Semiosis", *Chinese Semiotic Studies* 12, no. 2 (2016): 168-170.

evolution of semiotics unfolds in a variety of traditions, albeit involving uneven degrees of significance. The authors of the CJC are included in the group that Deely deems to be the main tradition.[210] One tradition won the battle for intellectual supremacy in the so-called Modern Age, but ultimately the authors who prepared the ground for such a victory ended up backstabbed by the modern unwillingness to learn from the Latins. Such a tradition is the one that follows the path of William of Ockham (†1347), who is commonly recognized as the figure behind the rise of nominalism. The doctrine of signs always continued to expand in the context of such a tradition as well, despite such a line of development also being given a relatively low emphasis within mainstream historiography. Could it be that there was some sense of there being here, as Deely believed, pillars of clay in the very foundations of the constructs of modernity? Is it a matter of malice on the part of historiographers, trying to cover up the rotten philosophical ground on which they are perhaps standing? We think not (Deely would certainly notice that this wording can prove to be a risky one for the followers of Descartes.

[210]John Deely, *Semiotic Animal: A Postmodern Definition of "Human Being" Transcending Patriarchy and Feminism* (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2010), 31.

However mistaken such a tradition may be in setting apart categorically the realm of mental realities from the one of corporeal ones, it is nevertheless entirely fair that there are those who hold this view to be convincing, no matter how this may entail some *bona fide* scientific nonsense or even the prescription of miracles in explaining the way in which it is possible for communication to take place at all. The Francophone scholarly world provided us with the results of some very respectable efforts to chart the development of the nominalist doctrine of signs during the fourteenth century, proceeding from Ockham's views and following the trail of his immediate impact on the community of inquiry. If not simply to become more learned, perhaps to counterbalance some of Deely's views on these matters, one can read Joël Biard's, *Logique et Théorie du Signe au XIVe Siècle*.[211] On Ockham, in English, it may be edifying to read Johannes M. M. H. Thijssen's "The Crisis over Ockhamist Hermeneutic and Its Semantic Background: The Methodological Significance of the Censure of December 29, 1340".[212] Those who wish to transcend

[211]Etudes de Philosophie Medievale, LXIV (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1989).

[212]In *Vestigia, Imagines, Verba: Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIIth-XIVth Century)*, ed. Constantino Marmo, Semiotic and Cognitive Studies, IV (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), 371–92.

Deely by considering the importance of other traditions of European semiotics, this time with a focus on Poinsot's century, have no other choice but to read, in French, Hélène Leblanc's, *Théories Sémiotiques à l'Âge Classique.* Translatio Signorum.[213] Also part of the tradition favored by Deely is Peirce, who wrote the following on the fifth of November 1891, under the title "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined":

> "the conclusions of science make no pretence to being more than probable, and (...) a probable inference can at most only

[213]Paris: Vrin, 2021. The Portuguese language is nowhere near having already provided due care to Leblanc, but Carvalho has already written a very commendable critical review of Leblanc's work, to wit: Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Hélène Leblanc, Théories Sémiotiques à l'Âge Classique. Translatio Signorum. Avec une préface de Laurent Cesalli. Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin: Paris, 2021, 314 pp. ISBN: 978-271-16-2947-3.", *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 30, no. 60 (2021): 417–22.

To be sure, the Italian language has already begun broadening the readership of Leblanc's work, by publishing Hélène Leblanc, *Teorie Semiotiche Del XVII Secolo.* Translatio Signorum, trans. Constantino Marmo (Bologna University Press, 2023).

The translation of this work into internationally resonant languages like Arab, Chinese, Hindi, Portuguese, or Spanish is of the utmost urgency, particularly because it is on the basis of Leblanc's work that we will be in a position to broaden and deepen our awareness of the history of the doctrine of signs throughout a period that characterizes the Western transition to modernity.

> suppose something to be most frequently, or otherwise approximately, true, but never that anything is precisely true without exception throughout the universe".[214]

Peircean observations about the uncertainty embedded in scientific reasoning provide the impetus for a broader consideration of the very nature of truth and knowledge. To avoid having turned out to be the "philosopher *maudit*" of which Nassim Nicholas Taleb speaks,[215] perhaps Peirce was short of the stylistic flair that the usage of some highly illustrative example, preferably including animals, might have added to his insightful claims. In contrast, the work of other philosophers, such as Karl Popper (†1994), attracted more instant acclaim, possibly due to the more accessible and popular nature of the examples offered. In dealing with the probabilistic nature of scientific conclusions, maybe Peirce ought to have given the same kind of example that Popper gave with regard to the falsifiability of scientific theories. Who knows if this would not have

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[214]Charles S. Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 8: 1890–1892*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010), 113.

[215]Nassim Nicholas Taleb, *The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable Fragility* (New York: Random House Publishing Group, 2010), 57. The first edition is from 2007.

earned Peirce the kind of early success enjoyed in life by Karl Popper, who capitalized on black swans to convey a message that resembles that of Peirce and that may be easily heard in paraphrases even in the flower shops of Freixo de Espada à Cinta or—more ergonomically for those among us who have not had or will not have in the near future the joy of visiting Portugal—read on page 4 of an English edition of *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*[216], where the Austrian philosopher notes that there is no case for the assumption that all swans are white, regardless of the number of white swans one may have observed; a black swan may ultimately come into the picture. As Mário Santiago de Carvalho is the august scholar to whom the community of inquiry owes an invaluable body of understanding about the CJC, Deely is the epoch-making figure to whom we all owe the establishment within the community of inquiry of the Peirce-CJC hypothesis in its most popular form (we will delve into this again below). It is pointless, in view of all the above and what is to follow, for us to be required at this stage to explain why we are speaking about Carvalho in the way we just did. As regards

[216]Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery*, 2008, Routledge Classics (London and New York: Routledge, 2008). The work was first published in German in 1935 under the title *Logik der Forschung*.

Deely standing as an epoch-making figure, the very same holds true, but here a challenge goes to the perplexed reader: do you happen to be aware of any other scholar who after only five years since his or her passing has had an international eulogy lasting more than 12 months and directly involving, apart from the audience and occasional contributors, more than a hundred scholars from almost forty different countries coming from all the continents of planet Earth, not to mentioned their institutional affiliations and the organizations involved? We are talking about the *IO2S Deely* (see above). Did anything analogous ever happen in the course of human history? Perhaps we should not have said that Deely is an epoch-making figure, for he may be more than that: a key personality in the evolution of humankind, of semiotic consciousness, and of a humane understanding of reality. Deely, however, may be fairly accused of having taken less time to flesh out his Peirce-CJC hypothesis than he did to thoroughly articulate it to other historiographical and systematic threads. These threads pertain to Deely's main concerns regarding the history of the sign and general semiotics as both distinct from and complementarily in tandem with the disciplines of applied semiotics.

A Neglected Reality

So, in conclusion, from the secondary literature it is known that Peirce was quite conversant with the CJC, having in some way gained access to Couto's *doctrina signorum*. What is more, Peirce is not among those who have been tricked by the *Logica Furtiva*,[217] for as we will show below, when Peirce methodically made references to it, he was directly and unequivocally pointing to the CJC. As we will show below, Peirce's explicit references to the CJC are by no means all that is at issue: his involvement with the CJC may well be revealing of a weighty and pervasive network of associations reaching far beyond the references themselves. Yet, considering the references, we will show that Peirce drew on two volumes of the CJC: *On the Soul*[218] and *On the Whole of Dialectics* (as a minimum).[219] Peirce relied on the CJC for guidance at least as to the following topics: logical quantities; abstractive knowledge (and, as we will

[217]We are speaking of the counterfeit version of the logic of the CJC as opposed to the genuine one, Couto's *Dialectica* (see above).

[218]Manuel de Góis, Baltasar Álvares, and Cosme de Magalhães, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis S. J. In Tres Libros de Anima Aristotelis Stagiritæ* (Coimbra: A. Mariz, 1598).

[219]Sebastião do Couto, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritæ*.

see, knowledge or cognition in general); whether logic is an art or a science; predication; fallacies; and the history of logic, most notably matters related to Scotist logic, Thomistic logic, and the relations between these two traditions and nominalism. Sad to repeat, the community of inquiry has not yet yielded to date any research specifically devoted to the Peirce-CJC relation, save for two preliminary studies.[220] It is sad to repeat it, for more research on this topic could have lead to priceless findings about Peirce and his relation to the CJC, while the lack of such inquiries means that the chance to further develop the topic is being ignored, or at least missed. To affirm the extent of the impact of the CJC on Peirce in a legitimate way, the matter has to be examined, for it is by no means sufficient that Peirce claims to have made use of the CJC or that some members of the community of inquiry—regardless of how acclaimed they are—assume that such an impact is extremely significant for

[220]Namely Robert Junqueira, "Charles Sanders Peirce and Coimbra", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi, Coimbra as an International Institution (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2020) and Id., "Peirce and the Coimbra Jesuit Course: A Bond Far More Pervasive Than Commonly Believed", in *PhicaRe (Philosophy & Care Repository)* Coimbra: Institute for Philosophical Studies, 2023, 1–12 (Published as presented at the Charles S. Peirce Society's *10-Minute Thesis Initiative: His Glassy Essence in Relation*).

the doubts surrounding the matter to be settled in a sensible way. As regards the definition of the sign in particular, there is a problem with added complexity in that the logical link between Peirce and the CJC as regards the sign-relation is established, though its extent has yet to be evaluated so as to substantiate the hypothesis pertaining to the genealogical link. Since Peirce shows signs of being so well acquainted with the logic of the CJC, it is worthwhile to pay attention to some doctrinal aspects relative to general semiotics, like the divisions of signs into different kinds and other details that may be of use to consider in order to fortify or disqualify our belief as to whether the CJC was indeed the stepping stone for Peirce to arrive at the triadic definition of the sign-relation. No such research has so far been undertaken. The case for further inquiry into the matter is the single most pressing point that can be made right now. That the question lies in this state of paucity signals unmistakably the extent to which this project is needed. We already know that Peirce was to some extent being intelligently determined by the CJC and that the Peirce-CJC relation is not a figment of our imaginations, yet we do of course remain unaware of the extent to which Peirce can be linked to the CJC.

Turning to His Glassy Essence

Peirce's Access to the CJC

Consent Booster

Even though Peirce may have only once referred to Couto by name and not more than ten times to the CJC (see below), such references are already representative of the uninterrupted and enlightened use that Peirce made of the CJC. Nevertheless, primary questions remain unanswered or yet to be asked. Just listen to the starkest example: how did Peirce get access to the CJC? To this question we are not about to give a definite answer, something that perhaps is not even feasible. But because the irritation of doubt may annoy some people who may have imagined that Peirce may have indeed not accessed the CJC, but merely copied a few passages from some textbook that made use of it, we will proceed with a preliminary consideration of the matter. While we trust that this will serve as

an aid to later scholarship, we also expect to lend a voice in the articulation of a reasoned view on the topic; or, to put it another way, by leading the way into these woods, we hope to bolster the ring of agreement surrounding the fair assumption that Peirce did indeed walk his own walk down the CJC road.

Mission Perhaps Impossible

First in mind is the question of whether Peirce owned a copy of one or more volumes of the CJC. Unfortunately, the Peirce Edition Project did not publish any findings suitable for the community of inquiry to give a definitive answer about it, as one can see throughout the "Bibliography of Peirce's References" that follows the annotations section in the back matter of the volumes of the published *Writings of Charles S. Peirce*. As a matter of fact, it may not be possible at all to respond conclusively to such an interrogation. Here is why:

> "... a large number of the volumes from Peirce's library were given away, many to a university in Japan which had lost its library in a great fire, but some to other libraries. A few of Peirce's books (...) appear to have gone to Boston College. Some

> books were given to interested individuals. Of the more than twelve hundred books, possibly many more, from Peirce's library that Harvard received, fewer than twenty five are included in the Peirce Collection in the Houghton Library. Most of the rest that remain at Harvard are in open stacks either in the Widener or Robbins Libraries where they may be borrowed and carried away by patrons who may be entirely oblivious that the marginal comments are by one of the world's great thinkers".[221]

Whether Peirce owned a copy or copies of the CJC or not may be pretty challenging to ascertain. As to the treatment of Peirce's estate in the institution mentioned above, it is probably advisable to preserve one's decorum and refrain from commenting on it, save to say that while there is life ahead there may be hope, and the day may come when—albeit the damage already done is beyond repair—there will at the very least emerge a sense of caring duly for a

[221]Nathan Houser, "The Fortunes and Misfortunes of the Peirce Papers", in *Signs of Humanity / L'homme et Ses Signes: Proceedings of the IVth International Congress / Actes Du IVe Congrès Mondial. International Association for Semiotic Studies / Association Internationale de Sémiotique. Barcelona/Perpignan, March 30-April 6, 1989*, ed. Gérard Deledalle, Michel Balat, and Janice Deledalle-Rhodes (Mouton de Gruyter, 1992), para. 7.

heritage belonging to the whole of humankind. It is no doubt better to light a candle than curse the darkness. As far as the "great fire" is concerned, Houser is referring to the Imperial University of Tokyo (now University of Tokyo), and to what he described as "a shadowy period of about ten years", starting from 1916 due to the passing of Josiah Royce,[222] regarding the edition of Peirce's writings.[223] What happened was that in 1923 there was a major earthquake in Kanto, which caused a fire that destroyed the library of the Imperial University of Tokyo. About seventy thousand books are said to have been destroyed in the fire.[224] Knowing if some copy or copies of some volume(s) of the CJC happened to be among the titles offered to the University of Tokyo is a very important task in order to get closer to certitude regarding the question of whether Peirce owned

[222]Royce was setting an example that no one has immediately followed in terms of caring for Peirce's estate (see above).

[223]Ibid.

[224]Mitsutake Ikeda, personal communication in May 26, 2020. Ikeda is currently finishing doctoral research at the Coimbra Institute for Philosophical Studies (IEF) on the Portuguese/Japanese philosophical and cultural relations.

To know more about Ikeda, Yulia Nikitenko, and other members of the mentioned institute read Robert Junqueira, "Residência Institucional no Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos da Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra", report, June 2021. Kermit Snelson was not a member of the IEF in those days.

at least some volume(s).

Greater Boston's Greatness

Without wishing to undermine the severe need to track the books which belonged to Peirce, let us hypothesize: say that Peirce did not possess a copy of any of the volumes of the CJC. How did he get access to the CJC? The volumes of the CJC were edited multiple times in different locations.[225] Which edition(s) did he use? Did Peirce rely on a Cologne Edition, as suggested by the Peirce Edition Project?[226] Would it be possible for Peirce to access the CJC in the area of Greater Boston? By what means could copies of the CJC be accessible in the Boston Metropolitan Area? If Peirce were our contemporary, it would be easy to answer such a question; for, even

[225]For an incomplete (though as yet the only available) list of the different editions of the CJC see Grupo de História e Teoria da Ciência, "Comentários Dos Padres Jesuítas de Coimbra Sobre as Obras Filosóficas de Aristóteles. *Commentarii Colegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu... Aristotelis Stagiritæ*", *LUSODAT. Bases de dados sobre história da ciência, da medicina e da técnica em Portugal e Brasil, do Renascimento até 1900*, [nd].

[226]Charles S. Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 2: 1867-1871*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 556.

if Peirce had no access to the World Wide Web,[227] it would still be fairly easy for him to access almost all of the CJC volumes via the compendious holdings of Boston College. In effect, this institution enables access to editions of almost every volume of the CJC, as well as to the counterfeit version of the volume on logic.[228]

Boston College Today

Via Boston College's reading rooms, it is possible to access at least:

— the eight hundred and fifty-one pages-long *Physica*, the second largest volume of the CJC.[229] Written by Manuel de Góis, the volume *On Physics* was completed at the beginning of 1591 and published in Coimbra in 1592 at the expenses of the Coimbra University Publisher, António de Mariz. This treatise was the first to follow from the Coimbra Jesuits' struggle "against the contemporary authors who maligned nature", covering "the more common principles of physics, namely: matter, form and privation, nature and its causes, unity,

[227]Today one only has to follow a link in order to enjoy easy access to digitized versions of all the CJC volumes: http://www.conimbricenses.org/resources/.

[228]The counterfeit volume on logic can be read in Burns Library (B437 .C65 1604 JESUITICA). Details regarding the so-called *Logica Furtiva* have already been provided above.

[229]In Burns Library (PA3903.A1 C6 1602 JESUITICA).

species and types of movement, finite and infinite, place, void and time, the Prime mover and its attributes".[230] The greek φύσις (*phusis)* refers to nature or to that which is natural. However, it denotes (and connotes) temper as well, ie., *the nature* of personality. It connotes temper in such a way that the *doctrina animæ*—what António Manuel Martins refers to as 'rational psychology', Mário Santiago de Carvalho refers to as 'anthropology', and we refer to either way because both forms signify nothing different—will be considered a matter for the natural philosopher. More below. Góis' study of the *phusis*—the whole of natural reality; i.e., the subject covered in the strongest sense by the *Physica*, *De Coelo*, *De Generatione et Corruptione*, and the *Meteororum* (see below)—cannot be equated with what came to be labeled as "physics" after Galileo Galilei (†1642). Thus, one should be careful when alluding to the overall CJC approach to physics; "[p]erhaps it would be better to speak of 'natural philosophy' every time".[231]

[230]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Cursus Conimbricensis", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019).

[231]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "In Octo Libros Physicorum. Editorial History", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2018).

— the four hundred and fifty-three pages-long *De Cœlo*,[232] also written by Góis, the volume *On the Heavens* was published at Simão Lopes' Printing House (Lisbon) in 1593 and covers the following theoretical fields: "mobile being, the structure and composition of the Universe, the five simple bodies, the four elements of the so-called sublunar world, their place and type of local movement".[233]

— the one hundred and forty-three pages-long *Meteorologica*.[234] Góis also wrote the *Meteorologica* or *Meteororum*, the second largest among the volumes printed in Lisbon (1593, by the Publisher Simão Lopes). To get an idea about the freshness of the *Meteorology*—which is also the oddity of the *Parva Naturalia*—, some of the difficulties that the late fifteenth-century Coimbra professors had to face, as well as how much they were concerned with 'pedagogicalities' (pedagogical matters), it is worth reading: "... this title reproduces in its cover the logo of the Society of Jesus, with the Latin motto, '*Nomen Domini Turris Fortissima*"'—literally, 'The name of the Lord is a mighty tower';

[232]Also in Burns Library (PA3903.A1 C6 1602 JESUITICA).

[233]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Cursus Conimbricensis"; see also "In Quatuor Libros De Cœlo. Editorial History", both in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, respectively 2019 and 2018).

[234]Same place and reference as *De Cœlo*, for it is part of a binder's collection also including the latter, *Parva Naturalia*, and the *Ethica* (see below).

except for the *Dialectica*, all the volumes of the CJC feature in their cover the same logo of the Society of Jesus, where this Latin motto is printed—"The volume on *Meteororum* is the first volume of the entire Coimbra Jesuit Aristotelian [Course] to follow a different style, which will be also adopted by the *Parva Naturalia*. The Preface (*Prooemium)* of the *Meteororum* indicates and justifies such a method of brevity: the omission of the Aristotelian text, as well as the lesser investment in the division of the questions, is due to the lack of time for lecturing the whole cycle of Arts within the period of time prescribed for it; furthermore, it is decided that the Jesuit perspective on what Aristotle had sparsely written should be summarized and put together under a few chapters, and, it is said that with a choice like that – namely, thirteen treatises divided into chapters – the Coimbra Jesuits aimed at turning such an enjoyable subject matter into an even more enjoyable and profitable lesson".[235] This volume evidences in an exemplary way the unified quality of the eight volumes of the CJC, as questions which could have been dealt with in the *Meteorologica*, such as the dependence of the sublunary world relative to heaven and the motion of planets, "will be skipped" because they

[235]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "In Libros Meteororum Aristotelis. Editorial History", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia* (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2018).

were properly examined in the volume *De Cœlo*.[236]

— the one hundred and four pages-long *Parva Naturalia*,[237] also published in Lisbon (1593) and written by Góis (more info on this volume above). Although the books included under the umbrella of the *Parva Naturalia* are traditionally nine, Góis included only eight: *On Memory, On Sleep, On Dreams, On Divination in Sleep, On Respiration* [or *On Breathing], On Youth and Old Age, On Life and Death, and On the Durability and Brevity of Life*. The reason why Góis did not include a commentary on *Sense and Sensibilia* is that "the subject matters on *Sense and Sensibilia* were dealt with mostly in the volume on *De anima*".[238]

— the ninety-five pages-long *Ethica*. The CJC volume *On Ethics* is the last volume included in the binder's collection mentioned above. Also authored by Góis, the *Ethica* was the last volume published by Simão Lopes Printing House (Lisbon 1593), as well as the first volume of the CJC to be translated into English, although the labor was limited to a brief section centered on the question of "Whether

[236]See *Ibid.*

[237]See the footnotes on the *Meteorologica* and *De Cœlo* above.

[238]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "In Libros Aristotelis Qui Parva Naturalia Appellantur. Editorial History", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia* (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2018).

Happiness Consists in an Activity of the Soul". This section consists of three articles: (i) arguments are given in support of an affirmative answer to the question of whether happiness resides in goods of the soul; (ii) the question of the location of happiness among the activities of the soul is addressed; and (iii) Aristotle's definition of happiness is described.[239] This volume is the only volume of the CJC whose title does not exhibit the word "Commentary". The volume *On Ethics* does not only dismiss the Aristotelian text but also represents another "exception", as it "does not follow the explanation method, but each one of its nine disputations is divided into questions and these again subdivided into articles".[240] In this volume, "nine disputes are subdivided into four parts which configure the teaching framework and the philosophical horizon that defines the scope of philosophical ethics: the good and the end (the first two disputes), which, apart from configuring a meta-ethics, also set the

[239]The translation can be found in Coimbra Commentators, "Introduction Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics: Disputation III, Question 3", in Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts, ed. and trans. Jill Kraye, vol. 1. Moral philosophy (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 81–85.

[240]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "In Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis Ad Nicomachum. Editorial History", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2018).

ontological frontiers of ethics; happiness and human actions, first from the perspective of their principles, and then in their relation with good and evil (third and fifth disputes); the passions (sixth dispute); finally, the virtues, first studied overall, then with a focus on prudence, deemed the most important virtue and the other ones' overseer. The remaining virtues – justice, courage and temperance – are briefly discussed in the last dispute".[241]

— the five hundred and ninety pages-long *De Anima*.[242] The CJC volume *On the Soul* was published in Coimbra in 1598; perhaps the fact that Góis died one year prior to it explains why this volume is authored as well by Álvares and Magalhães (some information about this volume is provided above). It is clear that among those involved in making of the CJC, Manuel de Góis played a pivotal role, followed in importance by Couto alone (because of the volume on logic, of course) and at a comfortable distance. Góis was so devoted to the CJC that he "wanted to oversee all of the course materials and even that the texts be published in his name, and not as a collaborative

[241]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Cursus Conimbricensis", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019).

[242]In Burns Library (PA3892.A2 C65 1600 JESUITICA).

work".[243] The volume *On the Soul*, in methodological terms, does not follow an innovative approach within the CJC universe. "As happened with the *Physica*, the *De Cœlo*, the *De Generatione and Corruptione* and will happen too with the *Dialectica*, the *De Anima* is published with the Latin version of Aristotle's text surrounded with the philological section (*explanatio)* and the various questions, all divided into several articles. It must, however, be noticed that the two appendixes have two different approaches, the one by Baltasar Álvares ["*Tractatus de Anima Separata*" or "Treatise on the Separated Soul"] follows the style already used in the *Meteorology* – but instead of 'treatise' Álvares uses the term 'disputation' each one further divided into articles – and the one by Cosme de Magalhães ["*Tractatio Aliquot Problematum ad Quinque Sensus spectantium*" or "Treatise on a Few Problems Related to the Five Senses"], [follows] the method already used by Góis in the appendix of *On the Heavens*, i.e. discussing a few problems in each one of the several sections in which the Treatises were divided".[244] The volume *On the Soul*

[243]António Manuel Martins, "Introductory Note to the Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Iesu", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019).

[244]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "In Tres Libros de Anima Aristotelis Stagiritæ. Editorial History", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de

clarifies "a form of knowledge about the Human's rootedness in the World", which "belongs to the study of the natural philosopher"; indeed, "[i]t is in the terrain of physics that the science of Man or the soul is developed, and in unexpected dialogue with the Renaissance era (...), natural philosophy will culminate in the knowledge of oneself in the world. If we wished to use a more modern word (...), we would have to say that the 'anthropology' [or rational psychology, another way to speak of studying humankind] of the Coimbra Jesuits was mostly physical. Man will have to open himself to metaphysics, or even impose it on himself, but it is worth keeping in mind, from here on out, that this will be done via the transcendence of corruption and time (although not entirely of movement) that happens with one's separation from materiality. In a certain sense, this is where ancient Greece and European modernity come together. Or put in a more accessible, although not literal, manner: anthropology has a physical starting point and almost entirely exhausts itself in the physical domain; but it also has a metaphysical dimension, linked to an idea of dematerialization, which implies a rupture with historical time. One thus realizes that, ultimately, the ontological situation of human existence is not that of time, but eternity".[245]

Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2018).

[245]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Cursus Conimbricensis", in *Conimbri-*

— the one thousand and fifty-nine (four hundred and thirty-one plus six hundred and twenty-eight) pages-long *Dialectica*;[246] Some more info about *On the Whole of Dialectics* is accessible in the introduction above. Published in two tomes, the *Logica* or *Dialectica* has been printed with a Preface to the Reader (*Ad Lectorem)*. "If one takes Manuel de Góis' Preface, in the *Physica*, as the first theoretical foundation of the entire Coimbra Jesuit Aristotelian Course, the more than fifty pages by Sebastião de Couto's own Preface to *Logica* may be read, in a certain way, as a revision of Góis' rationale".[247] Couto's volume comments on Porphyry's *Isagoge*, Aristotle's *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, as well as the latter's *Topics* and *Sophistical Refutations*. The last two were given less prominence than the others. "The uneven weight of the subject matters the volume deals with can be explained by the importance given to science and the language at its service to the detriment of the topics. (...) Tallies and statistics tell us that Couto's text is 3.5 times longer than Aristotle's *Organon* and, in light of that, what stands

censes.Org Encyclopedia, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019).

[246]Also in Burns Library (PA3892 .O7 C65 1611 JESUITICA).

[247]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritæ. Editorial History", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2018).

out the most is the relevance and novelty of subjects such as the theme of 'pre-cognition' (in the initial chapter of the *Prior Analytics*), the theory of universals (in the Preface to *Isagoge*), and the doctrine of the signs (in chapter 1 of *On Interpretation*)".[248]

! the five hundred and forty-five pages-long *De Generatione et Corruptione*, which—if according to the chronological criterion of the publication schedule of the *editiones principes*—should have been listed between *On Ethics* and *On the Soul*, seems to constitute the one gap in the holdings of Boston College. According to our best estimates, one does not have to walk roughly 500 kilometers northwest of Boston to find, in the University of Quebec in Montreal, a physical copy of *On Generation and Corruption*, which can be read *in loco* by soliciting the work "YBV 99" from the rare books section. A nearly five-kilometer walk to Cambridge would suffice (see below). Published by the Printer António de Mariz (Coimbra 1597) and authored by none other than Góis, the volume *On Generation and Corruption* took a long time (about five years) to be published after being composed. "Another thing strikes the modern reader: *On Generation and Corruption* is the more carelessly edited of all the titles of the

[248]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Cursus Conimbricensis", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019).

Coimbra Jesuit Aristotelian Course (see its non-exhaustive Errata and the various pagination misprints)".[249] The third largest among the volumes of the CJC covers the following theoretical fields: "the corruptible dimension of the Universe, generation, change, growth, and mixed bodies".[250]

A College Born of Spilled Blood

The Society of Jesus enjoys a very wholesome, enriching, and already age-old presence in North America. In a time when the Society of Jesus fell under mounting pressure to deploy Jesuits both for missions and for colleges, Florida became the first Jesuit destination throughout the Spanish Americas (1566-1572), roughly 2200 kilometers southwest of Greater Boston. So the Society of Jesus stepped onto land that now belongs to the United States of America

[249]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "In Duos Libros De Generatione et Corruptione Aristotelis Stagiritæ. Editorial History", in *Conimbricenses.org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2018).

[250]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Cursus Conimbricensis", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2019).

before the first volume of the CJC was even published in 1592.[251] 1570 is the year when Spanish Jesuits established a mission in the vicinity of the York River in eastern Virginia without military backing, with the aim of converting the locals to Roman Catholicism. Their mission ended early the next year with all missionaries (save for a kid) being murdered. In any case, the Society of Jesus had already reached nearly 1000 kilometers of Boston, [252] so we might be tempted to picture that it was very quickly that the Jesuits made it to Greater Boston. The history of the Jesuits in North America, however, does not reveal a pattern of nothing but breakthroughs and fortunes, but of lots of suffering and much bleeding.[253] This is

[251]A fairly recent dissertation on this topic is available for those wishing to find out more about it: Saber Gray, "'I Do Not Know How to Fulfill Those Demands': Rethinking Jesuit Missionary Efforts in *La Florida*, 1566-1572" (St. Petersburg, FL, University of South Florida St. Petersburg, 2014).

[252]On this particular mission see Charlotte M. Gradie, "Spanish Jesuits in Virginia: The Mission That Failed", *The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography* 96, no. 2 (1988): 131–56. On the quite intimidating martyrdom of those eight Jesuits in 1571 it is worth paying attention to Maureen Ahern, "'Dichosas Muertes': Jesuit Martyrdom on the Northern Frontier of La Florida", *Romance Philology* 53, no. 1 (1999): 1–21.

[253]A fairly recent book focusing on this issue is Nicholas P. Cushner, *Why Have You Come Here?: The Jesuits and the First Evangelization of Native America* (Oxford University Press, 2006). Published about the same time was Raymond A. Schroth, *The American Jesuits: A History* (New York University Press, 2007).

actually a very compelling historical development, but one we are not going to dwell on here. What may be of some use here is to find out if there was a Jesuit educational establishment or library that Peirce could have frequented in the region of Greater Boston. It was not until 1863 that the Boston College was founded by the Society of Jesus in the city of Boston—Peirce was 23 or 24 years old—, where it remained until 1909, when it moved to Greater Boston's Newton, seven miles west of downtown Boston city. As we will see below, the key to enabling Peirce to access *On the Whole of Dialectics* may lie in the establishment of Boston College, although to have access to *On the Soul* he would have been allowed to stick to Cambridge—"a small, quiet college town (...) more rural than urban" which belonged to a "thoroughly gentle and Protestant world": the "privileged world" of Greater Boston[254]—, the neighborhood where Charles was born on September 1839, where he went to school, and where he graduated (from Harvard University).[255]

[254]Joseph Brent, *Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 26.

[255]Joseph Brent, *Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life* (Indiana University Press, 1998), 363. For an appendix with a chronology of events pertaining to Peirce's life, we had to consult the revised and expanded edition of Brent's biography of Peirce, which is the one just referred to.

Harvard Down to the Genes

Peirce's family is deeply involved with Harvard. At least Peirce's grandfather, Benjamin Peirce (†1831), served there as a librarian; Peirce's father, also Benjamin Peirce (†1880), served as a professor of mathematics and astronomy; and Peirce's brother, James Mills Peirce (†1906), also served there as a professor of mathematics and astronomy. The latter, in addition to having had a brilliant administrative career, is said to have "clearly surpassed" his father as a teacher and, although not being considered "as original as his irascible brother Charles", it is said that he was "by far the more lovable" of the two.[256] We are most appreciative to Edison Torres, lecturer in History of Science at the Nueva Granada Military University, for having kindly corrected us on February 18, 2023 (during the 10-Minute Thesis Initiative; see above), about a mistake we had made on account of the homonymy between both father and grandfather of Charles.[257] In 1830, before Charles Peirce

[256]Hubert Kennedy, "The First Written Examinations at Harvard College", *The American Mathematical Monthly* 87, no. 6 (1980): 485.

[257]The scholar who prevented us from being more distant from the truth in this study is the author, *inter alia*, of Edison Torres, "Idealismo Epistemológico y Realismo Metafísico En Charles S. Peirce", *Cuadernos Sistemática Peirceana*, no. 1 (2009): 181–213.

was born, his grandfather Benjamin Peirce worked as a librarian at the Harvard University Library, which in the same year published a catalog whose first volume is of the utmost interest to us. We are speaking of *A Catalogue of the Library of Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts*, henceforth CLHU.[258] Benjamin Peirce is also the historian who authored a book on a very meaningful chapter of the history of Harvard University, published only posthumously, shortly after he died.[259] The Peirce family stands as a sterling monument of scholarly excellence. Benjamin's namesake son, whose marriage to Sarah Hunt Mills (†1887) resulted in the birth of Charles and his brothers and sister—besides James: Benjamin Mills Peirce (†1870), Herbert Henry Davis Peirce (†1916) and Helen Huntington Ellis (†1923)—, was in 1863 one of the founders of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America.[260]

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[258]Harvard University Library, *A Catalogue of the Library of Harvard University in Cambridge, Massachusetts*, ed. Benjamin Peirce, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: E.W. Metcalf, 1830).

[259]Benjamin Peirce, *A History of Harvard University: From Its Foundation, in the Year 1636, to the Period of the American Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Brown, Shattuck and Company, 1833).

[260]For additional details and a humble reproduction of Albert Herter's (†1950) 1924 painting of Benjamin Jr. and the other founders— the physicists Alexander Dallas Bache (†1867), Joseph Henry (†1878), the biogeologist Louis Agas-

Edited by Benjamin Peirce, the first volume of the CLHU systematically indexes the works contained in the institution's public library. The CLHU is lacking six volumes of the CJC, among which is the one on logic. Shortly preceding the alphabetical catalog of works, the following can be read:

> "It is unnecessary to offer any statement of what the Library contains in the several departments of knowledge, as that is sufficiently apparent from the Catalogue, particularly the Systematic Index. The books are principally from the first presses in Europe. A long list might be given, in which the arts of typograpgy, of engraving, and binding have exhausted all their powers of execution and embellishment. The Library contains many rare and valuable works, which are probably to be found no where else in this country. It has some books, which were printed in the fifteenth, and many in the sixteenth century".[261]

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siz (†1873), the anti-slavery politician Henry Wilson (†1875), the researcher and rear admiral of the United States Navy Charles Henry Davis (†1877), and the astronomer Benjamin Apthorp Gould (†1896)—standing together with Abraham Lincoln (†1865), the sixteenth President of the United States of America (the third ever to have died—appallingly—in office), see Joseph Brent, *Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 35.

[261]Benjamin Peirce, "Preface", in *A Catalogue of the Library of Harvard Univer-*

The two only volumes of the CJC to be found in the catalog, as part of a section dealing with Aristotle, are Cologne editions of the 1598 volume *On the Soul* and the 1593 volume *On the Heavens*, respectively published in 1617 and 1603. On page 39 of the CLHU, linked to on page 189, the only two volumes of the CJC to be found in the catalog are listed in a section devoted to Aristotle, and both of them were first published in the late sixteenth century, although the editions concerned were published in the seventeenth. Several volumes of the CJC are simply missing in the CLHU, among which is the only volume to have been first published in the seventeenth century, i.e. Couto's 1606 *On the Whole of Dialectics*. Since Benjamin Peirce's catalog dates from 1830, it is open to question whether Harvard University came into possession, at a later date, of any other volumes of the CJC, in particular the one on logic, to which Peirce not only expressly refers but in the late 1860's he also names its author, Sebastião do Couto, as will be explored in more detail *infra*. Undoubtedly, Peirce's grandfather was aware of the existence of the CJC and greatly treasured the centuries-old scholas-

sity in Cambridge, Massachusetts, by Harvard University Library, ed. Benjamin Peirce, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: E.W. Metcalf, 1830), xiv.

tic philosophical masterpieces. Certainly we have been making use of the concept of Scholasticism in line with the common practice, but it should be noted that recently there has been much work undertaken to bring both the concept and the labels we may derive from it to the next level—which may well be one of their abandonment—in terms of precision, paying due attention to the shades of difference that characterize the history of so-called Scholasticism.[262] Further to the above, taking a step back, it seems quite conceivable that after 1830 Harvard would have acquired a copy of the treatise on logic, although this remains unknown. To be more accurate, we remain uncertain whether Harvard acquired a copy of the *Dialectica* early enough for Peirce to access it there before 1867. However, we are aware that, nowadays, whoever can access the literary holdings of this fairly long-standing institution—Harvard is the oldest institution of higher education in the United States of America, founded on September 8, 1636—can find the CJC volume *On the Whole of Dialectics* for in-library use at Harvard's Houghton

[262]Marco Forlivesi, "The Historical Development of the Notion of 'Scholastic Philosophy': An Underestimated Historiographical Problem", in *Che Cos'è La Seconda Scolastica*, ed. Igor Agostini, Simona Langella, and Rafael Ramis-Barceló (Madrid and Porto: Instituto de Estudios Hispánicos en la Modernidad and Editorial Sindéresis, 2023), 83–132.

Library.[263] Of course, Harvard is quite a historical place, but the University of Coimbra had been running for almost 350 years by the time of the foundation of the former. So, it is but a matter of fact that when we write under the auspices of an institution founded in 1290, we tend to have a perception of Harvard University as a somewhat young (and very dynamic) organization.[264] Somewhat young, very dynamic, and relatively sensitive to cultural heritage, for Harvard provides access to other volumes of the CJC, among which the volume *On Generation and Corruption*, again through the Houghton Library.[265] It is safe to assume that Peirce was able to access Har-

[263]HOLLIS number 990049802370203941; GEN (Ga 113.171.6*).

[264]One can learn about the scientific heritage of such a prestigious American institution in Clark A. Elliott and Margaret W. Rossiter, *Science at Harvard University: Historical Perspectives* (Bethlehem, PA: Lehigh University Press, 1992). Regarding a more recent endeavor to enhance Harvard's research activities, see Corie Lok, "Harvard under Review: Harvard Is Embarking on an Experiment to Foster Collaboration and Interdisciplinary Research. Corie Lok Looks at Whether It Can Change Its Culture and Reinvent Communities along the Way", *Nature* 454, no. 7205 (2008): 686–90.

[265]While we are not informed about the policies that govern access to the latter, the details for attempting access are the following: HOLLIS number 990049801950203941; Offsite Storage (Ga 113.166*). HOLLIS is the outstanding catalog of Harvard Library; it stands for 'Harvard On-Line Library Information System' and also refers to Thomas Hollis (†1731), a distinguished benefactor of Harvard University.

vard's copy of the volume *On the Soul*. But what about the volume *On the Whole of Dialectics*? Was it possible to access it in the region of Greater Boston? Possibly via Harvard? Or perhaps by way of Boston College?

From Hall to Silence

To be sure, during Peirce's lifetime, the region of Greater Boston had some reading and writing about the logic of the CJC. We are thinking of the 1902 "Some Observations on the Doctrine of Proximate Cause", authored by the American lawyer Prescott Farnsworth Hall (†1921). This text was written in Boston[266] and published in Boston as well. Not only does Hall refer to Couto by the Latin version of his name—i.e., "Sebastianus Contus"—but he also unequivocally quotes the volume *On the Whole of Dialectics*. The quotation pertains to the issue of how knowledge is gained as to *why something is*.[267] Yet it remains unclear at this point how could Peirce have accessed Couto's logic, even though there are plenty of possibilities. Who knows if Charles Peirce obtained a copy of Couto's treatise for

[266]See Prescott F. Hall, "Some Observations on the Doctrine of Proximate Cause", *Harvard Law Review* 15, no. 7 (1902): 567.

[267]Ibid., 553.

his private library? Or maybe Peirce accessed it on one of his five work assignments in Europe?[268] As will be noted below, Peirce is not supposed to have set foot on European soil without first becoming conversant with the CJC. Perhaps Peirce would not have needed to travel a long distance within his homeland to get his hands on some of the volumes of the CJC, bearing in mind the fact that the Public Library of Harvard University was not the only library in the institution, and how rich the Boston area was as far as available study resources are concerned. The words of a precious witness are echoing:

> "Besides the Public Library, there are very respectable libraries belonging to some of the societies in the University; and it may also be mentioned, among the advantages enjoyed at this seat of learning, that within one hour's walk are various other repositories of learning, particularly the noble collection of the Boston Atheneum, second in extent and value to no other collection, probably in this country, with the exception of Harvard College Library".[269]

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[268]Joseph Brent, *Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life* (Indiana University Press, 1998), 365-368.

[269]Benjamin Peirce, "Preface", in *A Catalogue of the Library of Harvard Univer-*

Chances are decent that Peirce accessed the CJC in Greater Boston. The issue nevertheless lingers in the open as to where Peirce actually accessed the volumes. To answer the question of where Peirce got access to the CJC, we take the delicate step of admitting the complexity of the issue, then adding that it is most plausible that he did so in Greater Boston when he was an emerging researcher and for many years thereafter. The pieces all fit together for this to be true, and yet if the question were put to us demanding absolute certitude, all we could do would be to fall silent, possibly punctuated by a sympathetic 'I believe so, but we may never find out. Or perhaps we will... Who can be so bold as to say? Life is full of surprises, innit?'.

Beyond Boston and Indeed America

Perhaps Peirce acquired some copy(s) for his own personal library. To be more certain about it, that would entail a monumental deal of digging, in consideration of what happened to Peirce's personal library after his passing (see above). In any event, this would take

sity in Cambridge, Massachusetts, by Harvard University Library, ed. Benjamin Peirce, vol. 1 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: E.W. Metcalf, 1830), xvii.

going to Boston, but not just Boston: it could also take going to Tokyo (see above). And anyway, it is worth keeping in mind that the findings might simply be inconclusive. It may also be the case that Peirce accessed one or more volumes of the CJC by turning to the holdings of some institution(s) elsewhere in the United States of America, implying that one would have to determine whether and which copies of the CJC were actually available and within Peirce's reach. To make things clear, it will be necessary to confront the bibliographical records of the institutions and other relevant documents with a biographical examination of Peirce that would possibly have to delve beyond the previous efforts of the explorers who were already looking for signs of Peirce's life among the remains of the former days. A further concern, of keen interest to the scientific community at large but above all to historiographers and semioticians broadly speaking, will be to tackle the whole matter relative to the hypothesis that Peirce had access to the CJC in Europe. Peirce's travels to Europe would have to be examined (see above). To the best of our knowledge, only the first trip has been studied in due diligence, in an article from 2009, providing an excellent starting point

for further research on the topic and related matters.[270] This, incidentally, would call for a very demanding investigation not only of Peirce's travels but of the copies of the CJC that were available in his surroundings, something that, as far as we are aware, remains to be done. Given that Peirce's earliest known European trip dates from the early 1870s, the likelihood that Peirce accessed the CJC before 1867 in Europe is to dismiss, unless Peirce traveled to Europe earlier and no record of this has been found by the community of inquiry. This is virtually out of the question. Nevertheless, it is still conceivable that Peirce felt the need to keep in touch, apart from his memories, with the pages of the CJC during his stays on European territory, heading to nearby libraries in search of his Coimbra sources of inspiration: the volumes of the CJC. We are not at all aware of any details in this regard. Be this as it may, the issue of knowing more about the contours of the Peirce-CJC relation in European soil can be but a subsidiary issue to be appended to the greater value of learning more about Peirce's European trips. How,

[270]The article referred to is Jaime Nubiola and Sara Barrena, "Charles Peirce's First Visit to Europe, 1870-71", *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy* I, no. 1/2 (2009). A critical step towards such an effort has been taken in Jaime Nubiola, "The Cosmopolitan Peirce: His European Travels", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 56, no. 2 (2020): 190-198.

when, and where exactly Peirce became involved with the CJC may always remain a mystery. But what do mysteries reveal to us, if not a stress on the open-endedness of sign-relations?

Part Known, Part Estimated

Should signs of mystery be capable of mediating between what is known and what is unknown, of prompting further semiosis and pursuit of understanding, then mysteries ought never to block the way of inquiry, but to tirelessly inspire it. Beyond any reasonable doubt, at any rate, is the effect the CJC had on Peirce and the reverence the American semiotician held for the Coimbra textbooks and their authors; so the bottom line here is that Peirce had, in one way or another, access to the CJC and he referred to it and its authors repeatedly and with considerable awe and avail, as will be testified in a moment. Though Peirce most likely first met the CJC while at Harvard and then sought out some more fruits from the same orchard through Boston College, this borders on the edge of speculation. It seems that future, more detailed inquiries would be worthwhile, also because inquiries might reveal some important new information about a number of secondarily related topics, like

the broader nineteenth-century academic milieu in Greater Boston. We trust that the work carried out here may be of use in the future, if only as a springboard for someone wanting to pursue one or several facets of the spectrum of possibilities regarding Peirce's access to the aged paper and the vintage Latin letters of the CJC.

Sailing the CJC in the Open

Scientia Aperta

The backbone of this particular chapter of our doctoral study was cooked up in a text that, out of pure respect for the open science agenda—and we are happy about it, for we have received valuable feedback from our readership—, has been previously published, and we will be using it at leisure here.[271] Open science has been defined as a revolutionary concept of scientific research, a model with some loose ends that depends on the unfolding of its components—open access to data and results, a culture of preprints,

[271]We are referring to Robert Junqueira, "Peirce and the Coimbra Jesuit Course: A Bond Far More Pervasive Than Commonly Believed", in *PhicaRe (Philosophy & Care Repository)* (Charles S. Peirce Society's 10-Minute Thesis Initiative: His Glassy Essence in Relation, Coimbra: Institute for Philosophical Studies, 2023), 1–12.

and citizen science—and on the establishment of a sustainable research, development, and innovation ecosystem for its fulfillment.[272] A worthwhile lesson to be added is that open science must perforce configure an open framework for observing and growing an evolutionary principle. One would say fittingly enough that such a framework represents an objective perception of the evolving process of scientific inquiry. This evolving process thereby becomes an instance of a unique and virtually uninterrupted series of unrepeatable and irreversible events wherein at every single point in time whoever is doing research benefits from previous investigations and from a given understanding of the future for the sake of sustaining a line of inquiry, if not indefinitely then up to the very moment in which the ultimate, ideal knowledge on the matter is secured by the community of inquiry.[273] There is some criticism that tells us that our business here is the 'open humanities' and not 'open science'.[274] Knöchelmann's choice of the term "open hu-

[272]See Ernest Abadal, "Ciencia Abierta: Un Modelo Con Piezas Por Encajar", *Arbor* 197, no. 799 (2021): a588.

[273]This musing can be put in relation with James Jakób Liszka, "Peirce's Interpretant", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 26, no. 1 (1990): 17–62.

[274]Such criticism is based on Marcel Knöchelmann, "Open Humanities: Why Open Science in the Humanities Is Not Enough", *Impact of Social Sciences (blog)*,

manities" as reflecting a pole in a particular duality—*humanities* x *science*, both labelled *open*—seems neither to be desirable for the community of inquiry in general nor for the sake of the humanities in particular. We believe that the humanities must stand firm in the resolve to be part and parcel of the whole movement for openness in scientific and technological research, development, and innovation, referred to as 'open science', wherein the interests of the arts and the humanities are surely not confined or diminished but belong. The fact of the matter is that the Jesuit, Catholic *scientia* of Coimbra was quite *aperta* for His Glassy Essence, i.e., Peirce's circumstances were liberal enough for him to turn to the CJC; and today we can see that he did. It is easy to find out who discovered each of Peirce's references to the CJC.[275] It was only fairly recently that Peirce's references to the CJC started to be flagged. The findings have been useful to the community on inquiry for validating Deely's hypothesis (see above), according to which Peirce relied on the CJC to arrive at the triadic definition of the sign-relation. We

February 25, 2020.

[275]In Robert Junqueira, "Charles Sanders Peirce and Coimbra", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi, Coimbra as an International Institution (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2020).

are aware it is likely that this has happened. On the one hand, it is understandable that Dr. Deely's hypothesis required careful validation, for it was not enough that it was possible for Peirce to have relied on the CJC for such a purpose: the community of inquiry required a high standard of probability, which was met upon proving that Peirce drew a good deal on the CJC from an early stage in his life (see below). On the other hand, Peirce's references to the CJC reveal that the effect of the CJC on Peirce goes far beyond the triadic definition of the sign-relation. However, the degree to which Peirce was affected by the CJC has not yet been researched. The CJC was a source of Peirce's semiotic logic: this much is permeable. However, how great an impact did the CJC have on Peirce? At the present stage, this can only be ascertained up to a certain extent. Hopefully, we will contribute here to expand the understanding of the community of inquiry on the matter.

Large Water Volumes

The pages of the CJC are veritable international waters, and Peirce was one of those great navigators who sailed on these international waters openly (as well as discreetly, as it turns out). What do we un-

derstand by "international waters"? International waters are those "over which no state has *complete* sovereignty, although states may assert limited rights in such waters".[276] It is clear that the CJC is a legacy stemming from Portugal and particularly Coimbra, but a legacy that from the outset was felicitously wired to belong not to a city or nation, but to the whole world and the community of inquiry at large. If limited rights could be asserted in such waters, this seems never to have been attempted. Quite the contrary, we see in Coimbra and beyond an effort to open the CJC waters as much as humanly possible to the global scene. One need only note the number of Portuguese-speaking authors, in the "State of the Art" above, who have made efforts to publish about the CJC in foreign tongues, clearly extending an invitation to the international community of inquiry to explore or keep exploring the waters of the CJC on their own. But of course, it is not Coimbra or Portugal exclusively to credit for the successful spread of the volumes of the CJC over the past (over four hundred years). A very substantial contribution is attributable to the Society of Jesus and to the Catholic Church

[276]Geoffrey S. Corn, Ken Watkin, and Jamie Williamson, *The Law in War: A Concise Overview* (Abigdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2023), 229.

at large. We will now join this multisecular, collective exertion by turning our attention to the particular sailing that Peirce did on the Latin waters of the CJC, while in the following chapter we will instead address Peirce's underwater or off-the-record navigation in the waters of the CJC. In either case, we will be often relying on the *Dicionário* authored by Carvalho (see above), arguably the most proficient seafarer ever to have waded into the waters of the CJC, and the sole lexicographer we are aware of who not only did so, but did so resorting to the waters of the CJC as a lexicographic subject matter. But of course, Carvalho was not the only lexicographer to have studied the CJC. Suffice it to think of Peirce, himself a prolific lexicographer who defined roughly six thousand specialized terms and also served as a contributing editor for another ten thousand entries or so of the *Century Dictionary*.[277] Peirce, as we shall see below, also relied on the CJC to enhance his lexicographical endeavors. In any event, the impact of the CJC on Peirce has been such, as will be noted, that hardly would it be reasonable to expect the CJC not to have played a significant role across a considerable

[277]Orin Hargraves, "The Century Dictionary Definitions of Charles Sanders Peirce", *Dictionaries: Journal of the Dictionary Society of North America* 40, no. 2 (2019): 33.

share of the chapters of Peirce's life and works.

The Common Belief

We have been arguing that the union between Peirce and the CJC is far more pervasive than commonly believed. As a matter of fact, it is, and the time has now come to prove it. The common belief, as we stated earlier, is attributable to Deely. Of course, Doyle is another one—a rather remarkable one—among many who contributed to the international community of inquiry attaining a preliminary (valid but narrow) common belief regarding the effect of the CJC on Peirce. Doyle, we said it before, rendered the treatise on signs of the volume of the CJC *On the Whole of Dialectics* from Latin into English even before it had been translated into Portuguese by Amândio Coxito (see *supra*). References to the Peirce-CJC relation earlier than Deely's cannot be found in the scholarly literature. First and foremost owing to the zealous exertions of John Deely in dealing with all matters philosophical, namely with those key atlases—the CJC being a prominent example among them—related to the history of philosophy understood as the diachronic breadth of semiotics, the seeds for the acknowledgement of the Peirce-CJC relation

have been sown in the gardens of scholarly wisdom. Deely has been bringing the importance of the CJC to the attention of the English-speaking community of inquiry at least since 1981. By no means do we intend to restrict this effect to native speakers of English. One of the many examples to be kept in mind from the "State of the Art" (*supra)* is the Mexican Mauricio Beuchot, who may well have started paying serious attention to the CJC in the wake of Deely but who teamed up with the latter to drive our common understanding of CJC-related matters—most notably the Peirce-CJC relation—further. It is worth keeping in mind that a year before Deely laid the groundwork for the significance of studies to be carried out on the Peirce-CJC relation, Beuchot was a trailblazer by co-authoring with Deely a very meaningful article on the sources common to Peirce and João Poinsot.[278] Carolin Behrmann stands for a further instance, for Behrmann has received the results of Deely and Beuchot's (as well as Doyle's) groundbreaking Anglographed efforts and amplified them to the German-speaking readership. An-

[278]The texts are, respectively, John Deely, "Why Investigate the Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot?", in *Semiotics 1994*, ed. John Deely and C. W. Spinks (New York: Peter Lang Verlag, 1996), 34–50 plus Mauricio Beuchot and John Deely, "Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot", *The Review of Metaphysics* 48, no. 3 (1995): 539–66.

glographed stands for 'written in the English language'.[279] While expressing a serious sense of curiosity about Couto's doctrine of signs and some degree of understanding about the Peirce-CJC relation, Behrmann seems to have been ill-equipped to learn more about the CJC, as Behrmann has come to presume (*Ibid.)* that *On the Whole of Dialectics* is a legal book, or else we would not have read that "the writings of the Conimbricenses on legal theory (*die rechtstheoretischen Schriften der Conimbricenses)*" were embraced by Peirce.[280] At least since 1995, Deely has been disseminating the meaningfulness of the Peirce-CJC relation. Deely's first mention of the CJC we have spotted is from "The Relation of Logic to Semiotics".[281] In this paper, Deely mentions the CJC only marginally, when focusing on Pedro da Fonseca,[282] the man who came up with the early impetus for designing something along the lines of the CJC (see above). Nev-

[279]Behrmann relies on the work of Beuchot and Deely to address the Peirce-CJC relation, *inter alia*, in Carolin Behrmann, *Tyrann und Märtyrer: Bild und Ideengeschichte des Rechts um 1600* (De Gruyter, 2015), 55.

[280]Our translation, under the guidance of Joaquim Braga and Mário Santiago de Carvalho (2022, respectively November 14 and 18).

[281]*Semiotica* 35, no. 3–4 (1981): 193–265.

[282]On Fonseca, besides the texts mentioned above, it is worth keeping an eye on the future developments of an open access section of the *Conimbricenses.org Encyclopedia* which António Manuel Martins coordinates.

ertheless, in more than twenty different works, Deely underscores or discusses the centrality of the CJC in the history of philosophy, albeit not always with a view to emphasizing the key role of the Peirce-CJC relation.[283] Deely is to be credited as the father—a single father who, in this particular instance, has yet to be surpassed by the community—of the common belief about the Peirce-CJC relation. Single because there is no one else, differently from what has been said about semiotics and the Peirce-Welby relation above, to whom the original conception of the recognition of the Peirce-CJC relation can be ascribed. However, there has of course been an uncle (Beuchot), a godfather (Doyle), and many close friends (Carvalho and many others). A second generation of family bonds between the Peirce-CJC relation and the community of inquiry is now budding, and the future shall comment on it. For sure, Deely will be referred to as a grandfather, then one day a great-grandfather, and so on and so forth over the course of the years. The common belief concerns only the triadic definition of the sign-relation and is neatly encapsulated in Deely's statement that Peirce "took up" from the

[283]As for this particular subject, if not all at least arguably the most noteworthy works have already been mentioned *supra*.

CJC "the idea of the sign as necessarily involving three terms in a single relation".[284] It is true that Deely hardly ever goes beyond the issues of general semiotics that directly pertain to the conception of the sign. It is equally the case, however, that the common belief on the Peirce-CJC relation lies quite close to the surface as to what John has in effect managed to achieve. While Deely fails to broaden his views past general semiotics and even to delve as thoroughly as would be desirable—even in such matters—into the Peirce-CJC relation, Deely forays in relative depth into the matter at hand. The fact is that a collation of the treatment of signs in the CJC and the one in Peirce's writings that goes beyond the mere formulation of the general definition of the sign has yet to be worked out. Nevertheless, Deely's forays reach far deeper than what the community of inquiry seems to have succeeded in assimilating so far. Among other matters covered by Deely to which the wider community seems as yet to have paid insufficient attention—and here I have in mind not only the centrality of the CJC but also the very profound implications of the works of the Coimbra student João Poinsot—is the follow-

[284]John Deely, *Purely Objective Reality*, Semiotics, Communication and Cognition 4 (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2009), 129.

ing point he firmly emphasized and that we cite repeatedly here given the value of the message, not least in terms of the conceptual and terminological awareness it instills, which will be of subsequent use:

> "Once it becomes clear that 'all thought is in signs' (the realization first formulated by Poinsot's teachers, the Conimbricenses, but credit for which these days is assigned customarily to Peirce), it becomes further clear that all objects are objects signified, or, to suppress the redundancy, that all objects are significates. Not all *things* are significates, but all *objects* are".[285]

Deely has been most definitely effective in spreading the belief that the *doctrina signorum* of the CJC provided a stepping stone for Peirce, as earlier for João Poinsot, to arrive at the triadic definition of the sign understood as a sign-relation. Herculano de Carvalho (†2001) authored a comparative study of the CJC and Poinsot's doctrines of signs which may serve as a model for future comparative

[285]John Deely, "The Unmasking of Objectivity", in *Person, Being, and History*, ed. Michael Baur and Robert E. Wood (Washington D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 2011), 300-301.

studies of the sort.[286] Hopefully at this stage, not merely restating the contents of what lies above, it is well worth refreshing our memories in short on the more specific aspects of the state of the art, to provide an outline of that which is now about to be superseded: the common belief of the community of inquiry on the Peirce-CJC relation. The common belief on the Peirce-CJC relation holds valid because not only did Peirce actually mention the CJC—we will come to it in a moment—, but the definition of the sign in the CJC also substantiates it. In the CJC, we read that the sign is "*omne id, quod potentiæ cognoscenti aliquid a se distinctum repræsentat*"; in other words, "anything which represents something other than itself to a knowing power"[287]; the triadic definition of the sign-relation could be put in Peirce's words in the following manner: "something, A, which denotes some fact or object, B, to some interpretant thought, C"[288]. The details in this matter have yet to be fully examined, but

[286]See José Herculano de Carvalho, "Poinsot's Semiotics and the Conimbricenses", *Cruzeiro Semiótico: Ensaios Em Homenagem a/Essays in Honor of Thomas A. Sebeok* 22 (1995): 129–35.

[287]Sebastião do Couto, *The Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs*, trans. John P. Doyle, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 38 (Milwaukee, Wis: Marquette University Press, 2001), 56-57.

[288]Charles S. Peirce, "Lowell Lectures on Some Topics of Logic Bearing on Questions Now Vexed. Part 1 of 3rd Draught of 3rd Lecture. MS [R] 464" (1903). Like

the common belief stands up nicely as to the impact of the CJC on Peirce as regards the triadic definition of the sign, although a more general and careful study reaching beyond the formulation of the definition of the sign-relation has not yet been initiated by the community of inquiry, and is to be launched by us below as a starting point for future research projects.

Is That All?

The question at the time being, however, goes in this direction: could the Peirce-CJC relation be restricted to just this, i.e., the triadic definition of the sign-relation? It is not true that it would be too little if this happened to be the case, but it is an equally clear truth, as it will be shown, that this is not so: the effect of the CJC on Peirce is not restricted to the definition of the sign. It is evident that we cannot simply conclude about the extent to which a particular text affects an author by taking the references of the latter to the former; and yet, this is a reliable and still unexplored avenue

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this one, there are plenty of definitions of sign, invariably triadic, found in Peirce's manuscripts that can be accessed for free in the online dictionary of the project *Commens.org*. Some are available above.

for us to grasp the extent of the impact of the CJC on Peirce. Let us take a look at Peirce's references to the CJC. As it will transpire, this will suffice to bring out quite plainly how the common belief borders on short-sightedness.

Logical Quantities

According to the Director and General Editor of the Peirce Edition Project, it is of "special interest" for our project to determine

> "the extent (if any)" to which Peirce's "extensive discussion of logical quantities (breadth and depth in their varieties)" is indebted to the school of Coimbra, bearing in mind that such discussion is "at the core of Peirce's early writings and never lost relevance".[289]

The topic of logical quantities, indeed, seems never to have lost relevance among Peircean studies.[290] Even though the discussion

[289]André De Tienne, Personal communication; 2020, April 21.

[290]A small sample illustrates how, even in recent years, the interest in the topic has persisted; see James Jakób Liszka, "Peirce's Interpretant", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 26, no. 1 (1990): 30–38; C. W. Spinks, *Peirce and Triadomania: A Walk in the Semiotic Wilderness*, Approaches to Semiotics 103 (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1991), 88–91; Floyd Merrell, *Peirce, Signs, and Meaning*, Toronto Studies in Semiotics (Toronto and Buffalo: University of

of logical quantities has been profoundly considered by Peirce scholars, the consideration of the connection between Peirce's treatment of logical quantities and the CJC is still abecedarian.[291] One would be unlikely to meet a single person who could deny in a valid way the vast and profound gravity of a topic such as that of logical quantities, and of course there is no shortage of literature on the subject.[292] It is already known that Peirce was acquainted with the CJC doctrine of logical quantities. Quantities are addressed in several volumes of the CJC. This includes the volumes we know Peirce dealt with, to wit: the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century volumes

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Toronto Press, 1997), 13–16; Ivan Mladenov, *Conceptualizing Metaphors: On Charles Peirce's Marginalia*, Routledge Studies in Linguistics 4 (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 36–39; Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, *Signs of Logic: Peircean Themes on the Philosophy of Language, Games, and Communication*, Synthese Library, v. 329 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2006), 30–31; and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, "Signs Systematically Studied: Invitation to Peirce's Theory", *Sign Systems Studies* 43, no. 4 (2015): 390–91.

[291] It has been touched on in passing by us alone, in the 2020 and 2023 writings referred to above in the present section.

[292] Yet, for an insightful perusal of Peirce (but also of Edmund Husserl) that could boost one's understanding of the bearing of the topic, consider reading Francesco Bellucci, "Philosophy of Notation in the 19th Century. Peirce, Husserl, and All the Others on Inclusion and Assertion", in *Peirce and Husserl: Mutual Insights on Logic, Mathematics and Cognition*, ed. Mohammad Shafiei and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019), 61–75.

On the Soul and *On the Whole of Dialectics*. Here is no venue to examine each matter in which Peirce has been found to be impacted by the CJC on a one-to-one scale, as each is worthy of being addressed individually from a doctoral perspective; besides, there are too many matters. While it is accurate to say that it is better to bend a tree while it is young and that our academic career is merely taking off, we need to accept our limitations. We could not exhaust the possible studies on the Peirce-CJC relation even if we were undying. Others shall come. Shared joy is double joy. No sorrow. For the benefit of future research on these topics related to the Peirce-CJC relation, though, we shall be shedding some light on each instance, and the logical quantities are not to be excluded. We can tell that, in dealing with the 3rd book of *On the Soul*, Peirce must have been in close proximity with the use of quantity as an example to explain the specificity of knowledge in both its abstractive and reflexive forms, as well as with the claim that there is such a thing as spiritual quantities. The same is to be the case regarding Couto's treatment, in *On the Whole of Dialectics*, of: the divisions, species, and predication of quantity; quantity's attributes; the formal rea-

son of quantity; and quantity's locative effect.[293] At this point, it is clear that mapping out all the prospectively worthy avenues of inquiry into the Peirce-CJC relation will require a great deal 'of paper'. That a barrel so loaded with assets has remained unnoticed for such a prolonged period of time only reinforces the claim that the more loaded barrels are the quieter. But why should we be convinced Peirce knew the CJC doctrine of quantities? First, how to tell in a straightforward and understandable formula what logical quantities stand for? In Peirce's words, "'wide' learning is, in ordinary parlance, learning of many things; 'deep' learning, much knowledge of some things". Logical quantities are heterogeneously referred to by the tradition, as Peirce noted in "Upon Logical Comprehension and Extension", under the heading "Of the Different Terms applied to the Quantities of Extension and Comprehension". In their diachronicity, logical quantities such as "extension" and "comprehension" have been expressed in a variety of ways. *Inter alia*, the first and the second can be respectively referred to as (i) external and internal quantity, (ii) scope and force, as well as (iii) breadth plus

[293]See Mário Santiago de Carvalho, *Dicionário Do Curso Filosófico Conimbricense*, Skiagraphia's (Coimbra: Palimage, 2020), 378-381.

depth. The latter two are terms that Peirce favored and considered to "have great merits" due to their casualness, their brevity, and the fact that they are "suited to go together".[294] In 1867, in "Classification of Arguments" (under the label "Of a General Type of Syllogistic Arguments"), Peirce made clear that logical *extension* and *comprehension* "must not be confounded with" *breadth* and *depth* in every context.[295] But this is not all there is to it. As a matter of fact, a bit later in "Upon Logical Extension and Comprehension" (under the rubric "Three Principal Senses in which Comprehension and Extension will be taken in this Paper"; also 1867), Peirce shows that, in different circumstances, he is willing to adopt the terms "breath and depth" for "extension and comprehension". Peirce remarks, however, that he did "employ them in different senses", which he distinguished "by different adjectives", such as *potential*, *substantial*, and *informed*.[296] In addressing the logical quantities, Peirce argued that the substance of Port-Royal logic was already

[294]We are witnesses to how Peirce accounted for taste in a most respectable way. Read Charles S. Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 2: 1867-1871*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 72-74.

[295]*Ibid.*, 26.

[296]*Ibid.*, 78-82.

contained in the *Isagoge* of Porphyry of Tyre (†305) and that the Scholastics diligently studied Porphyry's doctrine of logical quantities, very well clarified what these quantities meant, and provided them with various names. "Port-Royal logic" stands for *La logique, ou l'art de penser*, the eminent 1662 treatise on logic written by Antoine Arnauld (†1694) and Pierre Nicole (†1695).[297] Also known, *inter alia*, as *Quinque Voces*, *Institutiones Porphyrii*, and *Librum Porphyrii*, the *Isagoge* served as the intermediary between Aristototle's works on logic and the philosophers both of the Renaissance and the Middle Ages.[298] Then, having identified a link between Port Royal, Porphyry, and the Scholastic world, and without providing a bibliographic reference, Peirce mentions the "Conimbricenses" as an adequate source for those who wish to find synonyms to speak

[297]We can find a contemporary edition in Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, *La Logique ou l'art de penser: contenant, outre les règles communes, plusieurs observations nouvelles, propres à former le jugement*, ed. Pierre Clair, 2. éd., Bibliothèque des textes philosophiques (Paris: Vrin, 1993).

[298]Pinharanda Gomes, "Prefácio", in *Porfírio Isagoge: Introdução Às Categorias de Aristóteles*, by Porfírio, ed. and trans. Pinharanda Gomes (Lisboa: Guimarães Editores, 1994), 28-32.

About the *Quinque Voces* in the context of the volume *On the Whole of Dialectics* (not ignoring the *Logica Furtiva)* see Arnaldo de Pinho Dias, "A Isagoge de Porfírio Na Lógica Conimbricense", *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia*, no. 20 (1964): 108–30.

of logical quantities. And so is the promise of this topic alone being worthy of doctoral research further substantiated, for its scrutiny will call for a full-fledged philological quest. This pertains to a text dating from 1867, meaning that Peirce was engaged in a relationship with the CJC since at least his late twenties[299]. Here is what Peirce says:

> "... it would be most surprising if the doctrine had been totally overlooked by the schoolmen, for (...) they certainly studied the commentary in question as diligently as they did the Bible. It would seem, indeed, that the tree of Porphyry involves the whole doctrine of extension and comprehension except the names. Nor were the scholastics without names for these quantities. The *partes subjectives* and *partes essentiales* are frequently opposed; and several other synonyms are mentioned by the Conimbricenses".[300]

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[299]Charles S. Peirce, "Terms: That These Conceptions Are Not so Modern as Has Been Represented", in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol. II. Elements of Logic. Book II. Speculative Grammar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), para. 391.

[300]Ibid. Also available in Id., *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 2: 1867-1871*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 70-71.

It is thus clear that, from an early stage, the CJC did indeed have a bearing on Peirce's understanding of logical quantities, and that Peirce found the history of logic, as well as the role of the CJC in it, to be of prime significance. And yet, this is not the only area where the CJC had an effect on Peirce.

Abstractive Knowledge

Other critical areas in Peircean scholarship are also at play, such as those of cognition and knowledge at large,[301] and abstractive knowl-

[301]The list of works that examine such issues in Peirce's writing would be very long, so we will only list a few titles in an attempt to highlight the persisting concern of the community of inquiry in the last few years on such matters. We will do the same in the next footnote.

Consider Tamba Nlandu, "Reality, Perceptual Experience, and Cognition: A Study in Charles Sanders Peirce's Philosophy of Mind" (PhD Thesis, New Orleans, LA, Tulane University, 1997); Tom Rockmore, "Hegel, Peirce, and Knowledge", *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy* 13, no. 3 (1999): 166–84; Janos J. Sarbo, "Peircean Proto-Signs", *AIP Conference Proceedings* 839, no. 1 (2006): 474–79; Tanya De Villiers, "Mind and Language: Evolution in Contemporary Theories of Cognition" (Thesis, Stellenbosch: University of Stellenbosch, 2006), most notably the first chapter ("Peirce Sets the Scene"), 1-54; Priscila Borges, "Experience and Cognition in Peirce's Semiotics", *The American Journal of Semiotics* 30, no. 1/2 (June 19, 2014): 1–26; Aaron Bruce Wilson, "Peirce and the A Priori", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 51, no. 2 (2015): 201–24; Claudio Paolucci, "The Semiotic Mind. Beliefs, Habits and Extended Cognition", in *Cognitive Semiotics: Integrating Signs, Minds, Meaning and Cognition*, ed. Claudio

edge specifically.[302] Still in 1867, Peirce once again turned to the CJC to write an account of "abstractive knowledge", pointing to the anthropological volume *On the Soul*.[303] It is but plain to note that Peirce benefited from the Coimbra Jesuits' sharp focus on rigorous inquiry and scholarly exploration. Peirce's account of abstractive knowledge is in fact no more than a translation from Latin into En-

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Paolucci, Perspectives in Pragmatics, Philosophy Psychology (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021), 63–95.

[302]See Arthur Bakker, "Diagrammatic Reasoning and Hypostatic Abstraction in Statistics Education" *Semiotica*, no. 164 (2007): 9–29; Aud Sissel Hoel, "Lines of Sight. Peirce on Diagrammatic Abstraction", in *Das bildnerische Denken: Charles S. Peirce*, ed. Franz Engel, Moritz Queisner, and Tullio Viola (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 253–71; Yair Neuman, Peter Turney, and Yohai Cohen, "How Language Enables Abstraction: A Study in Computational Cultural Psychology", *Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science* 46, no. 2 (2012): 129–45; Moshe M. Pavlov, "An Experimental Implementation of Abstraction in the Existential Graphs", *Cuadernos de Sistemática Peirceana*, no. 8 (2016): 77–117.

[303]Charles S. Peirce, "Specimen of a Dictionary of the Terms of Logic and Allied Sciences: A to ABS", in *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 2: 1867-1871*, ed. Edward C. Moore et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 117.

The CJC volume *On the Soul* is, it is worth repeating, Manuel de Góis, Baltasar Álvares, and Cosme de Magalhães, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis S. J. In Tres Libros de Anima Aristotelis Stagiritæ* (Coimbra: A. Mariz, 1598).

The Portuguese translation of this volume by Maria da Conceição Camps has not yet been entirely published by the Coimbra University Press, and is split into two halves. For the second half, credit for transcribing and/or translating will also have to be given to Filipa Medeiros.

glish, presumably executed by Peirce, of an extract of the CJC. The section that Peirce refers to is the 1st article of the 3rd question of the 6th chapter of the 2nd book. Such a question is headed "*Utrum per divinam potentiam aliqua notitia abstractiva in externis sensibus dari queat*" ("Whether it is possible to some extent that abstract knowledge is imparted to the external senses by the divine power"), while the article is titled "*Quid in re proposita sentiendum videatur*" ("What ought to be considered in the proposed question").[304] In Peirce's writing referenced two footnotes above one can read:

> "Abstractive knowledge is the cognition of a thing not as it is present; for example, the knowledge by which I know Socrates when absent, and that by which an astronomer in the house considers an eclipse which he does not observe, supposing that he knows that at that time the earth is between the moon and the sun. And also, that by which the philosopher from creatures knows that God is. For although these cognitions are directed to the thing as to its existence, yet they are not so

[304]The article under consideration is contained in the half that has already been published in a bilingual edition and can be read in Manuel de Góis, *Curso Aristotélico Jesuíta Conimbricense. Tomo IV: De Anima - Parte I*, trans. Maria da Conceição Camps, Coimbra University Press, Classica Digitalia: Portugaliæ Monumenta Neolatina (Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2022), 391-397.

directed to it that the presence of their object is discerned".

In the 2022 edition of the CJC text mentioned in the preceding footnote it reads, between pages 390-391:

"*Notitia abstractiua, quæ etiam Simplicis intelligentiæ uocatur, est cognitio rei non ut præsens est, uerbi gratia, notitia, qua cogito de Socrate absente; et ea, qua Astrologus domi suæ considerat eclypsim, quam non intuetur, esto sciat ea hora interponi terram inter lunam, et solem. Et item ea, qua Philosophus ex creaturis cognoscit Deum esse. Licet enim hæ cognitiones tendant in rem sub esse existentiæ; non tamen sic tendunt, ut per eas cernatur præsentia obiecti*".

Perhaps Peirce thought of translating the *De Anima* of the CJC into English before Camps translated it into Portuguese? If so, no sign of completion, and for the time being, the most passionate of Peirce's followers have not devoted themselves to getting the job done. They may find the Portuguese translation useful. Be that as it may, this shows that it is now only safe to proceed with a thorough inquiry focused on this facet of the Peirce-CJC relation. We call it safe in that we are confident that it will prove to be very fruitful and well worth the time. It is always possible, of course, to

engage with Peirce's oeuvre while trying valiantly not to remember that he did not invent or discover the wheel. This might sometimes prove to be either handy or indeed required. Whoever wishes for a more nuanced understanding of the genius of the founding father of American pragmatism ought to listen to his sources and be mindful of the particulars of his relations to them. A great topic to be addressed in future inquiries is that of understanding to what extent the CJC had an impact on Peirce's mathematical interpretation of abstraction, or more broadly put, what bearing does this particular field of impact of the Peirce-CJC relation had on the former's mathematical works.[305] Studying the impact of the CJC on Peirce's mathematical achievements cannot stand in an isolated order, for all the matters we are discussing in the present study and others, to be sure, relate to one another intimately.[306] Other links

[305]It is likely to be of help in such an endeavor to take a careful look at Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Coimbra Jesuit Mathematicians. A Possible Reasoned Catalog", in *Conimbricenses.Org Encyclopedia*, ed. Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2022).

Not alone, but very particular regard should be paid to section 3, "Mathematics According to the Coimbra Jesuit Course".

[306]One can tell that by reading Fernando Zalamea, "Peirce and Grothendieck on Mathematical Cognition: A Merging of the Pragmaticist Maxim and Topos Theory", in *Handbook of Cognitive Mathematics*, ed. Marcel Danesi (Cham: Springer

between Peirce and the CJC may go a step further to reveal how significant the impact of the CJC really was on Peirce. In the late 1860s, Peirce took up from the CJC his understanding of abstractive knowledge as the cognition of something not in terms of its presence, but of how it can be cognized—or, at least, validly hypothesized[307]—from something other than itself which is first, formerly cognized, allowing us to unveil or synthesize features of our observations—like our background knowledge—and raise a hypothesis to further the understanding of said observations in such a way that, should the hypothesis be true, the reality of the observation would

International Publishing, 2022), 49–66.

The chapters of the now-mentioned monograph authored or co-authored by Andreas Obersteiner, Daniel Clark Orey, Denes Szűcs, Donna E. West, Irene C. Mammarella, Jenni L. Harding, Karin Kucian, Lital Daches Cohen, Lorenzo Magnani, Marcel Danesi, Milton Rosa, Piata Allen, Orly Rubinsten, Rachel Pizzie, Roi Cohen Kadosh, Sandra Wildfeuer, Sara Caviola, Silke M. Wortha, Stephan E. Vogel, Tamsin Meaney, Tony Trinick, Thomas Dresler, and Veronica Albanese are likewise recommended for those willing to search for the echoes of the CJC—most of all those brought in by way of indirect links—in some of the most authoritative contemporary teachings on these mathematical and other related matters.

[307]Regarding the process of abduction—a type of logical inference that stems from an observational point and finds the seemingly most reasonable explanation to make sense of the observation(s); or perhaps equally the process of forming valid or plausible hypotheses—, read Cornelis de Waal, "Charles Sanders Peirce and the Abduction of Einstein: On the Comprehensibility of the World" (arXiv, October 1, 2016).

be a matter of course regardless of having been observed. Peirce defined abstractive knowledge while translating an excerpt of the CJC into English, a fact that reveals not only how knowledgeable the early Peirce was in Latin, but also how significant the CJC was to his mind, fueling his lexicographical inclinations and laying the grounds for the unfolding of his insights on abstraction and other cognition-related matters. But the breadth and depth of the impact of the CJC on Peirce does not end at this point either. The CJC also impacted Peirce in other—and, of all relations, differences are also significant—ways.

Where Logic and the Scotists Lie

Albeit hitherto largely unnoticed by the community of inquiry, the connectivity between Peirce and Couto regarding the divisions or modalities of logic has already been hypothesized. Carvalho[308] suggested that there is a connection between Couto and Peirce regarding the division of logic into two modes or levels: *docens* (theoretical) and *utens* (practical). Could Couto's logical divisions have had an

[308]Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Couto, Sebastião do", in Mário Santiago de Carvalho and Simone Guidi (eds.), *Conimbricenses.org Encyclopedia*, Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos.

effect on Peirce? Here is a very fine topic for doctoral inquiries on the diachronic compass of the ways of reasoning. This line of inquiry has the potential to unearth novel facets of Peirce's work and suggest fresh interpretations of his semiotic logic. Should Carvalho be found to be correct, the community of inquiry will be left to understand to what extent these two logical modalities (practical and theoretical) bear relevance to issues such as Peirce's philosophical prioritization of certain (pragmaticist) doctrines over all other alternatives. While the theoretical-practical distinction has roots in quite an ancient soil, reaching all the way down to Arabic-Islamic *falsafa*[309] and medieval Latinity and further down to Stoic and Aristotelian layers of the past, one of the most up-to-the-minute logic

[309] *Falsafa* is the Arabic word designed to transcribe the Greek *philosophia*.

On *falsafa*, the authoritative work in Portuguese is still Mário Santiago de Carvalho, *Falsafa. Breve introdução à filosofia arábico-islâmica*, 2nd ed., eQuodlibet (Coimbra: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2020).

We already expressed our concern about the fact that we are not aware of any project for the translation of this work. See Robert Junqueira, "Mário Santiago de Carvalho, Falsafa. Breve introdução à filosofia arábico-islâmica (Coimbra: eQuodlibet, Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos, 2020). 172 pp. ISBN: 978- 989- 54- 3285- 1", *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 30, no. 60 (2021): 429–34.

We would add today that it is not possible to determine what the Lusophone world had to say about *falsafa* in the first quarter of the present century unless we carefully examine Carvalho's work.

textbooks available in English is still drawing on this differentiation—between logic as especially known (*logica docens)* and as more broadly understood (*logica utens)*—as a basic premise in the study of logic during our century.[310] The author explains that

> "It is true that, in everyday life, logic being unavoidable wherever there is thought of any kind, the person of affairs does as well without as with the aid of logical theory. (...). But as soon as thought moves beyond the everyday and especially into realms of objectivity only accidentally perceptible (such as the realms that higher orders of culture establish) or not properly perceptible at all (such as the questions traditionally classed as epistemological or also metaphysical) the aid afforded by theory of reasoning becomes as vitally important as it is commonly conspicuously lacking".[311]

According to Peirce, every reasoner has a *logica utens*—i.e., an overall picture of what sound reasoning is—which is distinct from the *logica docens*, i.e., the culmination of theoretical study.[312] This

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[310]John Deely, *Logic as a Liberal Art*, ed. Christopher S. Morrissey (Nanjing Shi: Nanjing Normal University Press, 2020), 7-8.

[311]*Ibid.*, 13n1.

[312]Charles S. Peirce, "Ground, Object and Interpretant", in *Collected Papers of*

amounts to believing that anyone has some understanding of the reality of logic, whereas it is only those who take logic as a field of study or a profession who understand such a reality not just as an outcome of experience from a practical perspective—which may or may not involve awareness of the actual existence of the very possibility of approaching said reality in a speculative way[313]—but also in a distinctly theoretical way. The fact is, of course, that logic generally speaking cannot be subsumed under specific labels such as "theoretical" or "practical"; that is, logic as a whole cannot be restricted to any of such two modes or tiers that it raises before our awareness, be it the more speculative or the more sensible one. Indeed it cannot, for both ultimately hinge on one another, with theory being unfolded and challenged in practical terms and practice being factored into and encoded in theoretical frameworks. Never-

Charles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol. II. Elements of Logic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), paras. 227–29 and Charles S. Peirce, "Logic", in *Ibid.*, paras. 203–18. See also Charles S. Peirce, "Logica Utens", in *Ibid.*, paras. 186–87.

[313]Same as every theoretical understanding of reality is first of all grounded in awareness—the result of a practical reasoning process—being informed by the actual existence of a possibility of approaching reality speculatively.

A prime vehicle to signify awareness of the possibility to approach reality theoretically is having a name for it.

theless, the division of logic into such differing modes is prone to prompting the debate as to whether logic is a theoretical or practical science, with the disjunction being not necessarily interpreted as a sign of inclusivity or actual contact. Mind that for centuries, distinguishing between *logica utens* and *logica docens* has seemingly led to more obscurity or fuzziness within the community of inquiry than it has contributed to greater levels of clarity or precision.[314] Although a systematic investigation devoted to the particulars of the impact of the CJC on Peirce relative to the divisions of logic needs to be advanced, we can anticipate that Carvalho's supposition is not implausible in light of Peirce's references to the CJC. Such is the case, albeit attention is to be paid to the alternative, older hypothesis that Pietarinen—hinting at Scotus as the source for Peirce's distinction between the practical and theoretical tiers of logic—has brought forward regarding precisely this issue.[315] Ar-

[314]Read Deely's "History of Attempts to Determine the Place of Logic Relative to Other Studies or 'Branches of Knowledge'" in John Deely, *Logic as a Liberal Art*, ed. Christopher S. Morrissey (Nanjing Shi: Nanjing Normal University Press, 2020), 17-23; especially 21-22.

[315]Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, "Cultivating Habits of Reason: Peirce and the *Logica Utens* Versus *Logica Docens* Distinction", *History of Philosophy Quarterly* 22, no. 4 (2005): 358.

On the very first page of this writing, which is immediately preceding the one

guably, Carvalho's and Pietarinen's assumptions are not at odds with each other, since it turns out that Peirce believes himself to be in agreement with both Scotus and the CJC. So it is, although Peirce's agreement with Scotus' understanding of logic rests on interpreting such an understanding not as Scotus and his followers understand it, but as the CJC does (see below). In 1869 or 1870, Peirce drew attention to "Sebastianus Contus", the author of the volume *On the Whole of Dialectics*. By this time, the belief that Peirce has considerable acquaintance with the CJC—and more than just a volume—grows in the reader's mind. We have spoken of acquaintanceship, but this goes well beyond it, as it involves Peirce acknowledging great authority to the Coimbra school[316] in matters pertain-

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just referred to, the author delivers a masterful description of the contrast between *logica utens* and *logica docens* that is worthy of attention both on its own and in comparison to other writings in the wider literature, extant or prospective.

On the Peirce-Scotus relation read especially Paniel Reyes Cárdenas, *Scholastic Realism: A Key to Understanding Peirce's Philosophy* (Peter Lang Verlag, 2018). Although the author is silent as to the Peirce-CJC relation, he discusses throughout the whole book a very wide palette of solidly argued hypotheses on the impact of Scotus on Peirce.

[316]One may argue that the Coimbra school exists but is limited to the Aristotelianisms of the 16th-18th centuries; one may argue that such a school simply does not exist; one may argue in favor of quite a lot of alternative views. As we see it, not only does the Coimbra school exist but it is neither bound to be Aristotelian nor confined to a specific temporal epoch.

ing to medieval logic. The matter at hand in Peirce's reference to Sebastião do Couto comes down to whether logic conforms to a theoretical or a practical faculty, only from a historiographical angle. Peirce's reference to Couto seems to be no mere name-dropping, but a well-considered and purposeful reference to a philosophical heritage that Peirce greatly cherished and became engaged with. This reference to Couto is a token of Peirce's deep entanglement with the CJC and a clear sign of Peirce's recognition of the soundness of Couto's contributions to the fields of logic and its history. Peirce leaves no room for doubt about his belief that what can be read in the CJC on Scotist logic is more correct than what both Duns Scotus and his followers professed about their own logic. Peirce claims to be in agreement with Couto's analysis, which the first logged as conveying the following message: the Scotist approach to logic calls for an understanding of logic as a practice, whether or not this understanding is labeled a theory. In other words, we may read Peirce as saying that Couto claims (and the first agrees)

As long as there will be philosophers based in Coimbra, there will be a Coimbra school. This school is both multifaceted and polyphonic, presenting a range of continuities and discontinuities, be they related to sources, themes, or methodologies. There is, though, a foundational unity resulting from the combination of territorial stability and the unfolding of time.

that Scotism shapes an understanding of logic as a sensible reality, no matter how much it may be branded as one that is wholly speculative, perchance configuring a practical science instead of a theoretical one. Here is what Peirce wrote:

> "Sebastianus Contus has acutely observed that although Scotus and his school profess to regard logic as a purely speculative science yet in their whole method of treatment of it, they show that they really consider it in a practical point of view; and the same may be said of most of the other writers who term it a purely speculative science".[317]

Though Peirce fails to provide a bibliographical reference, it is fairly certain that he had in mind the last article—titled "Teaching dialectics is a practical science (*Dialecticam docentem esse practicam scientiam)*"—of the question "Whether dialectics is indeed a proper science and whether it is distinct from the rest (*Utrum Dialectica sit vere, proprieque scientia, & ab aliis distincta?)*".[318] There,

[317]See Charles S. Peirce, "A Practical Treatise on Logic and Methodology", in *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 2: 1867-1871*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 350-351.

[318]Sebastião do Couto, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritæ* (Coimbra: D. G. Loureyro, 1606),

either it can be read what Peirce was reading, or at the very least it can be shown that Peirce was in the way of knowledge regarding Couto's standpoint. In effect, in Couto's estimation, the connection between Scotus and the Scotists, on the one hand, and the view of logic as an "absolutely and plainly practical (*absolute & simpliciter practicam)*" reality, on the other, is a relation of profound agreement, albeit superficially at odds.[319] Peirce does no more than mention Couto and evoke the latter's opinion on the topic at hand, and he does so without providing us with a bibliographic reference; nevertheless, Peirce was very conscious of what he was dealing with when he brought up the CJC, same as when he claimed to share his interpretation of the Scotist logic with the author of the volume *On the Whole of Dialectics*. An additional noticeable fact is that it becomes evident that Peirce was, already in the late 1860s or early 1870s, pretty much in tune with the CJC on issues pertaining to the history of logic that entail a common ground with respect to the general difficulty of understanding the divisions of logic. One

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respectively 32-36 and 20-36; the 1st pp. 32-36 and 20-36, for the volume *On the Whole of Dialectics* is divided into two sets of pagination (431+628). Our translation.

[319]See *Ibid.*, 33.

reason why this matters here is that this realization implies that Carvalho's hypothesis (see above) does not only stand up, but is indeed somewhat invigorated: there are sensible chances that Peirce has somehow been elevated to his learned understanding of the divisions of logic via the pages of the CJC; and, of course, Carvalho's assumption earns some more grounds for optimism. This is a historical-philosophical reason for optimism, but other layers of interdisciplinary interest can be attached to this and other related issues. A good example, concerning the Peirce-CJC relation as a whole, is that the relation would lend itself perfectly to illustrating in sociological discussion the relevance of intellectual cross-pollination without disregarding the role of specific persons such as Peirce.[320] Mindful of Peirce's next reference to the CJC, which is a little later than—though neatly coupled with—the one just noted, the grounds for optimism run a good deal wider than Carvalho's hypothesis just alluded to could ever achieve on its own. The fact

[320]A relatively recent example of a more individual-centered sociological approach to such matters, even if still somewhat distant from a person-centered approach, can be found in Caitlin Daniel, Eleni Arzoglou, and Michèle Lamont, "European Workers: Meaning-Making Beings", in *Research in the Sociology of Work*, ed. David Brady, vol. 22 (Bingley, UK: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 2011), 287–312.

that, over a dozen years after referring to the Latin version of Couto's name, Peirce will again be turning to the CJC for an understanding of elementary—albeit contentious—matters pertaining to logic as he was laying out in writing his introductory lectures designed for the study of the field is in fact indicative of Peirce's sustained, doctrinal reliance on the CJC. As the references grow more numerous, we are left to assume a pungent evolutionary leap in our sense of the vastness and full force of the Peirce-CJC relation, and this much is only yielded by our awareness of the collection of these references and the possibility of any future discoveries. As we proceed with the investigation, the semiotician's rootedness in the international waters of the CJC continues to prove how Peirce's journey has been fraught with Coimbricity. This is, however, insufficient to serve our purposes here. Peirce kept referring to the CJC during the remainder of his life, so let us renew our sense of the gravity of Peirce's journey by growing our awareness of the role played by the CJC in signposting the logicians' way through the open fields of semiotics. Another reference dates from 1883, when Peirce let it rest perfectly clear that he meant to encourage his students to "dip into" the old controversy about "whether logic is an art or a science" by "looking over the *Commentary* of the Conimbricenses".

In I2L,[321] Peirce has not specified more precisely where to look (p. 509). It is open to everyone at last, nowadays, to systematically traverse the sea of pages of the CJC by means of the results of the X-ray that has been performed on all of its volumes in Carvalho's, *Dicionário*. While not strictly required from Carvalho's readership, having at least some background in Latin or Portuguese may come in handy. The Peirce Edition Project (PEP) claims that Peirce's reference to the Commentary "is to the sixteenth-century commentaries on Aristotle from the Jesuit University of Coimbra in Portugal".[322] This information is convenient for our inquiry, and future inquirers may want to carefully examine whatever associates the Peirce Edition Project with the Peirce-CJC relation at large. Notice that the century (above) may be inaccurate (see *infra*). As a matter of fact, it is not impossible at all that the PEP fell straight to a misinterpretation when suggesting that Peirce is referring to "Conimbricenses. *Commentarii collegii conimbricensis societatis Iesu, in tres libros De*

[321] I2L stands for Charles S. Peirce, "[Introductory Lecture on Logic]", in *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 4: 1879–1884*, ed. Christian J. W. Kloesel et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 507-510.

[322] Charles S. Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 4: 1879–1884*, ed. Christian J. W. Kloesel et al. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), 592.

anima Aristotelis Stagiritae. 3rd ed. Colonia (Cologne): Lazarus Zetzner, 1600".[323] To be sure, we must underline that the PEP indicates that Peirce is not known to have owned the Cologne Edition of the volume *On the Soul*.[324] At any rate, it is already established that Peirce could access this volume of the CJC with ease from a rather young age. However, it seems a bit far-fetched to assume that Peirce is, in this case, referring to the CJC volume *On the Soul*, given

— the character of the mentioned controversy, to wit: whether logic is an art or a science;

— the fact that Peirce directly referred to the volume *On the Whole of Dialectics* in 1902 (see below) and to its author in 1869-1870 (see above);

— the fact that the lecture was on logic.

While it is not impossible that Peirce was referring to *On the Soul* in this instance, it seems more likely that he was drawing upon his knowledge of some other volume of the CJC, particularly *On the*

[323] *Ibid.*, 596 and 687.

[324] See *Ibid.*, 595-596.

Whole of Dialectics. In Peirce's mind was probably Couto's *Dialectica*. Now, if this is so, the invoked century should be the seventeenth (see *supra)*. Couto's *Dialectica* was not taken into consideration by the PEP in the second volume of the *Writings* as well, though the PEP acted much more carefully when indexing the volume regarding the "Conimbricenses".[325] Past these editorial concerns—of utmost consequence, indeed, but of marginal value to the development of the present study—, suffice it to stress that Peirce most likely had in mind Couto's *Dialectica*. It will pay off in future studies on this matter to examine the fourth and fifth questions of the introductory section of *On the Whole of Dialectics*. In the fifth question, headed "So what is the proper subject of dialectics? (*Quod nam sit adequatum Dialecticae subiectum*)", one can notice that the CJC is referring to logic as the art of mastering the instruments of reasoning, the means of scientific discovery which belong to the order of rationality.[326] The fourth question, headed "Whether dialectics is

[325]See Charles S. Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 2: 1867-1871*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 635; see also 71 and 117.

[326]See Sebastião do Couto, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritæ* (Coimbra: D. G. Loureyro, 1606), 36-46; the 1st pp. 36-46. Our translation.

indeed a proper science and whether it is distinct from the rest", may prove to be convenient to do justice to Couto's emphasis on practice by understanding logic as an art that is practiced theoretically, always remaining and foregrounding the practical.[327] This does not mean, however, that the significance of logic as a science is minimized in the CJC; for, as Couto wrote,

> "unless dialectics is a genuine science, no solid science can exist; for knowing is cognizing by way of demonstration (*Nisi Dialectica sit vera scientia, nulla firma scientia esse potest; nam scire est cognoscere per demonstrationem)*".[328]

This is not all of Peirce's references to the CJC, nor are the ties of the Peirce-CJC relation to the schools and personalities involved in the history of logic restricted to Scotus and the Scotists, for other schools are brought into the equation as well, as will be readily observed by the coming into the picture of the Thomists and Aquinas.

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[327] *Ibid.*, 20-36; the 1st 20-36. The translation was provided above.

[328] *Ibid.*, 28; the 1st p. 28. Our translation.

Thomistic Logic

It will be painlessly understood that Thomism as perceived by Peirce has been everywhere reflected throughout all references because of the very fact that the CJC is in the center stage. Around 1893, Peirce very well specified what should be carefully researched if one is to understand fully what he intends to signify when referring to "Thomistic Logic", which is much more than just the works of the Angelic Doctor. To be sure, Peirce means much more than the works of Thomas Aquinas, but also a whole lot less than the whole of the Thomistic tradition that has unfolded throughout the ages. Although not focused on logic, in the most recent scholarly literature English-speaking readers can find a very decent introductory overview, centered on the Christian philosophical and theological cultures, of the way Aquinas' works have resonated from the heart of the Middle Ages up to the present day. We are referring to *The Oxford Handbook of the Reception of Aquinas*.[329] We would recommend this book to anyone wishing to get an elementary idea of the magnitude of what the label "Thomistic" stands for. It is worth repeating,

[329]Matthew Levering and Marcus Plested, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of the Reception of Aquinas*, 1st ed. (Oxford University Press, 2021).

however, that the work is not focused on logic. Perhaps because of this—and because it is an incredibly short book; for, though it runs to more than 700 pages, this amounts to 'peanuts' when it comes to the theme under discussion—, the CJC is not referred to a single time. Or else, being true that the CJC has brought forth a wealth of expertise reaching far beyond logic, it is perhaps the case that the individuals involved in editing and writing the book disagree with Peirce (see below) and do not believe that the CJC ought to be covered under the umbrella of Thomism. Be that as it may, the most prodigious scholar to have studied in Coimbra since time immemorial, João Poinsot, is in contrast featured in more than one chapter. Please note that Poinsot is most frequently referred to by his religious name, that is, John of St. Thomas, and in the index of names and terms he is listed once for each name. Peirce did deem the CJC to be Thomistic. When referring to "Thomistic Logic", Peirce has in mind not just the works of—or whose authorship is credited to—Aquinas but also those of his contemporary Antoine-Marie Bensa (†1887); the 15th-century Cologne master Lambertus de Monte (†1499); as well as "the highly esteemed Logic of the Doc-

tors of Coimbra".[330] For some further details concerning Lambert of Cologne, particularly of relevance with respect to polemics over authorship attribution, see Ashworth's "The Post-Medieval Period"[331] The literature on Bensa, a professor of philosophy and theology based in Nice, is so scarce that it would be surprising if young researchers who are interested in Peirce's sources and 19th-century logic are not encouraged to tackle this author for their doctoral studies, for they would be bringing some definite breakthroughs to the community of inquiry.[332] Peirce'sindex[nominum]Peirce, Charles S. latter reference above is of utmost concern not just for studying the Peirce-CJC relation but also the Peirce-Aquinas, Peirce-Bensa, and other relations, as well as for enabling us to label the Peirce-CJC

[330]Charles S. Peirce, "The Essence of Reasoning: Some Historical Notes", in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol. IV. The Simplest Mathematics. BOOK I. Logic and Mathematics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), para. 27.

[331]E. Jennifer Ashworth, "The Post-Medieval Period", in *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Logic*, ed. Catarina Dutilh Novaes and Stephen Read, Cambridge Companions to Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016), 172.

[332]About Bensa, it is possible to find a stepping stone regarding his contributions beyond logic in Sylvio Hermann De Franceschi, "L'Invention chrétienne de la prépondérance française. La monarchie henricienne et la défense d'un ordre de Chrétienté au tournant des xvie et xviie siècles", *Revue Française d'Histoire des Idées Politiques* 44, no. 2 (2016): 249–252.

relation as being, in Peirce's understanding, a share of his broader relation to Thomism. How heavily was Peirce's view of the Thomistic doctrines reliant on one or more volumes of the CJC? Behold a first-class point of departure for discovering what remains, so far, terra incognita. Clearly, now no one will be left in the dark as to the fact that this is a relation that cannot be thoroughly discussed while ignoring the CJC and its effect on Peirce. The Peirce-Aquinas relation is frequently found in the literature, although usually in a very cursory way.[333] This brief account of Peirce's references to the CJC (more below) should already work as a starter for those willing to invest some real enthusiasm to pursue this challenging line of inquiry. In 1893, Peirce appealed to the authority of the CJC when countering an opinion, regarding Aquinas' logic, attributed by Peirce to Carl von Prantl (†1888). Prantl's alleged opinion is that the

[333]For the sake of future inquiries, it will be worthwhile to factor in Mauricio Beuchot and John Deely, "Common Sources for the Semiotic of Charles Peirce and John Poinsot", *The Review of Metaphysics* 48, no. 3 (1995): 539–66; the same is true about John Deely, "The Role of Thomas Aquinas in the Development of Semiotic Consciousness", *Semiotica*, no. 152-1–4 (2004): 75–139 and Randall G. Colton, "Aquinas and Poinsot (John of St. Thomas) on Instruments, Signs, and Teaching", *New Blackfriars* 100, no. 1087 (2019): 320–34; it may also pay off to have a look at Michael L. Raposa, *Peirce's Philosophy of Religion*, Peirce Studies, no. 5 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989).

authorship of Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's *Peri Hermeneias* has incorrectly been attributed to Aquinas. Peirce claimed that if Prantl had been right about the said controversy, it would seem beyond belief that "men of such learning as the doctors of Coimbra" failed to make precisely the same point as Prantl,[334] who has been involved in other such polemics.[335] In the case of Aquinas, there is some background that can help us understand why a bit of controversy arises at this point. Peter Thomas Geach (†2013) teaches that, notwithstanding the fact that

> "in the practice of theological argument he [Aquinas] was well aware of the need for having sharp logical tools and a good stock of them", and that "some of the logical distinctions he finds it necessary to draw (...) are of an importance that could hardly be exaggerated", Aquinas "was not much interested in formal logic for its own sake, as many medieval philosophers

[334]See Charles S. Peirce, "The Essence of Reasoning: The Proposition", in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol. IV. The Simplest Mathematics. BOOK I. Logic and Mathematics (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), para. 38.

[335]Some information about yet another controversy, relating to Galen of Pergamon (c. †216, a.k.a. Claudius Galenus), is brought up in footnote 14 of Neal Ward Gilbert, *Renaissance Concepts of Method* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), 14.

> were", so Aquinas "never bothered to finish his commentary on the *De Interpretatione*". Geach concludes that, barring one or another exception (which he flags), "what there is of his [Aquinas'] commentary is of little intrinsic interest". [336]

Aquinas' commentary was finished in 1496 by Thomas Cajetan (†1534) and has now been available for over six decades to the English-speaking readership[337] This is no time for challenging Geach's assertion that Aquinas' commentary on Aristotle's *De Interpretatione* is "of little intrinsic interest"; the point to be noted now is that Aquinas' commentary has been at the center of an intriguing scholarly discussion beyond its content, a discussion specifically concerning its authorship. The CJC played a central role in Peirce's scholarly discussion about the authorship of Aquinas' commentary when Peirce and Prantl seemed to the former to be in disagreement over the authenticity of the commentary on the *De Interpretatione*. Here's is how Peirce seems to perceive the clash: *Unbelievable... Prantl is getting Aquinas some really bad press*. Peirce's solution?

[336]Peter Thomas Geach, *Logic Matters* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1972), 300.

[337]In Thomas Aquinas and Thomas Cajetan, *On Interpretation: Commentary by St. Thomas and Cajetan of Aristotle on Interpretation (Peri Hermeneias)*, trans. Jean T. Oesterle (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Marquette University Press, 1962).

The authority of people of such learning as the doctors of Coimbra. But was there really a point of disagreement at all other than in Peirce's mind?[338] It seems not, and it is perhaps not overstating the case that Peirce's Latin was more finely tuned than his German. In Prantl's opus, we find no sign of a complaint about the authorship of the commentary on *De Interpretatione* having been erroneously attributed to Aquinas, and perhaps the high authority Peirce acknowledges to the CJC regarding such matters ought not to be so vociferously—or perhaps not at all—contrasted with that of the Bavarian knight.

> The following is Prantl's statement: "... *bemerke ich, dass mir in Uebereinstimmung mit älteren und neueren Untersuchungen unter den zur Logik gehörigen (...) kleineren Schriften nur folgende als ächt gelten*".
>
> "I remark that, in line with earlier and more recent inquiries, only the following minor writings pertaining to logic are authentic"; this is where Prantl lists a number of works—for sure not listing the Commentary to the *Peri Hermeneias*.

[338]We would like to warmly thank Mário Jorge de Carvalho and Mário Santiago de Carvalho, as they both alerted us to the dire need to check if Peirce's reproach of Prantl was indeed fair.

> Upon having done so, goes on: "*Die übrigen als unächt vorläufig bei Seite lassend muss ich, wie sich von selbst versteht ausser den Commentaren zu* De interpr.*, zur zweiten Analytik und zur Metaphysik auch die einzelnen entscheidenden Stellen aus den bekannten Hauptwerken (...) beiziehen*".
>
> "Ignoring the remaining ones for the time being as being unauthentic, I have to consult, as stands to reason, besides the Commentary on *De Interpretatione*, the ones on the *Posterior Analytics* and the *Metaphysics*, as well the specific decisive passages from the well-known major works...".[339]

When read in its own right, Prantl's position is unambiguously incompatible with the portrait painted by Peirce: there are no grounds for the disagreement between Peirce and Prantl. Probably Peirce's understanding of Latin was far superior to his understanding of German, a weakness which may have led to misinterpreting Prantl's work. There is plenty to discuss on this front, and certainly no shortage of inquirers willing to pursue it further, but in charting

[339]Carl von Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, vol. III (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1867), 108. Jürgen Müller, an Austrian medical practitioner with no professional ties to academia, assured us that our translation is faithful to the meaning of Prantl's message.

Peirce's references to the CJC we must not linger idly here.

(Non-)Natural Predication

Another reference dates from 1902, when Peirce puts forward various sorts of predication and, immediately after introducing two instances of "identical predication", points to the CJC, particularly to *On the Whole of Dialectics*. Let us read:

> "... Natural predication: when the subject and predicate ought to be so related according to their nature. This is substantially the definition given in many books; but it conveys little idea of how the expression is used. Natural predication is always divided into the identical and direct; non-natural predication is either *indirect*, i.e., *contra naturam*, or it is *praeter naturam*, i.e., *per accidens*. Examples of indirect predication, where the subject is related to the predicate as form to matter, are *alba est nix, animal est homo*. Examples of predication *praeter naturam*, where subject and predicate are related to some third term, as form to matter, are *album est dulce, dulce est album*. Examples of direct predication: *nix est alba*, homo est animal. Examples of identical predication: *gladius est ensis, Plato est*

Plato (Conimbricenses *in Praef. Porph.*, q.i. art. 4)...."[340]

A doctoral inquiry specifically addressing the question of the impact of the CJC on Peirce as regards predication seems altogether appropriate, for the text authored by Peirce we have just read is the final step in a longer catalog of types, subtypes, and examples of predication referred to by Peirce. While it is true that, throughout Peirce's long catalog, he also indicates other sources for certain sub/types of predication—for example Duns Scotus (but also Aristotle), as Peirce's polemic with Prantl persists (see above), this time over the authorship of some passages attributed by Peirce to Scotus[341]—, it is also true that in most cases no bibliographic reference is found at all. Often it may be tempting to consider the hypothesis that Peirce is in fact making reference to some of the writings of both Scotus and Aristotle via his reading of the CJC, but we are not in a position to take this step; this matter alone deserves careful discussion on the part of the community of inquiry,

[340]See Charles S. Peirce, "Propositions: Predication", in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol. II. Elements of Logic. Book II. Speculative Grammar (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), para. 361.

[341]See *Ibid.*

a discussion that will probably demand for a lot of time and resources. Maybe in a call for tenders of the kind we outlined earlier, a couple of inquiries on this or closely related matters could stand a reasonable chance of being funded, provided solid projects were on the table.[342] It may already be evident at this point that the Peirce-CJC relation promises to be worth the investment in most respects, but we would nevertheless like to encourage bold prospective doctoral students interested in the Peirce-CJC relation to explore the subject matter of predication with particular confidence; if not in a broader sense—including more than just the accidental, direct, identical, and indirect predication substypes; the respective types being natural or non-natural—, then at least as regards the broad division between natural and non-natural predication. Mind that the examples of identical predication do not exhaust all that Peirce has borrowed from the CJC as regards predication, for he took from it at least the whole divide between natural and non-natural predication and their further divisions. In the CJC, natural predication is split into two genera: identical and direct predication; non-

[342]We are thinking of Junqueira, "Plano Para o Lançamento de Um Concurso Europeu Na Área Das Humanidades:A Idade Latina Como Fonte de Respostas Às Interrogações Prementes Da Atualidade", preprint (Preprints, May 7, 2021).

natural predication, for its part, is divided into predication contrary to nature—which Peirce also calls "indirect predication";[343] in this he also follows Couto, who reads "*contra naturam, siue indirecta*"—and predication beyond nature (*praeter naturam).*[344] In dealing with such distinctions, Peirce relied wholly on what can be read in Sebastião do Couto's *Dialectica*; meaning that, at the very least, Peirce's reference to the CJC we are now flagging concerns the full text we read above. For a detailed chart to navigate the maze of *On the Whole of Dialectics* with precision, look for Mário Santiago de Carvalho's already mentioned *Dicionário.*[345] What we are providing here is but the first step towards examining the treatment given to the subject of predication in Couto's opus, something that is a requirement for anyone interested in undertaking doctoral research on the topic of predication in the context of the Peirce-CJC relation. This exciting avenue of inquiry is not the one we are able to walk

[343] *Ibid.*

[344] See Couto's *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritæ* (Coimbra: D. G. Loureyro, 1606), 68-69 (the 1st pp. 68-69, for the volume is—we said it above already—divided into two sets of pagination).

[345] See Carvalho, *Dicionário Do Curso Filosófico Conimbricense*, Skiagraphia's (Coimbra: Palimage, 2020), 355-359.

down now, as there are more of Peirce's direct references to the CJC and more to do in order to meet the demands of our doctoral plan.

A Great Controversy

In "Note on Metaphysics: Perseity and Per Se" (refer. *infra*), also in 1902, Peirce invites the reader to surf the pages of the CJC. Peirce does it right after quietly translating an excerpt of the CJC (check out below) and briefing the reader on a "great controversy" between the Thomists, the Scotists, and the nominalists pertaining to matters at the crossroads between cognition and logic. The controversy comes down to the following: how does it happen and what does it mean that a proposition is known *per se*? Peirce is referring to the CJC, more precisely to Sebastião do Couto's *Dialectica*;[346] at this point, it does not seem too far-fetched to suggest that Peirce has read through all or at the very least over 800 pages of *On the Whole of Dialectics*. It is clear that, apart from the whole education in the history of logic that Peirce received and treasured on the basis of the CJC, the very synchronic scale of his thinking was yet

[346]Particularly Sebastião do Couto, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritæ* (Coimbra: D. G. Loureyro, 1606), 382-396 (the 2nd pp. 382-396).

again further powered by this philosophical wellspring. Profoundly entrenched in his immersion in the waters of the CJC, not only did Peirce's intellectual adventure lay down a rock-solid historical rationale for logic but also fomented the momentum and immensity of a systematic bent in Peircean semiotics. Suffice it to draw a comparison, starting straight away at the moment of defining what in this regard would amount to 'the basics'. According to Peirce, "A proposition is known *per se* if, and only if, it is cognoscible from its own terms but not cognoscible in any other way".[347] Bear witness that Couto says it in Latin "*Propositio per se nota est cognoscibilis ex suis terminis, & non est cognoscibilis per aliud*" (reference in the penultimate footnote above, p. 389-390). This line of thought, borrowed by Peirce from the CJC via translation, underscores the cognitive self-standing quality of a proposition that is known *per se*, implying that such propositions are known wholly on the basis of their own terms, avoiding extraneous pointers or the provision of collateral bits of information. This is suggesting a communal Peirce-CJC un-

[347]Charles S. Peirce, "Note on Metaphysics: Perseity and Per Se", in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol. VI. Scientific Metaphysics. Book I. Ontology and Cosmology: B. Synechism and Agapism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), para. 385.

derstanding of the character of cognition, which in the particular case of a proposition that is known *per se* could be illustrated by the bare word "proposition"; no arrows, circles, triangles, or whatever else would be needed to convey a clearer message. Addressing cognition at the heart of the Peirce-CJC relation will demand a fair amount of effort from the community of inquiry, but it should be quite worthwhile to do it in order to learn more about the Latin roots of contemporary cognitive semiotics. Sonesson's recent and learned, though quite introductory, overview of different semiotic traditions throughout the history of semiotics is available in open access.[348] All of Sonesson's arguments concerning Deely's discussion of the different traditions merits review, and Sonesson may emerge from such a review under criticism; yet, such review ought not to entail devaluing Sonesson's formidable contribution to the *IO2S Deely* and the semiotic community broadly construed. Back to the point, we may also profit from the fact that examples are given by Peirce which are the same or otherwise akin to those of Couto, with slight variations like:

[348]See Göran Sonesson, Juan Mendoza-Collazos, and Elma Berisha, "What Is Cognitive Semiotics?", *IO2S Deely*, 2022.

— Peirce says that the fact that it is known that the letters on a certain page are black is not a case of knowing *per se*, "because it may be proved by testimony";

— Couto says that the fact that it is known that a certain paper (*papyrum)* is white is not a case of knowing *per se*, "for it can be demonstrated (*quia demonstrari potest)*".[349]

Because they can be proven by demonstration or testimony, the colors of the paper or of the letters on the page in Couto and Peirce's examples are not known *per se*. The propositions that Peirce and Couto are referring to in the examples are known not in their own terms because they can be known in those of some external, related sign. There's enough material here for further developments, but right now we will turn our attention to the end of the list of Peirce's references to the CJC that we have spotted.

The *Non Sequitur*

Still in 1902, at last, we can read that

> due to "the neglect of fallacies by the more scientific logicians,

[349]Stick to the references found in footnotes 346 and 347 above.

> it is not easy to cite many who define the fallacy [of the converse] correctly. The Conimbricenses (than whom no authority is higher) do so".

Then, we find a reference to a section of the *Dialectica*.[350] Here the CJC is mentioned first of all, followed only by Couto and Poinsot's French contemporary, Eustachius of Saint Paul (†1640), and Peirce's slightly older British contemporary, Edward Meredith Cope (†1873). Whoever seeks to learn more about Eustachius while also walking along the path of seventeenth-century philosophical instruction will find an insightful starting point in Roger Ariew's "*Le Meilleur Livre Qui Ait Jamais Été Fait En Cette Matière*"[351] For more on Cope's life and work, we encourage you to read Harvey Yunis's, "Paraphrase, Exegesis, Common Sense".[352] The topic at hand, as far as the

[350]Charles Peirce and Christine Ladd-Franklin, "Notes on Explicative Reasoning: Fallacies", in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol. II. Elements of Logic. Book III. Critical Logic: A. Explicative Reasoning (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), para. 613.

[351]Ariew, "*Le Meilleur Livre Qui Ait Jamais Été Fait En Cette Matière*: Eustachius a Sancto Paulo and the Teaching of Philosophy in the Seventeenth Century", in *Teaching Philosophy in Early Modern Europe: Text and Image*, ed. Susanna Berger and Daniel Garber, Archimedes (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2021), 31–46.

[352]Harvey Yunis's, "Paraphrase, Exegesis, Common Sense: Edward Mered-

Peirce-CJC relation is concerned, is that of the fallacies, and in particular that of the *fallacia consequentis*, a fallacy regarding which Peirce writes (in the previously mentioned place) that, in his day, it was already customary among scholars to refer to it simply as the '*non sequitur*', i.e., "it does not follow". This fallacy is still commonly referred to as the '*non sequitur* fallacy' nowadays,[353] being at the forefront of the debate on some technical issues pertaining to artificial intelligence models;[354] and there are those who take the fallacy as a commendable tool for disrupting oppressive environments.[355] In the context of CJC, this sort of fallacy belongs not to the genre of fallacies whose being invalid is justified by the way one puts what

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ith Cope's Commentary on Aristotle's *Rhetoric*", in *Commenting on Aristotle's Rhetoric, from Antiquity to the Present* / Commenter La Rhétorique d'Aristote, de l'Antiquité à La Période Contemporaine (Brill, 2018), 231–45.

[353]This is not limited to the philosophical community; see for example Callistus Ireneous Nakpih and Simone Santini, "Automated Discovery of Logical Fallacies in Legal Argumentation", *International Journal of Artificial Intelligence & Applications* 11, no. 2 (March 31, 2020): 37–48.

[354]See, for example, Søren Dinesen Østergaard and Kristoffer Laigaard Nielbo, "False Responses From Artificial Intelligence Models Are Not Hallucinations", *Schizophrenia Bulletin*, May 23, 2023.

[355]As far as discursive environments are concerned, see Alex Prong, "The Queer *Non Sequitur*", in *The Routledge Companion to Gender and Science Fiction* (Routledge, 2023).

is being claimed. Whatever the level of verbosity or appeal of the argument, these fallacies stand for defective ways of reasoning because they are flawed in terms of the very reasoning behind them: the conclusion does not follow from the premises. So, according to Couto, *non sequitur* fallacies belong to the genre of fallacies whose being invalid is independent of how one puts it.[356] Peirce appears as a follower of Couto when it comes to that which does not follow. But all remains to be done regarding the Peirce-CJC relation, both in general and in particular regarding the matter of fallacies. A thorough analysis of the technical and scientific handling of fallacies by Peirce and Couto is called for, as well as an account of how the doctrines at stake have been reshaped by contemporary approaches to the understanding and applicability of fallacies both in the arenas of academia and of innovation strictly construed, for instance in the domains related to the field of knowledge engineering.[357] Should you care about these matters at the crossroads of

[356]The definition of the CJC can be found in Sebastião do Couto, *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritæ* (Coimbra: D. G. Loureyro, 1606), 545-546.

[357]See for example Jingde Cheng, "Relevant Reasoning as the Logical Basis of Knowledge Engineering", in *Application of Advanced Information Technologies*, vol. 1 (4th World Congress on Expert Systems, Citeseer, 1998), 449–57; on Peirce and

the history of logic and AI-related fields, be sure to watch Takafumi Kato's *IO2S Deely* lecture on "Peircean Robotics".[358] Hopefully, it will become a bit more palpable to the larger community that the wealth to be explored or yet to be discovered in the territories of the Peirce-CJC relation is truly to be treasured. We also hope that our brief survey will be serving as a useful resource for future mappings, taking the opportunity to correct any possible errors in this first attempt and rendering it more complete.

Belief Upgraded

All in all, it is abundantly apparent that a more secure belief has to be established within the community of inquiry concerning the Peirce-CJC relation, a belief that reaches far wider than just contemplating the triadic conception of the sign-relation. The effect of the CJC on Peirce may be greater than we have noted so far. Translating this hypothesis into a settled proposition calls for more research in the future. We have seen and underline that there is

abduction see 455-456.

[358]Kato , Sachi Arafat, and Elma Berisha, "Peircean Robotics: Semiotics Applied to the Emergence of Symbols", *IO2S Deely*, 2022.

a compelling sense in which it is possible that all of Peirce's considerations on cognition-related matters are under the spell of the CJC, and not simply, though certainly abstractive knowledge. It is of paramount historiographical interest to consider the ways in which the whole tradition of contemporary cognitive semiotics can be traced to the Latin Age through the Peirce-CJC relation. This relation is a vehicle for overcoming the systematic ignorance of more than a millennium of very rigorous Latin-language scholarship, a distancing from historical reality that cuts our historical body off at the knees, since from a diachronic point of view we cannot be linked for example to the Greek Age, the age of Aristotle, without traveling through the one of Aquinas. We trust that the intersections between Peirce and the CJC we have charted above, as well as our brief observations, will be of use in conducting further research.

Navigating the CJC Off the Record?

Since the Beginning of Time?

Since 1867, not the dawn of all time, Peirce has been proving to be a fluent reader of the Latin pages of the CJC and of *On the Whole of Dialectics* in particular. This is hardly a mere detail, not least in so far as it lends credence to the assumption according to which Peirce relied on the CJC as a means of arriving at his triadic understanding of the sign-relation. Not long before his passing, around 1909, Peirce wrote:

> "For forty years, that is, since the beginning of the year 1867, I have been constantly on the alert to find a *genuine* triadic relation – that is, one that does not consist in a mere collocation

of dyadic relations, or the negative of such, etc. (I prefer not to attempt a perfectly definite definition) – which is not either an intellectual relation or a relation concerned with the less comprehensible phenomena of life. (...) In short, the problem of how genuine triadic relationships first arose in the world is a better, because more definite, formulation of the problem of how life first came about; and no explanation has ever been offered except that of pure chance, which we must suspect to be no explanation, owing to the suspicion that pure chance may itself be a vital phenomenon. In that case, life in the physiological sense would be due to life in the metaphysical sense. Of course, the fact that a given individual has been persuaded of the truth of a proposition is the very slenderest possible argument for its truth; nevertheless, the fact that I, a person of the strongest possible physicistic prejudices, should, as the result of *forty years of questionings*, have been brought to the deep conviction that there is some essentially and irreducibly other element in the universe than pure dynamism may have sufficient interest to excuse my devoting a single sentence to its

expression".[359]

We should draw attention here to the fact that these ideas of Peirce's borne fruit above all in the contemporary claims of physiosemiotics and, therefore, the latter are in the same way most closely linked to a source: the Peirce-CJC relation. It is up to the community of inquiry to follow up in the future in order to sort out the details pertaining to issues such as this one. What is more, the most representative contemporary text we are aware of dealing with physiosemiosis is Deely's,[360] himself intimately connected to the same source. Peirce's text above may well be interpreted to mean that the major source giving rise to the physiosemiotic assumptions, but also less radical ones of Peircean biosemiotics is found in the CJC. Literature abounds on biosemiotics, but the comfort of picking up a text in trust to read at leisure is best enjoyed with titles written by authors such as Kalevi Kull and Donald Favareau.[361] One has to remember as well to go through the en-

[359]Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks, 8 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-1958), vol. 6 para. 322. The second italics are ours.

[360]Read *e.g.* Deely "Physiosemiosis as an Influence of Signs", *Chinese Semiotic Studies* 10, no. 3 (January 1, 2014), 375-407.

[361]Advisable titles include Søren Brier, "The Paradigm of Peircean Biosemi-

tire list of *IO2S Deely* recordings, for there are lectures led or commented on by some of the hottest names in the present-day biosemiotic scene, including those mentioned above and others (like Sara Cannizzaro). It is reasonable to expect that Peirce's physiosemiotic beliefs significantly feed into the context of his relation with the CJC. This will be so as far as we assume that Peirce's relational insight, like that of Poinsot, was a way of taking a leap for which Couto—following Fonseca and others (some names above)—opened

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otics", *Signs - International Journal of Semiotics* 2 (2008): 30–81; Claus Emmeche and Kalevi Kull, eds., *Towards a Semiotic Biology: Life Is the Action of Signs* (Hackensack, NJ: Imperial College Press, 2011); Donald Favareau, Paul Cobley, and Kalevi Kull, eds., *A More Developed Sign: Interpreting the Work of Jesper Hoffmeyer*, Tartu Semiotics Library 10 (Tartu: Tartu Univ. Press, 2012); Robert Lane, "Peircean Semiotic Indeterminacy and Its Relevance for Biosemiotics", in *Peirce and Biosemiotics: A Guess at the Riddle of Life*, ed. Vinícius Romanini and Eliseo Fernández, Biosemiotics 11 (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 51–78 [here, see also but not only Menno Hulswit and Romanini, "Semeiotic Causation and the Breath of Life", 95–126]; John Deely, "Semiotics 'Today': The Twentieth-Century Founding and Twenty-First-Century Prospects", in *International Handbook of Semiotics*, ed. Peter Pericles Trifonas (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2015), 29–113; Paul Cobley, Donald Favareau, and Kalevi Kull, "John Deely, from the Point of View of Biosemiotics", *Biosemiotics* 10, no. 1 (2017): 1–4; Donald Favareau, "Facing Up to the Hard Problem of Biosemiotics", *Biosemiotics* 14, no. 3 (2021): 603–15; Kalevi Kull, "The Biosemiotic Fundamentals of Aesthetics: Beauty Is the Perfect Semiotic Fitting", *Biosemiotics*, 2022; Kalevi Kull, "Paul Cobley's Impact on Biosemiotics: Thomas Sebeok's next Century", *Chinese Semiotic Studies* 19, no. 1 (2023): 15–23.

the three-dimensional route. It is tempting to resort to the term relativistic instead of relational when referring to thinkers such as Poinsot, Peirce, and Deely, but this ought to be complemented by a rationale as to the extent to which relativism is to be regarded as a philosophically well-framed doctrine focusing on the category of relations, or as something that has us deluded by an inconsistent and more or less volitional thought of absolute relativity. If we understand relativism as a doctrine that focuses on relations, then relativism is subordinated to general logic or semiotics, the study of triadic sign-relations. We believe in this, since it is only through signs that it is possible to understand whatever kind of relations or other realities, meaning substance. We suggest that it is of considerable use to undertake a discussion that enables us to assess not only the way in which relativism, in whatever form, may relate to the Peirce-CJC relation, but also the way in which relativism may be understood as an avenue for extending or deepening—in some instances it may even, as in the case of Peirce, be more specifically an avenue for transcending—the doctrines of the CJC and indeed those of the Latin Age more broadly. Here is an existing topic for further and continuing Peirce-CJC-related inquiries out of the lab of philosophical historiography; and as a basis, it is a simple exer-

cise to find above what has been already mentioned about relations and begin by taking into account the few bibliographical references that have already been provided, which will open the way to several others.[362] The fact is that by 1909, it had already been no less than slightly more than forty years since Peirce had established his connection with the CJC. For reasons already stated earlier in this work, it may be surprising that Peirce read the CJC, but what is beyond surprising is that Peirce's encounter with the CJC laid the seeds of what has constituted some of the most relevant and enduring aspects of Peirce's semiotic life or, if nothing else, of his cognitive experiences and mental behavior—not meaning to say that cognitive/mental and non-cognitive/-mental experiences form an iron-clad, unbridgeable distinction—throughout all or nearly all of his adult life.

[362]On top of such references, it might be convenient to factor in David J. Stump, "Fallibilism versus Relativism in the Philosophy of Science", *Journal for General Philosophy of Science* 53, no. 2 (2022): 187–99.

Jogging Our Memories

If anyone should want to tell anybody about the way books can transform someone's life, it would surely suit them to use the Peirce-CJC relation as an outstanding example. Given that Peirce seems to have been so awestruck and his thinking so animated and well-populated since the time he met for the first time with the doctrines of the CJC up until the time of his demise, we now feel more encouraged to inquire what it is that is in fact—beyond the mere formulation of the definition of the sign-relation—the matter of the CJC and Peirce's doctrines of signs. So much was written by Peirce on the subject, and the secondary literature is so vast (see above) that the setting of a doctoral dissertation—let alone one devoted to the Peirce-CJC relation in general, extending beyond the doctrine of signs—fails to enable an in-depth study of the topic. Scholarship is a social enterprise, so future inquiries will enable others to experience the satisfaction of furthering research on these and related matters. We aim at providing a point of departure, a task that has so far not been attempted by anyone in the context of our community of inquiry's intergenerational exchange, making it therefore urgent to proceed with a first approach in this respect. Let us walk

back a step and jog our memories about some of the facts that were already conveyed above, yet need to be revisited. Both Couto and Peirce are concerned with signs in general and both agree that three elements are always at play whenever signs are involved. These are:

[A] a sign *per se* (CJC) or sign-vehicle—usually referred to as a *representamen*, in Peircean orthodox lingo—, such as a picture of a cat standing for some cat before awareness;

[B] an object or something different from A, such as a real cat whose picture stands before awareness;

[C] the awareness, mind, or cognizing power accessing B as B is stood for by A, such as a cat owner finding his/her cat semiosically standing before him/her by means of a picture of a cat.

Naturally, pictures of cats could stand for different objects before awareness—or be stood for by other vehicles, such as the words "*fotografia de um gato* (picture of a cat)" or "*aquela coisa ali* (that thing over there)"—and evoke different interpretants, but not in the example above. So Couto understands this relation in terms of a relation between three elements, one of them being the sign, so in the CJC the sign (A) is but one element in a triadic relation and the awareness (C) is a cognizing power semiosically accessing B by

means of A. The relation involving the sign is necessarily triadic, since A cannot stand for B unless C exists as a platform for A to stand for B; in the same way, A cannot stand for something other than itself in relation to C if there is no object at all (nothing other than itself or no B) to stand for before C; both B and C cannot be respectively stood for and before if there is no A to stand for B before C—and, *nolens volens*, both B and C are required. In the framework of Couto's *doctrina signorum*, the sign is part of this ineluctably tripartite relation, and yet the sign is not *the* relation. The reason for saying that Peirce took the CJC as a basis, and not that Peirce simply copied the CJC; that is, the reason for stating that Peirce went beyond Couto in this respect, is that Peirce's approach is a little out of Couto's step. According to our inherited understanding of Peirce's general semiotics (see above), the sign is in itself triadic, not just part of a triadic relation: the sign is *the* relation; put another way, for Peirce, the sign comprises the whole interplay of A, B, and C. Peirce's sign, so understood, is more than just the *representamen* (A); it is the overall activity of B being stood for by A before C, A standing for B before C, and C semiosically accessing B by means of A. If this is so, the CJC and Peirce are in sync on the triadic character of such relations, but they diverge on how to

understand the being of signs: according to the CJC, a sign is a constituent part of a triadic relation, whereas for Peirce the sign is the triadic relation itself. Let us not forget this issue of a subtle gulf in the way Couto and Peirce think about the very nature of signs. As this is currently part of the state of the art regarding the Peirce-CJC relation, we will revisit this facet in due course, for we may suggest that it is worth questioning the legitimacy of this well-established understanding. Perhaps a more detailed assessment of the extant literature, both primary and secondary, will be called for in order to properly delve into this facet of the Peirce-CJC relation. The details relative to this matter have yet to be fully examined, but our inherited understanding stands up nicely as to an impact of the CJC on Peirce as regards the triadic definition of the sign. As we are on the precipice of a renewed understanding of and deeper inquiry into the Peirce-CJC relation, we insist on the need for continuing and more specialized research, envisioning an open-ended series of future itineraries across the domains of the Peirce-CJC relation, not ruling out possible echoes of the threads addressed in our doctoral inquiry. As we said, the path we are now prepared to walk in exploring some of the multiple facets of the Peirce-CJC relation is one that is not limited to the mere phrasing of the definition of the sign.

This is an endeavor that the community of inquiry has not had a chance to complete, though we are now in a position to undertake, driven by the evidence we have gathered thus far.

The Grand Canvas

We were to pass over the issue of the formulation of the triadic definition of the sign in the light of the insights gained from our exploration hitherto and, by the same token, we were to walk past the issue of the very nature of the sign, for the delicate difference between Peirce and Couto has already been highlighted in the state of the art above. As we shall see, though, both the phrasing of the triadic definition of the sign, or of the relations involving signs, and the understanding of the nature of signs themselves in Peirce and the CJC lead us to the realization that a step back from the state of the art is in order. We shall, in fact, take up the study of the effect of Couto's doctrine of signs on Peirce's semiotic logic from its very roots, paying attention both to what is involved in the expression of what a sign is and to how its nature is actually understood by both authors. There is one lesson we have already drawn from all this: however basic and well-established some matters seem to

be in terms of the state of the art, such matters may turn out to be fraught with difficulties. Such basic matters will prove to be a worthy avenue of further inquiry, as well as to be of great pertinence to the overall discussion of the Peirce-CJC relation and in particular of the corresponding doctrines of signs. In recalling the significance of these fundamental facets, we shifted our focus to the implicit expressions of the Peirce-CJC relation. Earlier, we surveyed the manifest expression of the Peirce-CJC relation, and now we turn to a dimension that runs over and along with Peirce's references to the CJC. Given this shift in perspective, we are poised to enter into a more detailed discussion of the *doctrina signorum* in light of the Peirce-CJC relation; so, at this stage, we are moving on to an exploratory comparison of the CJC and Peirce's doctrines of signs. As we proceed deeper into the canyons of our scholarly inquiry, it becomes of overriding significance to appreciate the subtly differentiated stances taken by Couto and Peirce within the grand canvas of general semiotics. Along with this appreciation of the delicately distinct perspectives, one finds common elements or even a shared ground of understanding that unites Peirce and the CJC. Some common ground between the distinguished geniuses of Couto and Peirce has been highlighted: triadicity, to put it in the most

succinct terms. This commonality fails to eclipse the fact that the community of inquiry was made aware of the differences in the beliefs of these Portuguese and North-American scholars, specifically with regard to the nature of signs as a part or as a whole of a triadic relation. A divergent view as to whether signs are themselves triadic relations, or whether such relations are but the environment for the action of signs—i.e., whether signs are to be understood except as elements of such environments—has been highlighted. Although the potential of the study of Peirce's references to the CJC remains, as of yet, rather unexplored, it hints alluringly at the possible magnitude of the impact of the CJC on Peirce's mind, not least with regard to the definition of the sign, which the growing scholarly consensus believes Peirce to have been exposed to during his diligent inspection of Couto's magisterial *Dialectica*. The affinities between Peirce's understanding of the sign and that of the CJC are indeed remarkable; besides, it is not audacious to observe now, after looking back, that Peirce gathered a wealth of intellectual beans from the Coimbra Jesuit philosophical bag, so that it is less and less unexpected to find or imagine further intersections. To disregard both such affinities and the subtle divergences as sheer coincidence, especially in the face of our renewed understanding of Peirce's sailing

across the waters of the CJC, and to fail to revisit the assumption that animates our inherited, widespread narrative, or common belief about the Peirce-CJC relation, would be a blind step in the way of inquiry on this meaningful and related matters. The Peire-CJC relation represents a puzzle of scholarly threads found tangled in the web of the history of semiotics; far from standing for a straightforward, unidimensional link, it forms a multidimensional picture that in itself, and in each of its fragments and intricacies, enhances our understanding of the ways in which semiotics has evolved and is expected to unfold in the years to come. Here and now, we are merely to throw some light on the very reality of this relation by charting its skyline to some extent, as well as that of the associated assumption relative to the indebtedness of Peirce's *doctrina signorum* to that of Couto. With a burning intellect searching for insights into the teachings of days bygone, Peirce cultivated the doctrines found within the pages of the CJC, and his bond with Couto's *On the Whole of Dialectics* is one of profound familiarity.

Watch Out for Cerberus

It is well accepted within the community of inquiry that Peirce took from Couto's semiotics in order to arrive at his consistently triadic way of defining signs or signs as relations. As we have seen, a remarkable group of scholars believe this. Meanwhile, however much we searched, we found absolutely no one expressing opposition to this view. Nonetheless, hypotheses turn out to be scientifically dealt with once they are tested. The task is very challenging, not least because it is far from settled and we are not sure whether it is even possible to determine in all its details what a definitive understanding of Peirce regarding the sign in general would look like, bearing in mind the scale of the primary literature and the complex peculiarities of this corpus (some of which we have highlighted above). Though Peirce formulated the definition of the sign in various ways beyond the aforementioned ones, it may sometimes seem to be of little value to be concentrated on the formulations as such. This is so, not least because Peirce admitted that he was desperately struggling to formulate the triadic definition of signs in such a way as to convey *what he believed to be essential* to a large audience, even sometimes at the expense of rigor as to important related

nuances, not least the nature of the very elements that constitute signs or the relations involving them. A prime example of this is the well-known "sop to Cerberus"[363] that Peirce brings up, apropos the awareness involved in the C-A-B relation, in a letter sent in 1908 to the great and acclaimed British philosopher Lady Welby-Gregory concerning the relegation of the *interpretant* to a particular awareness, cognitive power, mind, or organism; or, to be more precise, the relegation of the interpretant to the interpreter, here human. As already mentioned (above), Victoria Welby-Gregory maintained direct correspondence with Peirce from 1903 to 1911 and such correspondence is crucial for the study of Peirce's doctrines. We have in mind the example of his account of the categorial space, which he divided tripartitely, his cosmology, and his conception of signs as media for communication.[364] Those who genuinely seek to deepen

[363]On this topic it is worthwhile to have a look at Paul Cobley's 2022 "'A Global Enterprise': Deely, Sebeok and the 'Sop to Cerberus' in Semiotics", *International Open Seminar on Semiotics: a Tribute to John Deely on the Fifth Anniversary of His Passing (IO2S Deely)*.

On Cobley, peradventure the greatest living "integrator" in the semiotic scene, it is worth reading Kalevi Kull, "Paul Cobley's Impact on Biosemiotics: Thomas Sebeok's next Century", *Chinese Semiotic Studies* 19, no. 1 (2023): 15–23.

[364]On these and related matters check Edmundo Balsemão Pires, "Communication and Consciousness in the Pragmatist Critique of Representation: W. James

their knowledge about Lady Welby ought to pay attention to Petrilli's massive corpus of work. Not only at the crossroads of ethics and semiotics but at the level of Welbyian studies more particularly the community of inquiry owes so much to Petrilli that it is already possible to learn about some details of the Welby-Petrilli relation.[365] It is worth reading what Peirce wrote to Welby in Dec. 1908:

> "I define a Sign as anything which is so determined by something else, called its Object, and so determines an effect upon

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and C. S. Peirce", *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy* III, no. 1 (2011), 11 and 14; check also Jon Alan Schmidt, "A Neglected Additament: Peirce on Logic, Cosmology, and the Reality of God", *Signs - International Journal of Semiotics* 9 (2018): 7-8; and also check Charles S. Peirce, *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2: 1893-1913*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998), 544.

For the whole correspondence between Peirce and Lady Welby see Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Welby, *Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Lady Victoria Welby*, ed. Charles S. Hardwick and James Cook (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977).

[365]We are thinking about in John Deely, "Lady Welby and Lady Petrilli", *Semiotica*, no. 196 (2013): 13–20.

For the latest introduction to Welby, and certainly to inform the dear reader's own contribution to the state of the question as regards the Welby-Petrilli relation, see Susan Petrilli's 2023 "Victoria Lady Welby, a Significian of Our Times", *IO2S Deely*; on top of that, it is advisable to study, *inter alia*, Petrilli's most notable *Victoria Welby and the Science of Signs: Significs, Semiotics, Philosophy of Language* (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 2015).

> a person, which effect I call its Interpretant, that the latter is thereby immediately determined by the former. My insertion of 'upon a person' is a sop to Cerberus, because I despair of making my own broader conception understood".[366]

Due to Peirce's admission of—or capitulation to—a narrower understanding of the sign, his "sop to Cerberus", we ended up reading a passage that suggests an at least peripheral and certainly unexpected reconciliation of his understanding with that of Couto when it comes to the nature of the sign. While we noted that the most relevant issue in this chapter of ours is not so much the linguistic formulation of the triadic definition of the sign, let us proceed in light of the fact that a relevant issue in the Peirce-CJC relation has to do with the well-established belief that Peirce, unlike Couto, understands signs to be triadic relations in their own right and not just elements of such environments.[367] This matter is fundamen-

[366]Charles S. Peirce and Victoria Welby, *Semiotic and Significs: The Correspondence between Charles S. Peirce and Lady Victoria Welby*, ed. Charles S. Hardwick and James Cook (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977), 80-81.

[367]Apart from the sources that can be found above, see also Claus Emmeche, "Causal Processes, Semiosis, and Consciousness", in *Process Theories: Crossdisciplinary Studies in Dynamic Categories*, ed. Johanna Seibt (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2003), 317.

tal when it comes to general semiotics, and there seems to be an unexpected Peirce-CJC alignment, for Peirce is not referring to the sign as being *the* relation but rather as being one of its elements. Could this detail in Peirce's way of formulating the definition of the sign be taken as another Peircean sop to Cerberus, whereby Peirce labels the vehicle a sign just to make it more palatable? Whether the sign is itself a triadic relation or one of its elements is certainly one central aspect when it comes to studying signs and the relations involving or involved in them. We dare not shy away from emphasizing the need to continue addressing this issue, an issue not only intimately involved with what prompted us to design a doctoral project on the Peirce-CJC relation to begin with, but also one that is hoped to catalyze more in-depth discussions in the years to come. It is certain that whatever findings future inquirers devoted to this matter will arrive at will have a bearing on the evolution of our collective awareness of these and related matters. Since we are interested in casting a light on the Peirce-CJC relation regarding a variety of aspects pertaining to general semiotics, we are careful not to assume that we hold the conclusive say on each particular angle of the Peirce-CJC relation; our purpose is but to put forth an open-ended resource for future inquiries to transcend. Still, we

suggest that it is entirely possible that the above concern about the interpretant is not Peirce's only sop to Cerberus. After all, in case Peirce thought that the sign is not merely the vehicle but the relation itself, then why does he speak of the sign as occupying the position of the *representamen*—the "A" of the C-A-B relation—in his letter to Welby and elsewhere (see *supra*)?

C-A-B Relations

As we become more immersed in the universe of the Peirce-CJC relation, it is critical to ask whether, in Peirce's understanding, the sign is itself a triadic relation or just one of its elements. This question is sure to play a role in our interpretation of what the relation between Peirce and CJC means at a key level of his semiotic logic: the definition of the sign in general. Peirce may have built upon his study of Couto in more or less innovative ways. So, are we dealing here with a divergence between Peirce and the CJC, already well present in the current state of the question regarding the Peirce-CJC relation (see above), or with a convergence? From the standpoint of the verbal, there is no doubt a level of convergence: Peirce thinks—or at least he speaks, decade after decade—of the sign as

the aforementioned A, which we have already considered as simultaneously relating in a specific way to B and C. A is a sign of B for C, or at least the sign's element occupying the role of the vehicle by means of which the object is stood for before awareness. These C-A-B relations, while on the surface a joint basis of Peirce's and Couto's understandings of signs, may in fact conceal a discord in the way both semioticians complexify their interpretations of such relations between the A, B, and C. The annals of the history of logic suggest an underlying disparity between Peirce and Couto, despite the fact that the two appear to be technically in tune. Let us read Deely, though not without underscoring that the issue of Peirce and Couto's divergence or convergence regarding the nature of the sign remains to be fully addressed; this is well justified, not least given the fact that future inquiries into these matters revolving around the triadic understanding of signs and their nature may both serve to reinforce or refute John's point:

> "Poinsot's undergraduate teachers, the Conimbricenses [John means Álvares, Couto, Góis, and Magalhães], for sure, had already established earlier in that same 17th century the necessarily triadic fact that three terms are involved in the being of signs. But even the Conimbricenses seem still to have

thought mainly in terms of particulars, in terms of the accustomed manner of speaking of that particular which performs the function of representing the particular object signified to the particular organism made aware of that object as being the 'sign' properly so called. Poinsot's further move, as that of Peirce independently after him, of recognizing the consequence that what makes the representing particular in question be called 'a sign' is nothing intrinsic to the particular as such at all, but rather *the position that particular occupies* (and hence role it plays) in the *triadic relation itself* constituting the being proper to signs, opened the way to the decisive next stage in the development of semiotic inquiry, namely, the shift from the being proper to signs to the proper significate outcome of that being, to the *action itself* distinctive of signs, or 'semiosis', as it would come to be called. For if it is a triadic relation as such that makes *any thing* be called a sign, then any thing which comes to occupy the representing position within the triad of united terms will come to be considered as 'a sign', not by reason of what it is 'in itself' but by reason of the *role it plays*, the position that it occupies, temporarily and under these rather than those circumstances, in relation to two other terms for as long as there are three are [*sic*; three terms or elements]

> united under (or 'within') a single triadic relationship. In other words, while no particular as such 'is' a sign, *any* particular *can become* a 'sign', and *does* become a sign whenever and to whatever extent it enters into the representing role of a triadic relation as such constituting the sign in its proper being".[368]

So Deely traces Poinsot's triadic understanding of the sign (briefly mentioned above) to Couto's corroboration of an understanding of the relations involving signs as relations of the type C-A-B. Couto proposed that the being of signs necessarily entails the involvement of signs with two other elements; this postulate can be traced, as noted above, to Soto's doctrine of signs, even though Peirce seems to have been unmindful of the works of Soto or Soto's students such as the Cordoban Francisco de Toledo (†1596).[369] Resembling the

[368]John Deely, *Medieval Philosophy Redefined as the Latin Age: The Development of Cenoscopic Science, AD354 to 1644 (From the Birth of Augustine to the Death of Poinsot)* (South Bend, Indiana: St. Augustine's Press, 2016), 386.

[369]About Toledo's doctrine of signs read Hélène Leblanc, "*Translatio Signorum*: Penser Les Signes à l'Age Classique à Partir de La Division *Signum Formale/ Signum Instrumentale*" (These de doctorat, Lille 3, 2015); Toledo is a major name in Leblanc's whole dissertation, but give special notice to §. 2.1.2.

Also on Toledo, focusing on related anthropological and psychological concerns, read Daniel Heider, "Francisco de Toledo, Francisco Suárez, Manuel de Góis and Antonio Rubio on the Activity and Passivity of the External Senses", in *Cognitive Psychology in Early Jesuit Scholasticism*, ed. Daniel Heider (Neunkirchen -

foundation stone of a mighty castle, the triadic understanding of the relations involving signs set the ground for some of the most significant semiotic discoveries of all time. We saw above that there is hardly any ground for disputing the fact noted by Deely that Couto, Poinsot, and Peirce all share an understanding of signs that involves a triadic relation, whether the latter be the sign or whether the now-latter be one of the elements (the vehicle) within a triadic relational framework or environment. Doctor John Deely also points out that there is a particular feature of Couto's understanding: a fixation on particulars. Such particulars play none other than the role of the representamen, or what in the ordinary language we call signs; always a particular sign standing for an object vis-à-vis awareness. It should be noted that Couto's fixation on particulars does not imply that universals are not part of the C-A-B relation. Couto recognizes that words, as examples of signs, can signify concepts:

> "Words signify from human intention. Therefore, they will signify all that to which intention is extended. But the inten-

Seelscheid: Editiones Scholasticae, 2016), 38–66 and Mário Santiago de Carvalho, "Como Teria Lido, Aristóteles, Os *Exercícios Espirituais*? A Leitura de *De Anima* II 7-12 Por Francisco de Toledo, Francisco Suárez e Manuel Góis", *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 28, no. 56 (2019): 411–32.

> tion of men in establishing words was the manifestation of concepts. Therefore, words are signs of concepts (*Voces significant ex hominum intentione; ergo id omne significabunt, ad quod intentio se extenderit: sed hominum intentio in vocibus imponendis fuit conceptuum manifestatio, ergo voces conceptuum signa sunt.*)".[370]

This holds true for any concept, so we can say that Couto's *doctrina signorum* builds on an understanding of the action of signs and the nature of the objects conveyed by them that transcends the divide between particulars and universals. Couto's sign, however, is always a vehicle and not the C-A-B relation. Peirce and Poinsot, we have read above, are believed to have recognized a decisive difference in their respective journeys of semiotic inquiry and noted that the defining characteristic of the sign is not traceable to the particular vehicle that stands for an object before awareness. Whatever we call a sign in our day-to-day vernacular—namely each particular instance of A—is no sign; it partakes of the sign; and the function it performs invests it with its relative level of signhood. Deely suggests

[370]Sebastião do Couto, *The Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs*, trans. John P. Doyle, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 38 (Milwaukee, Wis: Marquette University Press, 2001), 96-97.

that such understanding also presided over a significant reorientation of semiotic inquiry towards pragmatism, as the focus shifted from being to action, from signs to semiosis or the action of signs. This was Deely and his Peirce; now we turn to what Peirce wrote c. 1903:

> "The principles and analogies of Phenomenology enable us to describe, in a distant way, what the divisions of triadic relations must be. But until we have met with the different kinds *a posteriori*, and have in that way been led to recognize their importance, the *a priori* descriptions mean little; not nothing at all, but little. Even after we seem to identify the varieties called for *a priori* with varieties which the experience of reflexion leads us to think important, no slight labour is required to make sure that the divisions we have found *a posteriori* are precisely those that have been predicted *a priori*. In most cases, we find that they are not precisely identical, owing to the narrowness of our reflexional experience. It is only after much further arduous analysis that we are able finally to place in the system the conceptions to which experience has led us. In the case of triadic relations, no part of this work has, as yet, been satisfactorily performed, except in some measure for the

> most important class of triadic relations, those of signs, or representamens, to their objects and interpretants".[371]

It seems clear that whether Peirce considers signs to be C-A-B relations themselves or part (A) of the frameworks that contain A, B, and C as their elements, he believes triadic relations of this kind are inevitably at play whenever signs are concerned. It is suggested by Peirce that a phenomenological approach can provide a description of the divisions of triadic relations. The most up-to-date literature in Peircean studies is quite open to anyone who is willing to take a deeper dive into these matters.[372] Whether the author considers

[371]Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks, 8 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-1958), vol 2 para. 233.

[372]You may wish to begin with the following titles: Richard Kenneth Atkins, "Comparing Ideas: Comparational Analysis and Peirce's Phenomenology", in *Charles Sanders Peirce in His Own Words: 100 Years of Semiotics*, Communication and Cognition, ed. Torkild Thellefsen and Bent Sørensen, Semiotics, Communication and Cognition, volume 14 (Boston: De Gruyter Mouton, 2014), 561–67; Brian A. Kemple, *The Intersection of Semiotics and Phenomenology: Peirce and Heidegger in Dialogue, Semiotics, Communication and Cognition*, volume 20 (Boston: De Gruyter Mouton, 2019); Göran Sonesson, "Elements of Peircean Phenomenology: From Categories to Signs by Way of Grounds", *Semiotica*, no. 228 (2019): 259–85; Mohammad Shafiei and Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen, eds., *Peirce and Husserl: Mutual Insights on Logic, Mathematics and Cognition*, vol. 46, Logic, Epistemology, and the Unity of Science (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2019).

signs to be part or the whole of C-A-B relations (or both), he observes that the different kinds of triadic relations—including the relation between a sign or vehicle, its object, and awareness—are amenable to a phenomenological approximation, if only at a certain distance. Why does Peirce bring distance into the equation? Is it because Peirce understands that when it comes to triadic relations there is a lack of direct contact between the phenomena and awareness? This would mean that, according to Peirce, what we can closely observe and permits us a distinctively distanced, if only indirect approach to triadic relations is whatever workings or behavior such relations may involve. If so, and if Peirce would consider that signs are themselves not part of but these very relations of a triadic kind, then the activity that they imply and that can be closely observed would be semiosis or the action of signs; and, in this case, Deely's interpretation would become even more convincing as regards the Peircean orientation not to the being but to the action of signs. If Peirce, on the other hand, would take the sign to be A, then the mere fact that semiosis—an activity that happens to be found in C-A-B relations whether we take the sign to correspond to such a relation or merely to A, even though in the latter case semiosis would not in itself include the action of B and C—can be

found in the C-A-B relation does not imply that the sign, regarded as A in general or a particular sign A, can be phenomenologically approached only from a distant angle, for in this case the sign is not the C-A-B relation and this relation is what Peirce claims to be accessible only from a distance. If this happens to be the case, then nothing seems to stand in the way of A being approached closely and on its own, though nothing seems to stand in the way of Peirce not having shifted his focus from signs to action due to an impossibility to approach the sign phenomenologically except from a distance, in case we take the sign to be the C-A-B relation and semiosis the whole complex of the activities involved. Should Peirce consider the sign to be A or a particular A, it seems not impossible for the moment that he believed it to be possible to approach A's manifestations closely, while he believed it to be necessary to approach its context (the C-A-B relation) from afar. Should Peirce take the sign to be the C-A-B relation, then he believed, at the turn of the twentieth century, that it is only possible to approach signs in a distanced way, as with any triadic relations; perhaps indirectly, by navigating semiosis or approaching it from a close distance, in the case of signs, or so doing regarding any other activities that may be at stake in triadic relations of any kind. Next, Peirce underscores the value

of both *a posteriori* and *a priori* knowledge for understanding the divisions of triadic relations, regardless of whether such divisions are seen as the divisions of signs or those of the relations involving them. This leads us to suspect that Peirce thought that the understanding of signs, either as relations or as part of them, entailed a whole of knowledge that was at once practical and theoretical. In addition, Peirce acknowledged that cognition faces difficulties of its own in bringing theoretically informed expectations or speculations into precise conformity with the more practically inspired outcomes of empirical observation, due in particular to the constraints our reflexive experiences face. This sounds as if Peirce believes that there is some priority or superiority of the *a posteriori* over the *a priori* when it comes to knowing in general, or at least with respect to the divisions of triadic relations, and so potentially with respect to signs and semiosis. Under certain circumstances (after careful analysis), Peirce suggests, whatever we come across in our practice can be processed, understood, and woven into the synchronic web of our knowledge. As far as this study of ours is concerned, we are still somewhere between chewing and digesting, for we have not yet arrived at a satisfactory outcome to our goal of challenging the state of the art, though we trust we will get there. Bear in mind that, if

Peirce understood the sign as a vehicle and not as a relation, then we should no longer speak of a subtle, though fundamental divergence between Peirce and Couto on the level of the definition of the sign as A or a C-A-B relation, but rather of a radical agreement between the two. Such a convergence would imply that Peirce did not merely use Couto as a bridge to arrive at his triadic understanding of the sign, but rather that Peirce was loyally navigating the international waters of the CJC, starting with the nature of the sign and the triadic character of the relations involving signs. We believe that such loyalty suffers no harm on the grounds that there is a lot more of the CJC in Peirce than what Peirce's direct references to the CJC necessarily imply, albeit these references do suggest humongous levels of Peirce's exposure to the CJC, as we have seen above. The loyalty we are speaking of is philosophically oriented, much more far-reaching and meaningful than what is to be found on the superficial layers of bibliographical references. Moreover, we think that the authors of the CJC have also shown their loyalty to Peirce and to all of posterity, for they have given us a wealth of good counsel on matters philosophical. If anyone is keen to learn more about how to properly cavalcade across the lands of loyalty and counsel, as well as the interplay between the two, please read the Portuguese King

D. Duarte I (†1438)[373] and Poinsot.[374] It is worth noting that the ebbing of the divergence thesis put forward by Deely as regards the nature of the sign should allow us to call for scrutiny of the same issue in the case of the Poinsot-CJC relation. Should Poinsot also follow Couto in this respect, the community of inquiry should find out whether in fact Deely was, though himself unaware of it, the first among us to argue for the sign as a triadic relation in itself, and not only as the element that plays the role of the representamen in the kind of triadic relations involving signs. Also worthy of mention, before returning to Peirce, is that there is the chance that all or some

[373]We refer to his masterpiece, first published in 1437-1438: D. Duarte, *Leal Conselheiro: Electronic Text*, ed. Paloma Celis Carbajal and Pedro Estácio, Ibero-American Text Collection / Leal Conselheiro Electronic Edition / Spanish and Portuguese: Medieval (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin-Madison Libraries, 2012).

[374]For learning more about counsel and the other six gifts of the Holy Ghost, which include both those of understanding and science, surely a reference document—first published in 1645, one year after the passing of Poinsot—in Catholic theology is of the highest priority. We have in mind a publication that was masterfully introduced by Cajetan Cuddy, O.P., and recently made available to the English-reading community in John Poinsot, *The Gifts of the Holy Spirit*, trans. Dominic Hughes, O.P., Cluny Media edition (Tacoma, WA: Cluny Media, 2016).

To focus on counsel, one will benefit from being aware of Romanus Cessario, O.P., "John Poinsot: On The Gift of Counsel", in *The Common Things: Essays on Thomism and Education*, ed. Daniel McInerny, American Maritain Association Publications (Mishawaka, Ind.: American Maritain Association, 1999), 163–78.

of the authors we are considering now (Couto, Poinsot, and Peirce) are not mentioning that the sign is a relation for no other than pedagogical reasons—that is, to render matters more readily digestible, somehow as in Peirce's sop to Cerberus—, and so such an understanding should be inferred from their doctrines by those teaching or trained in philosophy and its history. One suitable way to attain belief about this issue respecting such a complex and formidable trio of logicians is sure to imply a thorough, yet-to-be-done—not to belittle the very significant studies the community has already put into related matters, and certainly not to neglect Deely's learned acumen and scholarship—evaluation with a watchful eye on this issue, which would make for a rousing collegiate research endeavor, hopefully extending its coverage to other authors such as Aquinas, Fonseca, Scotus, Soto, and Toledo. We have no compunction in factoring Poinsot's name into the picture here, both because the state of the art associates him with the Peirce-CJC relation and because Poinsot, as we have noted in arriving at and unpacking our research question earlier, defines the signum as "*id, quod repraesentat aliud a se potentiæ cognoscenti*", thus talking about it as playing the role of the vehicle in the C-A-B relation. As we see it, it is entirely reasonable to raise concerns about our community's understand-

ing of Poinsot's doctrines in a way similar to those we have raised about Peirce, which are deeply linked to what Ashworth suggested in the late 1980s regarding first of all the Poinsot-Soto relation: that all the historiographical hype stirred up by Deely over the Poinsotian doctrines is a bit of a stretch, for Ashworth claims that Soto himself—one of the sources of Poinsot—had previously expressed similar insights.[375] It has also been suggested that Professor Deely was not well-versed, in the 1980s, in what the doctrines of the CJC are all about. We are hardly exaggerating, for Ashworth says that it is "somewhat worrying that of Poinsot's predecessors Deely has apparently studied only Suarez"; and next she claims that Deely "does not even seem to have read" Couto's "influental" *On the Whole of Dialectics*.[376] Notice that Deely has never been or posed as a Soto scholar, nor a CJC one, nor even one of Peirce in a strict sense; and if it is true that Deely has espoused far more theories and working hypotheses than those any single researcher is capable of testing in the course of a lifetime, this renders him no more or less than simply human, a quite remarkable one just like Ashworth. It is not out

[375]It is worth reading E. Jennifer Ashworth, "The Historical Origins of John Poinsot's Treatise on Signs", *Semiotica* 69, no. 1–2 (1988): 129–147.

[376]*Ibid.*, 130.

of the bounds of a good chance that Ashworth is right about John's limitations in the 1980's, as the latter does not go into much detail about Couto's doctrine, though it is the case that Prof. Deely seems to have agreed with Ashworth beforehand. So it is, for Deely said, summoning future inquiries, that it would be well worth the effort to tackle Poinsot's works historically,

> "tracing precisely in his forebears (such as the Conimbricenses, Complutenses, and other more individualized thinkers [certainly Soto, among other sources of Poinsot's doctrine]) views and controversies on the subject of signs".[377]

As early as the 1990s, Deely situates the authors of the CJC not at the heart of the Latin mainstream, but rather on the Iberian stage of a "revolutionary underground of high medieval semiotics" that Domingo de Soto, in particular, is credited with inspiring.[378] John Deely claims that two "major reactions" emerged in Coimbra to stand up to the approaches imported from Paris by the Dominican

[377]John Deely, "Editorial Afterword", in *Tractatus de Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsot*, by John Poinsot, ed. and trans. John Deely, 1st ed (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 413.

[378]John Deely, *Basics of Semiotics*, Advances in Semiotics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 112-113.

friar Domingo de Soto: "One favored, in effect, restoring the ancient - read 'Greek' - perspective". Here Deely is referring to the main faces of this reaction, Fonseca and his *Dialectical Institutions* or *Instructions*. Another reaction to the Segovian's Frenchified Latin, John says, was one that favored Latinity over Greek antiquity. The latter reaction is said to have involved promoting "the prospective unity heralded by Augustine (...), but without being able to show finally how the being of signs provides a purchase for such an overall perspective" of the being of *signa*. Deely is crediting Sebastião do Couto's treatise on signs with this reaction. Despite the credit, Deely claims that Couto did not know how the being of signs affords access to such an overarching perspective, which John believes to provide the only satisfactory basis for the emergence of semiotic consciousness.[379] To phrase it tersely, semiotic consciousness involves awareness of the triadic, relative being of signs as C-A-B re-

[379]The books we recommend for the purpose of achieving a historiographical and systematic understanding of Deely's conception of semiotic consciousness are John Deely, *Semiotic Animal: A Postmodern Definition of "Human Being" Transcending Patriarchy and Feminism* (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 2010) and Id., *Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-First Century*, Toronto Studies in Semiotics (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 2001).

lations, of the singularity of relations, and inquiring mindfulness of semiosis or the action of signs. According to Deely, it was Poinsot who succeeded in following Couto's steps for a decisive overcoming of the latter, Fonseca, Soto, the logic of Paris, and the whole complex of issues stemming from the Latin argumentation about signs and sign-related matters.[380] Perhaps there is no excess in the historiographical hype generated by Deely, primarily with regard to the significance of the early definitions of the sign as participating in a C-A-B relation (Soto and Couto), and possibly as well, if duly demonstrated, with regard to Poinsot's innovative definition of the sign as a C-A-B relation. Infinitely more awkward than facing Ashworth's invaluable allegations would be to find someone impudent enough to argue that Deely was unfamiliar with Poinsot's doctrine of signs, for reasons evident from the state of the art that can readily be revisited above. If Deely was well aware that Poinsot—as we believe he in fact also was regarding Peirce, Couto, and others, although in Peirce there is much terminological experimentation—defines the sign while preserving the label of *signum* for the representamen, then why did Deely keep insisting for around three

[380]See *Ibid.*.

decades that Poinsot's sign does not only imply a triadic relation but is itself one? When editing and translating Poinsot's doctrine of signs from Latin into English, right before affirming and drawing consequences from the "ontological status of signs as relations", Prof. John noted that it "clearly follows from Poinsot's doctrine that all concepts are signs and all signs are relations".[381] The place of concepts in the doctrine of signs would be a most interesting topic for the study of the Poinsot-CJC relation. We shall not dig deeper into this matter here, although scrutinizing Deely's insights into not just Peirce and Couto's doctrines but also Poinsot's will inevitably affect, and perhaps also help us to come to a clearer understanding of the Peirce-CJC relation. Let us go back to our reading of Peirce's text, though first pointing out that we believe that it would be wise for the community of inquiry to make clear whether Deely was correct in his reading of Poinsot and Peirce, just as in how he differentiated their doctrines from those of Couto—their common mentor, although Poinsot had the added privilege of having lived during the same epoch as Couto. Peirce, as we read above, pro-

[381]John Deely, "Editorial Afterword", in *Tractatus de Signis: The Semiotic of John Poinsot*, by John Poinsot, ed. and trans. John Deely, 1st ed (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 486.

ceeds to make it clear that understanding triadic relations, be they taken to be signs or the kinds of triadic relations that constitute the environment of signs, is an ongoing task that requires continuous study and elaboration. Peirce then notes that, although the same is not true of the remaining kinds of triadic relations, a satisfactory job has been accomplished up to c. 1903 concerning the relations of signs or representamens to their correlated objects and minds or resulting interpretant thoughts. Peirce is obviously showing himself to be satisfied with the way the community of inquiry was proceeding with respect to triadic relations involving signs until the dawn of the century which saw the birth of the nuclear age of geopolitical relations.[382] Could Peirce's satisfaction be simply due to his own remarkably extensive body of contributions to the field of semiotics up to then? It is apparent that Peirce is referring to the sign as the representamen and not as the relation itself, although such a triadic relation is specified as a C-A-B relation. Is it not conceivable

[382]We borrowed the expression "nuclear age" from Graham Chapman's 2003 *The Geopolitics of South Asia: From Early Empires to the Nuclear Age*, 3rd ed (Farnham, England and Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2009).

For an official narrative about the advent of the military innovation that signified the transition to such an age read Francis George Gosling, *The Manhattan Project: Making the Atomic Bomb* (United States Department of Energy, 1999).

that, unlike Deely, Peirce knew himself not to be in fundamental disagreement with the doctrine of signs of Sebastianus Contus, the author of *On the Whole of Dialectics*? If this is so, a redefined understanding of the history of the sign, renewed in reference to the one established by Deely, is in order. In such a case, in terms of the definition of the sign in general, Peirce ought not to be characterized solely as a person who turned to the CJC in an effort to pick up the trail of the sign and push it a decisive step further, but rather as a disciple of the Coimbra school. It was no doubt the CJC, though presumably not exclusively, that Peirce was contemplating when he observed that the triadic relations involving signs were at a satisfactory state of the art. To be sure, the scholarly community had been engaged in the debate over the meaning of the sign and the relations involving signs long before Peirce, and the prominence of the seventeenth century in this discussion is largely due to, though not solely reliant upon, the 1606 volume of the CJC. For those who plan to delve into the depths of these matters, it would be unwise to content themselves with the works of Deely, Leblanc, or indeed any of the other aforementioned (or any other) authors who have almost invariably written their names in the annals of Latin-alphabet

philosophical historiography.[383] When Peirce says "the most impor-

[383]Such quests for insights, knowledge, and understanding should not only embark upon the waters of these more familiar textual environments, but should also be attentive to a work of immense wealth and extension (around 650 pages), a true repository of learning which—to the dismay of those of us who are still entirely powerless to read most of the original writings of authors such as Vladimir Solovyov (†1900) or Anton Tchekhov (†1904)—remains for the time being accessible only within the realm of the Russian language, to wit: Galina Vdovina [Галина Вдовина], Язык неочевидного. Учения о знаках в схоластике XVII века [*Jazyk neočevidnogo: učenija o znakach v scholastike XVII veka | The language of what is not obvious. The doctrine of signs in 17th-century Scholasticism*], Bibliotheca Ignatiana Nauka (Moscow: Inst. filosofii, teologi i istorii sv. Fomy, 2009).

In Vdovina, by and large one finds not only a comparative review of a vast array of doctrines coming from a multitude of Latin authors, but one also finds solid evidence of the leading role of Couto's 1606 *On the Whole of Dialectics* during the seventeenth century, a century that may one day come to be known as that of the doctrine of signs or the one of semiotics.

To Yulia Nikitenko, a grantee of the Portuguese Government's Foundation for Science and Technology, I.P. and researcher at the Institute for Philosophical Studies of the Faculty of Arts and Humanities of the University of Coimbra, we would like to convey our indebtedness for rendering a significant selection of elements found in Vdovina's work from Russian into English for the sake of our study. We are infinitely grateful for this, so... спасибо вам большое.

To better understand the debates concerning the relations involved in the doctrine of signs unfolding in the wake of Couto's *Dialectica* during its own century, it is necessary to bear in mind as well the works of authors not yet referred to in the present study, including the Galician Dominican Francisco de Araujo y Chaves (†1664) and the Corkonian Franciscan John Punch (†1661).

Both Francisco de Araujo y Chaves—who, according to César G. Ochoa, took to be one of his tasks to reflect on the ontology of the sign thoroughly; on this see César González Ochoa, *Filosofía y semiótica: algunos puntos de contacto* (UNAM,

tant class of triadic relations, those of signs", it might be assumed that signs constitute such a class, though the semiotician may as well be understood as saying not that the sign is the relation, but rather that such relations are those which involve signs. This issue alone is requiring a doctoral study focused exclusively on it, so we are inclined to reserve judgment until future scholarship handles this issue in a manner that leads us to attain belief, in the face of whatever repercussions it may have in revising our understanding of the Peirce-CJC relation. Although below we will provide further insight into related matters, let it now be remarked that a promising approach for a prospective doctoral project would be to frame the Peirce-CJC relation with regard to general semiotics in light of a dual Peirce: the Peirce of the sop to Cerberus and His Glassy Essence beyond such a cap. A relevant question for such

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1997), 83—and John Punch seem to have been in disagreement with Couto as to critical matters related to the doctrine of signs. See Vdovina, 57-58.

While Vdovina mentions a multitude of Latin authors and renders their relevant passages into Russian, she makes scrupulous efforts to always provide the original text and refer back to the corresponding literature, so that the most skilled of the specialized historiographers dealing with philosophical Latinity can in fact navigate somehow profitably throughout the pages of her volume even if they happen to be unable to read Russian.

or other related studies would be whether there is a dual Couto[384] who is referring to the sign in a certain way when in reality he is treating it in some other way, perhaps in a way that is closer to Peirce on issues where the two philosophers may now or eventually be perceived by the specialized historiographical mainstream as diverging on more or less subtle doctrinal aspects. After all, when working on the *Dialectica*, Couto knew was writing a textbook. If we were sure to be dealing with a twofold Couto, today we would be allowed to claim that there is a chance that Peirce found out not only what a sign is from the CJC, but also how to formulate a

[384]And who knows if there is another side to Poinsot? God only knows, so to say, if Poinsot is also interpreting his or even Couto's terms in a somehow fluid and adaptable form, so we cannot but wait for the results of future inquiries. Future inquiries may provide new information about this opportunity to situate Couto, Poinsot, Peirce, and others such as Deely and Cobley, in the context of the history of strategies of the kind of Peirce's sop to Cerberus.

The literature suggests not such a thing; see for example Mário Garcia, "Reflexão Sobre a Natureza e Divisão Do Sinal Na Lógica de João de S. Tomás", *Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia* 31, no. 3 (1975): 301–4; Anabela Gradim, *Teoria do Sinal em João de São Tomás. O Projecto Semiótico do "Tratado dos Signos"* (Covilhã: Universidade da Beira Interior & Lusosofia, 1994); José Herculano de Carvalho, "Poinsot's Semiotics and the Conimbricenses", *Cruzeiro Semiótico: Ensaios Em Homenagem a/Essays in Honor of Thomas A. Sebeok* 22 (1995): 129–35; José Rafael Espírito Santo, *Arte e Prudência Em João Poinsot (João de São Tomás)* (Lisboa: Imprensa Nacional-Casa da Moeda, 2016).

definition of the sign and talk about signs with an eye to the general public; meaning that, in reading Couto, Peirce—and Poinsot as well, conceivably—may have found inspiration for his strategy for making the best of communication while inhabiting the very same reality as that of Cerberus. Whether or not Couto was implementing the sop to Cerberus strategy, it should already be clear from the above that Couto did not write that the sign is "*omne id, quod potentiæ cognoscenti aliquid a se distinctum repræsentat*"—or anything else in the *Dialectica*—unaware that his work was going to be in the hands of a large readership including more than just a handful of rigorous scholars. We already know beyond any reasonable doubt that Peirce was one of the eminent learners of Couto's *On the Whole of Dialectics*, and yet it is still striking how much the definitions of the sign in general in Peirce and the CJC converge. This is true not just because of the triadic nature of the relations involving signs, but because the definition of the CJC worked well enough, if not perfectly, for Peirce to articulate in short to a wider audience what the doctrine of signs is chiefly concerned with. Even if the definition of Couto and others was approached and improved upon in some respects by Peirce, the proximity is such that the very least that can be said is that Peirce was spreading what he

found in Couto—possibly as a sop to Cerberus as to the nature of the sign and the designation of the representamen as "sign", something that Peirce may have regarded as a minor imprecision in the name of increasing the probability of successful communication of what he deemed to be essential as far as C-A-B relations are concerned. To us, this does not sound at all like a long shot, for such a strategy was indeed adopted by Peirce, as we have seen, when he reduced the interpretant to the interpreter; and surely the being and role of the interpretant thought and the triadic nature of the relation involving it or its mind is not the only complex point Peirce sought to convey, in at least some essential respects, to the universe of successful communicative processes involving verbally mediated interactions. As seen above, Peirce's interpretant has become a popular topic of research in Peircean studies, but the same does not hold true regarding the ratio of Peirce's mind to Couto's cognizing power, a ratio that the community of inquiry has shown to be either unaware of or mostly silent about. In our conjectural approach, we suggest that the sop to Cerberus strategy may have been used in other ways important to the understanding of the doctrines of Peirce and Couto, and others, as well as their relations, although this issue has remained poorly attended to in past schol-

arship and requires attention in future exploratory efforts, not least as regards C-A-B relations and all these involve over and above the mind or its interpretants. Needless to repeat, we are here dealing with the underwater navigation that Peirce performed in the international waters of the CJC, and so there are no references to Couto on these matters in Peirce's writings, a circumstance that does not block but rather frees or at least loosens a bit the way of inquiry, making it even more challenging.

Natural Signs and So Forth

Now let us seek to map some other areas of concern for future studies or inquiries respecting the restricted terrain that surrounds Couto and Peirce's general doctrines of signs. We already ruled out the reasonableness of not exploring further the issues related to the divergences or the convergences between Couto and Peirce in terms of their complex understandings of the sign either as a triadic relation or as one of the three elements of such an environment or relation. We have observed that there is a very marked convergence between the understanding of the sign as expressed by Peirce, even if in a simplified way, and that found in Couto's *Dialectica*—a con-

vergence which ought not to be neglected on the basis of Deely's insufficiently explored related assumptions, and which deserves to be dealt with in detail by the community of inquiry. In the remaining time available, we intend to cover as wide a range of topics as possible worthy of the attention of those scholars who may become or happen to be already interested in the particulars of the Peirce-CJC relation, as well as of their doctrines of signs. Our time is very short and we are running out of space, so we will look at only a few of the numerous possible avenues for the study of the Peirce-CJC relation. Hopefully, we are choosing some of the more sugary pathways available. Above and below, we leave unanswered questions such as whether it really follows not only from the doctrines of Poinsot and Peirce, as Deely holds, but also from the doctrine of Couto, that signs fall ontologically into a particular category, that of relation. The purpose of this is not to avoid addressing the issues involved, but simply to approach a wider range of matters that need to be tackled in order to satisfy the aspirations set out in the first place above, and to resist going astray by entering every door that emerges as connected, or even as more or less consequential, while we go down each particular corridor of our planned journey. Whereas it is true that the topic of the general doctrine of signs in

both Peirce and Couto is a fairly circumscribed one if we consider the Peirce-CJC relation as a whole, the reality is that this topic is enormously far-reaching, as will be made even more visible in the coming paragraphs. We will now consider only a few aspects concerning, first of all, the vehicle or representamen, surely referred to and arguably considered by both Peirce and Couto as being the sign. In the *doctrina signorum* of the CJC five structural questions are addressed: on the essence of and common grounds for all signs; on the divisions of signs; on the meaning of words, both in speech and in writing; on the universality of concepts and the variability of words; and, finally, on the mind and the truth or falsity of some concepts, as well as the lack of both of them in some others. While all of these topics, as well as all related issues, will require coverage in the course of a more comprehensive comparative approach or set of approaches to the Peirce-CJC relation, let us briefly discuss here only a kind of representamen met in one of the core divisions of signs found in Couto's *On the Whole of Dialectics*. Hopefully, this will not only enable us to render this study a more valuable springboard for future inquiries, but it will also afford us the occasion to widen the horizon of our understanding of the systematic interplay between Peirce and Couto's doctrines of signs beyond the definition

of the sign in general. Since all references to Couto will be coming from Doyle's bilingual edition,[385] when referring to the text we will simply include the following elements in brackets throughout the remainder of this chapter of our study: Doyle's Couto, [page number]. Couto declared that

> "the most often recognized divisions of signs are these two: first into natural signs and signs by institution, and second into formal and instrumental signs (*[c]elebres ergo signorum divisiones sunt hae duae; altera in signa naturalia et ex instituto; altera in formalia et instrumentalia*)" (Doyle's Couto, 56–57).

Let us suppose for a moment that signs are real. According to Couto, signs can be divided into groups, two of which are quite well-known: A and B. Couto presented numerous distinctions between kinds of signs; for the sake of time, let us look at solely at natural signs, belonging to one of the two most often admitted groups: A. We could, of course, consider other kinds of signs instead or as well, such as those by institution, or other divisions, such as the divisions between formal and instrumental signs (group B) or between

[385]Sebastião do Couto, *The Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs*, trans. John P. Doyle, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 38 (Milwaukee, Wis: Marquette University Press, 2001).

practical and speculative signs. This fact attests to the breadth of the task at hand and the need for further inquiries into the Peirce-CJC relation. For the sake of future inquiries, before moving to natural signs in group A consider what these other divisions, essentially excluded from our study, have to do with. Group B: Formal signs are "images and likenesses of things which impressed on potencies lead to knowledge of things (*imagines, et similitudines rerum, quae potentiis consignatae ducunt in rerum notitiam)*"; instrumental signs, on the other hand, are those which occasion knowledge of "something other (*alterius rei)*" than themselves while being known themselves. According to Couto,

> "[e]verything by whose mediation we know something else must be itself first either known or not known to us. If it must be known, it is an instrumental sign; if not then it is formal (*[o]mne id, quo mediante aliud cognoscimus, aut necesse est a nobis prius cognosci, aut non, si debet cognosci, est instrumentale signum; sin minus, formale)*" (Doyle's Couto, 58–59).

By way of suggestion, we might say that formal signs, as characterized by Couto, are closely related to Peirce's icons. When *circa* 1903 Peirce groups iconicity in conjunction with indexicality and

symbolicity, what distinguishes an icon from an index and a symbol is the icon's capacity to signify something other than itself on the basis of some likeness.[386] We are not going to elaborate further on this promissing aspect of the Peirce-CJC relation, which we wish simply to highlight given the relevant role of icons in the context of Peirce's semiotic logic. As Peirce said, "The only way of directly communicating an idea is by means of an icon", such as an image (which for one reason or another has a visual likeness to its object) and a diagram (where the parts relate to each other like the parts of its object do), "and every indirect method of communicating an idea must depend for its establishment upon the use of an icon".[387] Step forward to Group C: Practical signs are those "which not only signify a thing, but also cause it *(quae non modo significant rem, sed eam etiam causant)*"; speculative signs do not cause their significates; these signs are those "on which what is signified does not depend *(a quibus significata non pendeant)*" and "which only indicate something, as smoke indicates fire, or the

[386]Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol. II. Elements of Logic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), paras. 247-249 and 274 *et seq.*.

[387]*Ibid.*, para. 277-278.

breaking of trees indicates a coming storm *(quae rem tantum indicant, ut fumus ignem, fragor arborum futuram tempestatem)"* (Doyle's Couto, 58–59). While a speculative sign is not a cause of its object, but an effect or something in particular on which what is signified does not depend, a practical sign, according to Couto, is one on which what is signified depends. So it is, for practical signs not only stand for whatever they signify (always something other than themselves), but also physically cause or bring about those significates they stand for before those elements of awareness involved in the C-A-B relation—so there is a direct causal link to the object. Remember the effect of heat on ice. If heat is exerted on ice, it will cause the ice to melt and turn into water. The very heat is functioning in our awareness as a practical sign, for it not only stands for the change from a solid to a liquid state, but it also brings about this change directly. The melting or melted ice caused by the heat will be functioning as a speculative sign and, as every speculative sign, it will be simultaneously functioning as an improper sign. The distinction between proper and improper signs rests on a purpose-based approach. There are signs (inc. natural signs) whose action in the context of the C-A-B relation conforms to a purpose—these are proper signs, purposefully directed towards their objects—and

others, improper signs, whose function does not. Couto says that this division of signs is not very common or suitable. Indeed, the division between proper and improper signs is one that Couto does not pay much attention to, as is the case with most of the divisions on offer, such as the group of commemorative signs (those that signify something past), demonstrative signs (those that signify something present), and prognosticative signs (those that signify something future). Signs in the latter group depend on the temporal correlation between the sign and its significate. Of course, the vehicle or sign is always present in the C-A-B relation; what Couto is emphasizing is that the object of the sign may not be so present (On all these matters, see *Ibid.*, 54 *et seq.*). Now the point is that Couto's attention is mainly focused on groups A and B mentioned above, but we have a reason to pay special attention to group C. Let us dwell on Couto's speculative sign for a moment, for it bears a very intimate resonance with Peirce's index. An index, in the most general sense, is a type of sign that has a causal connection with its object independently of the C-A-B relation. If whatever could function as an index were not functioning as such in some moment or at all—i.e., even if no awareness whatsoever of the link between a sign and its significate would ever come about—, it would remain connected to

whatever else could function as its object before awareness; that is, whatever functions or could function as an index is always an effect brought about by whichever functions or could function as its significate, were both to partake in their respective capacities in the context of a C-A-B relation. "Such, for instance," said Peirce in 1902,

> "is a piece of mould with a bullet-hole in it as sign of a shot; for without the shot there would have been no hole; but there is a hole there, whether anybody has the sense to attribute it to a shot or not."[388]

Are not all indexes speculative signs, in the sense they do not cause their objects, i.e., in the sense that the significate exists independently of whatever plays the role of the sign or vehicle in the C-A-B relation? This topic would lend itself to a very exciting study, and hopefully it will, though we are proceeding apace now. To signs by institution, or conventional signs, we shall return below, though briefly, for this study is but a first step in breaking the ice in rendering more transparent the extension of the kinship of the doctrines

[388]Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol. II. Elements of Logic (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1932), para. 304; see also the 1901 paras. 305-306.

of signs, both in Peirce's writings and in Couto's *Dialectica*, beyond their understandings of the sign in general. So, before heading to the conclusion, let us delve a bit more into the Peirce-CJC relation and take a look at natural signs. Natural signs are those supposing "nothing in the knower" (*in cognoscente nihil supponit)* but in themselves having "a nature which is fitted and sufficient for drawing the potency to the thing signified (*naturam accommodatam, et sufficientem ad pertrahendam potentiam in significatum)"* (Doyle's Couto, 64–65). For Couto, natural signs require no knowledge on the part of the cognizing power; they are fundamentally endowed with an intrinsic quality that is fitting and auspicious for drawing the awareness of the cognizing power to the object they stand for. One might pause to think of the frightening roar of a lion as perceived by a desperate prey: the roar is functioning as a natural sign of the lion, or likewise of danger, for it required no previous deliberate association of the sign to an object on the part of the cognizing power for the sign or vehicle to stand for its significate before awareness. Based on Peirce's 1885 account, natural signs exhibit a distinct character that is relatively independent of the mind aware of them, for there is a dyadic relation between what we call a sign or A, when playing the role of a representamen, and the object it stands

for before awareness—a direct relation, from the significate to A, that is wholly separable from the triadic relation involving the sign or representamen, the object, and awareness or the mind's interpretant thought.[389] Also in this respect, it seems likely that Peirce drank from Couto's water, and it is increasingly apparent how the encounter between Peirce and the triadic definition of the relations necessarily involving signs, the C-A-B relations, has impacted him most vividly. Actually, triadicity is everywhere in Peirce's mind, and it may well have been his readings of Couto's *On the Whole of Dialectics*—not due to Peirce being a blind follower of Couto, but rather due to the doctrinal excellence of the CJC—that shaped him in such a pervasive and all-encompassing way. According to Deely,

> "if Peirce was right in learning from the Conimbricenses that the sign cannot perform its function, cannot achieve its 'proper significate outcome', as he put it, in the absence of a triadic relation, the usual dyadic interpretation of the *signifiant/signifié* relation as constituting signification cannot possibly be the

[389]Charles S. Peirce, "Three Kinds of Signs", in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol. VI. Exact Logic (Published Papers). XIII. On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), para. 361. The three kinds of signs Peirce refers to are tokens (symbols), indexes, and icons.

whole story".[390]

Deely was bringing up Ferdinand de Saussure (†1913) and his distinction between *signifiant* and *signifié*. As described by Pires, Saussure's notion of sign, as well as the previously mentioned division,

> "still kept the reference to the double across the body/mind polarity and to the 'mental image' of the sign, *Vorstellung* [image, representation or idea], concept or 'signifié', as the core of meaning".[391]

Via Deely, we are further informed that Saussure's division failed at bringing in

> "[t]he dynamics of the process linking semiosis in culture with semiosis in nature, and making one the extension of the other in an ongoing spiral of interactions", i.e., it "lacked the thirdness whereby the sign in its foundation (and whether or not

[390]John Deely, *Purely Objective Reality*, (Berlin and New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2009), 130.

[391]Edmundo Balsemão Pires, "Communication and Consciousness in the Pragmatist Critique of Representation: W. James and C. S. Peirce", *European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy* III, no. 1 (2011), 25.

this foundation be essentially arbitrary or 'stipulated') undergoes transformation into first an object and then into other signs".[392]

According to Deely, "Peirce insisted that the sign was triadic" for the sole reason that such a proposal enables us to "understand the phenomenon of signification"; Deely added that such insight was "brilliant (...), though by no means original with Peirce, who mainly gleaned it from the Latin teachers of Poinsot, the Conimbricenses".[393] Another example of triadicity in Peirce is his "theory of categories", environing the categories of firstness, secondness, and thirdness. According to Pires, Peirce concluded that it is not possible to conceive of *what is*, i.e., to think maturely enough as to "construct a fact"—according to secondness or conditioned by "the actuality of action and reaction"—, without it entailing a "determination of thought" gradually advancing in extent in "an endless course", delimited by the interval that intermediates between both furthest points of "the indeterminate *firstness*" and the regulating principles for "the recognition of the thought process itself", con-

[392]John Deely, *Basics of Semiotics*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990), 115.

[393]Deely, *Purely Objective Reality*, 158–59.

sistent with *thirdness*.[394] For those interested in this matters, be aware that Pires had already attested, regarding the nature of the strictly formal relation identified between Peirce's categories, that

> "[t]he ordinal ordering of the categories (into 'first', 'second', and 'third'), serves the purpose of specifying the mode of being of the phenomena of consciousness from the viewpoint of relative value in a series. This value always depends on the position of the different categorical universes in relation to each other. Respecting the principles of 'formal' meaning attributed by Peirce to the series of categories, it could be said that the first ('firstness') does not depend on anything other than itself, as well as that it is the commencement of the series; the second ('secondness') depends on the first insofar as a process of genesis proceeds from it; the third ('thirdness') depends on the first and the second in their reciprocal action or whilst the first is an agent and the second a patient. This series shows signs of the nature of the categories in such a way that the previous positions are assimilated in the posterior ones (without, however, them disappearing as specific and relatively autonomous positions). Arising out of this last viewpoint, both the first and

[394]E. B. Pires, *ut supra,* 12.

the second can be thought of as conditions of possibility for the third. Still, the condition of possibility of continuity between any first and any second is created in the latter. Thus, the categorial series will have to be read both in an ascending and a descending direction. If in the ascending track, the nether category prepares the immediately upper category, this conditioning is due to what is manifested in the hub of descent, when the whole series has been completed, and a spirit formed by its own experience is wholly conscious of it".[395]

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[395]["*A ordenação ordinal das categorias (em 'primeiro', 'segundo' e 'terceiro') serve o objectivo de especificar o modo-de-ser dos fenómenos da consciência, do ponto de vista de um valor relativo numa série. Esse valor acaba sempre por depender da posição dos diferentes universos categoriais uns em relação com os outros. Respeitando os princípios do significado 'formal' atribuído por Peirce à série das categorias, poderia afirmar-se que o primeiro ('firstness') não depende de outra coisa senão de si próprio e é o início da série; o segundo ('secondness') depende do primeiro na medida em que um processo de génese se inicia a partir dele; o terceiro ('thirdness') depende do primeiro e do segundo na sua acção recíproca ou enquanto o primeiro é agente e o segundo paciente. Esta série evidencia de tal modo a natureza das categorias que as posições anteriores são assimiladas nas posteriores, sem que, porém, desapareçam como posições específicas e relativamente autónomas. Deste último ponto de vista, pode pensar-se tanto o primeiro como o segundo como condições de possibilidade do terceiro. Porém, neste último, cria-se a condição de possibilidade da continuidade entre qualquer primeiro e qualquer segundo. Assim, a série categorial terá de ser lida em sentido ascendente e em sentido descendente. Se na via ascendente a categoria inferior prepara a categoria imediatamente superior, a razão de ser deste condicionamento só é manifesto*

All these and other matters are of the highest interest and should be included in a wide-ranging program for studying the Peirce-CJC relation. Right now, however, we will not be pursuing any of these promising and ambitious research avenues, which are springing up like mushrooms as the circumscribed nature of our doctoral project is discovered, for time is running out and we have yet more to say about natural signs. In Peirce's 1885 account mentioned above, he also proposes the concept of the index as a kind of sign that includes natural signs. So we can suggest that, when he read Couto, Peirce thought that all natural signs, because they are indexes, are also speculative signs. Because a speculative sign indicates something without causing it, a natural sign can in fact be speculative. For example, the crowing of a rooster is both a natural sign, since it occurs naturally, and a speculative sign, since it tells us that the morning draws near without causing it. But is it always like that? Are other natural signs able to bring about their objects beyond the C-A-B relation, and thus serve as practical signs as well? Should a

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em sede descendente, quando toda a série se completou e é totalmente consciente para um espírito que se formou com a sua própria experiência]". E. B. Pires, "Categorias e semiosis. Notas introdutórias ao pensamento do individual em Ch. S. Peirce", *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 2, no. 3 (1993): 131–32. Our translation.

wolf grow sexually excited at a female wolf's howl, would the howl not function as a natural sign and, at the same time, be a practical sign, in the sense that whether anyone (inc. the wolf) is aware of it or not, the excitation of the wolf points back to the cry of the she-wolf? Or is this a conventional signal in a C-A-B relation where the wolf (C) has some prior information (part of C) that enables it to sail, in a semiosic capacity, through the howl (A) all the way to the very she-wolf (B), triggering the wolf's arousal? We must be careful and move forward, for the hypothesis that emerged above features some highly conjectural elements and has to do with what Peirce thought as if it had ever or always integrally formed a logically pellucid system, so our guess is all the more vibrant if we read Peirce's work in a completely synchronic perspective, given that it was from a 1902 text by Peirce (see above) that we found Peirce's indexes to be a part of Couto's category of speculative signs, whereas the text referred to later, in which it is mentioned that natural signs are part of the class of indexes, is from 1885. We mean not that a balanced, careful, and fruitful, as well as markedly and justifiably synchronistic approach to Peirce's work is not possible.[396] At this point, in any event, Peirce

[396]It is, and this has been shown from the first to the last page of Paniel Reyes

believed that natural signs are part of the indexical type of signs, so we will see what he was saying about indexes in this last text:

> "The index asserts nothing; it only says 'There!' It takes hold of our eyes, as it were, and forcibly directs them to a particular object, and there it stops".[397]

If we imagine a thunderstorm, the sound of thunder may stand before awareness for the imminence of a storm, but the connection between the advent of the storm and the sound of thunder is separable from the triadic, C-A-B relation involving awareness and both of them as the object and the indexical vehicle or sign. The sound of thunder functions as a natural sign because there is a link between it and the coming storm that requires no deliberate associations, cognitive procedures, or interpretant thoughts for it to be real. The dyadic relation between the sound of thunder and the imminence of a storm, which is independent of the triadic relation that involves awareness, enables the sound of thunder to behave as

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Cárdenas, *Scholastic Realism: A Key to Understanding Peirce's Philosophy* (Oxford, UK: Peter Lang Verlag, 2018).

[397]Charles S. Peirce, "Three Kinds of Signs", in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol. VI. Exact Logic (Published Papers). XIII. On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), para. 361.

an index in the context of the C-A-B relation, directing awareness to the other element of the dyadic relation (its significate in the C-A-B relation) by means of the mere fact of being in a dyadic relation to the advent of the storm. Peirce is in full agreement with Couto about the fact that natural signs presuppose no cognitive endowment in order to stand for objects before awareness, and that they have a nature that is convenient and efficient for bringing awareness to the object. Both authors, we had already learned, believed a triadic relation to be necessary whenever something, whatever, is to stand for some object before awareness. "Whatever", indeed; we are not exaggerating, at least when it comes to Peirce. Doyle suggested looking at the range of Peirce's definition of the term sign in "Ideas, Stray or Stolen, about Scientific Writing", wrote late in 1904.[398] In such a text, in the words of the Peirce Edition Project, besides focusing on "the third science of his semiotic trivium, rhetoric, which he has liberated from its traditional limitation to speech", Peirce offers "a comprehensive statement" of his "mature" *doctrina signorum*.[399]

[398]See John P. Doyle, "Introduction", in *The Conimbricenses: Some Questions on Signs*, by Sebastião do Couto, trans. John P. Doyle, Mediaeval Philosophical Texts in Translation 38 (Milwaukee, Wis: Marquette University Press, 2001), 28n62.

[399]Charles S. Peirce, *The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Volume 2: 1893-1913*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington and Indianapolis:

Peirce admits that he includes, under the term *sign*,

> "every picture, diagram, natural cry, pointing finger, wink, knot in one's handkerchief, memory, dream, fancy, concept, indication, token, symptom, letter, numeral, word, sentence, chapter, book, library, and in short whatever, be it in the physical universe, be it in the world of thought, that, whether embodying an idea of any kind (and permit us throughout to use this term to cover purposes and feelings), or being connected with some existing object, or referring to future events through a general rule, causes something else, its interpreting sign, to be determined to a corresponding relation to the same idea, existing thing, or law".[400]

Peirce also presents an opposition between the adjectives "practical" and "speculative", though applied the noun "rhetoric".[401] As we noted above, Couto employs the same adjectives to label groups of signs (Group C), so whoever is looking to compare the doctrines of Peirce and Couto under such a lens will have to factor in this discussion of rhetoric. Peirce also acknowledges that "a universal

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Indiana University Press, 1998), 325.

[400] *Ibid.*, 326.

[401] *Ibid.*, 328.

art of rhetoric" would be "the general secret of rendering signs effective". According to Peirce, it is not necessary to know if there can be such a universal art for it to be the case that there is

> "a *speculative rhetoric*, the science of the essential conditions under which a sign [a triadic relation itself?] may determine an interpretant sign or itself and of whatever it signifies, or may, as a sign, bring about a physical result".[402]

To be sure, this is very interesting. Indeed, further studies are desirable and needed to flesh out the details with respect to all these matters, no least Couto's point about the intrinsic quality of natural signs and Peirce's point about the dyadic relation illustrated above with reference to the sound of thunder and the advent of a storm. Perhaps Peirce's most original contribution compared to Couto on the subject of natural signs can be found in Peirce's treatment of the natural sign as being simultaneously an index. This matter deserves to be examined more closely in the future and will certainly attract some in-depth discussion on the part of the community of inquiry; the same is true about a lot of matters that have been flagged above, including the topic of conventional signs, the other

[402] *Ibid.*, 326-327.

half of natural signs in Group A. Signs by institution or conventional signs are those requiring "nothing' (*nihil)* in themselves, but requiring a recollection of their relation to the object in the cognizing power (Doyle's Couto, 64–65). Conventional signs are devoid of any intrinsic quality to draw awareness to the object, meaning that these signs require nothing in themselves to perform the role of representamen; as Couto notes, signs by institution—or, if feasible, institutional signs—require the cognizing power to be aware of the meanings assigned to the signs, in a process of recollection of what cognizing powers are supposed to become aware of when facing such vehicles. Conventional signs, such as stop signs determined by semiotic beings[403] to stand for the command "halt!"—actually, perhaps, for the act of stopping, because this is the shared purpose of the command and the stop sign—at certain intersections, are designed to stand before awareness for something other than whatever plays the role of the vehicle. For something to function as

[403]The realm of semiotic beings is still the realm of humankind, but all animals are semiosic, i.e., we all play the role of C in different C-A-B relations. Besides Deely's *Semiotic Animal* (see above or below), read Robert Junqueira, "Semiotic Beings: The Realm of a Single Kind?", *Iranian Yearbook of Phenomenology*, 2021. Depending on the platform, this text may be dated 2023, when it was first published by the Iranian Society for Phenomenology.

a conventional sign, its meaning must have been determined and memorized; the essential quality of conventional signs is not to be found in themselves, but in the memory or recognition of the relation between the vehicle and the object within the awareness of the cognizing power. Those who wish to delve into this topic in the future should pay attention to what Peirce says about symbols or tokens—signs that he considers, "for the most part, conventional or arbitrary"[404]—and legisigns, for "[e]very conventional sign is a legisign", i.e., every sign by institution is a law.[405] We are not going to delve into this matter or other related issues; instead, we will head to the conclusion feeling as if everything remains to be studied further after this inquiry of ours into the doctrines of signs of Peirce and Couto, a journey that has nonetheless managed to significantly shape our understanding of the Peirce-CJC relation. Our study may not have yielded many definitive conclusions regarding the numerous and intricate particulars of Peirce's off-the-record navigation in

[404]Charles S. Peirce, "Three Kinds of Signs", in *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, vol. VI. Exact Logic (Published Papers). XIII. On the Algebra of Logic: A Contribution to the Philosophy of Notation (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1933), para. 360.

[405]Charles S. Peirce, "Syllabus: Nomenclature and Division of Triadic Relations, as Far as They Are Determined" (1903).

the CJC, but we have steadily labored to pave the way for subsequent scholarship and to open the gates to hitherto unknown, to a greater or lesser extent, avenues of inquiry. We hope the value of semiotics has also been echoed; for, as Peirce wrote in a letter to Lady Welby in 1904, "the highest grade of reality is only reached by signs; that is by such ideas as those of Truth and Right and the rest".[406] Hopefully, there will always be a place for semiotics among the community of inquiry. There is one thing for sure: the more we advance in studying semiotics and its history, the more pressing it will be to intensify research into the Peirce-CJC relation. This first step of ours, we hope, will provide a seedbed for such studies.

[406]Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks, 8 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-1958), vol. 8 para. 327.

Conclusion

Out the Rear Window

A Historiographical Contribution

To bring closure to our circle of insights and discoveries, we shall now turn to a few historiographical contemplations stemming from the fruits of our labor. First we will look back, and only then forward, before we can run the curtain of our doctoral stage; so we will, but in any event and at all times overflowing with time and place. In retrospect, looking back at the work that was accomplished above and all it is rooted in, we now bring from Coimbra a laconic expression of a renewed understanding of the Peirce-CJC relation. As we stare intently out of the rear window, we can tell that the community of inquiry has only just begun the quest of understanding the significance and niceties of the Peirce-CJC relation. Our aim was to establish a diachronically flavored account; we were ever

mindful of this fact and assumed that our research would qualify first and foremost as a contribution to the histories of philosophy and science, notably that of semiotics. It is growing increasingly incontrovertible that Peirce's writings and the CJC flow into one another like the merging currents of two great watercourses that irrigate our philosophical soils. By pursuing inquiries into signs and related matters, Peirce, Couto, and others have inspired the unfolding of human understanding in manifold and far-reaching ways. It is right to say that, however much we may be passionate about general semiotics, we have not dealt here only with those issues pertaining to the general doctrine of signs, such as for example the nature of signs or the triadic definition of the sign or the relations involving them. It remains the case, at any rate, that such issues have not only prompted this inquiry, but have also suffused and been fairly relentlessly at the forefront of the entire proceedings. It is also right to say that the philosophical study of signs is of concern not only to every semiotician practicing general semiotics, but also to every scientist and humankind in a general sense, since there are no fields of human activity that lie unrelated to a more or less consequent understanding of what a sign is. Thus, it stands to reason that we are thrilled by the feeling that, with this

study, we have contributed to the movement of those who observe the teachings of the most eminent figure in contemporary Coimbra, Miguel Baptista Pereira (†2007). For a faithful picture of Pereira's life and works—those of one (perhaps the single most celebrated *one* in the twenty-first-century classrooms of the University of Coimbra) of the architects behind the persistence of philosophical research in Coimbra as the twentieth century was moving into its end—, the community of inquiry has yet to do virtually everything.[407] In tran-

[407]While it is true that the Anglophone world is essentially in the dark with respect to one of the leading personalities in the history of the twentieth century, we must highlight the one text to which Daniel L. Everett drew the attention of the Peircean community via the Peirce-L mailing list on the fifteenth of June 2023, to wit: Pedro Xavier Mendonça, "Technology and the *Lifeworld* in Miguel Baptista Pereira", in *Portuguese Philosophy of Technology: Legacies and Contemporary Work from the Portuguese-Speaking Community*, ed. Helena Mateus Jerónimo, Philosophy of Engineering and Technology (Cham: Springer International Publishing, 2023), 75–88.

In Portuguese, an isagogical picture can be found in Helena Pinela and Margarida Neves, "Miguel Baptista Pereira", *Personalia*, January 23, 2020.

For those who want to stay a little longer, the Portuguese language has more in store, most notably Helena Pinela, "O Pensamento Hermenêutico de Miguel Baptista Pereira. Entre a Originalidade e a Novidade". Dissertação de Mestrado em Estudos Clássicos, Faculdade de Letras da Universidade de Coimbra, 2019.

The literature on Pereira is scarce in any linguistic environment; the primary bibliography can be easily found in the most recent editions published by the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, involving almost the entire body of teachers and senior scholars of philosophy working at the University of Coimbra.

scending a temporal state of affairs characterized, at least in the universities, by the unfortunate circumstance whereby "philosophy and the sciences are moving in a sterile fashion while never coming together (*filosofia e ciências se movem esterilmente sem jamais se encontrarem)*",[408] we trust we have abided by Pereira's spirit. Let us simply reiterate now that this study should be understood as a contribution to the history of general logic or semiotics, particularly regarding the effect of some of the *doctrinæ* of the CJC—i.e., part of what emerged as the cream of the Latin Age—on what has emerged as a peerless product of the recent past: Peirce's writings. This topic would indeed require, to be fair, an entire bookshelf of doctoral dissertations, so we can but hope that the ones to come will find their turn to be more manageable on the basis of what we have done here than if we had not done our bit.

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[408]Miguel Baptista Pereira, "Sobre o Conceito Heideggeriano de Universidade", *Filosofia. Revista Da Faculdade de Letras Da Universidade Do Porto* 14 (1997): 82-83. Our translation.

An Action-Packed Field

The field of the Peirce-CJC relation remains open for future studies. We have witnessed that each of the themes wherein we are already aware of Peirce having drawn from the CJC could be examined deeply and independently, and it would certainly be worthwhile to proceed with some further research to pinpoint other such themes, no matter how much of an intense struggle interpreting what is hidden in between the lines would entail. In this study, we have undertaken what we saw fit to do first, and that was to concentrate on those matters that were the most readily detectable, but that were surprisingly left unstudied up until now. We also thought that it would be more beneficial to the community of inquiry for us to pursue a more global, and hence less in-depth study than to delve into one doctrinal topic in isolation. So we did, for we believe that no depth is attainable without a sound sense of the environment or background, however debatable this belief may sound depending on one's methodological palate. Yet we do feel some sorrow that we did not look more carefully at some important aspects of the Peirce-CJC relation, such as the potential bearing of Couto's understanding of formal signs on Peirce. The works of Camps and Leblanc

shall have an unwavering place in many, if not all future inquiries on these matters.[409] To a certain extent, one could argue that we have also contributed here to doctrinal scholarship, for 'Peirce' and 'CJC', *inter alia*, may be read as concepts. In this vein, the relations that are established as well as the quarrels around these and other such concepts constitute a doctrinal construct we may label historiographical. In mainstream historiography, the topic whose first undivided or somehow exclusive approach has been given here (the Peirce-CJC relation) was in a situation we cannot but designate as sidelined. Not much of the Peirce-CJC relation was ever mentioned before we addressed it now, and it had never been handled in terms of a magisterial dissertation or a doctoral thesis anywhere else in the world. A synchronic understanding of the annals of historiography from this point onward will require a newly weighted appraisal of biographical objects such as 'Couto' or bibliographical ones such as 'Peirce's writings' or *On the Whole of Dialectics*. Within

[409]In addition to other previously noted works, we have also in mind now Camps, "A conceção de sinal formal em Sebastião do Couto à luz da Contrarreforma Católica", *Texto Aberto* II, no. 1 (2022) and Leblanc, Camps, and Yulia Nikitenko, "Formal Sign in Coimbra" *IO2S Deely-*; in the latter, besides learning about the CJC we can also learn about Camps and Leblanc, for Nikitenko has provided us with important facts about both scholars.

the mainstream historiography focusing on medieval philosophy, an instance of the silence relative to the CJC is *Why Medieval Philosophy Matters*.[410] In Boulter, there is not a single reference to the CJC or to its authors, or even to Coimbra—could the author be suggesting that the relevance of medieval philosophy has little to naught whatsoever to do with Coimbra or names such as Couto, Fonseca, or indeed with how the CJC has affected contemporaneity? While Boulter's work has still some worth despite all this, it is nevertheless true that it needs to be reviewed so as not to partake in a certain level of insularity. There is hope, for as the Semiotist says to the Would-Be Realist, "a darkness precedes every full dawn".[411] Perhaps our doctoral exploration can provide some light for those seeking to walk out of the cave and explore the action-packed field of the Peirce-CJC relation.

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[410]Stephen Boulter, *Why Medieval Philosophy Matters* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2019).

[411]John Deely, "A Sign Is *What?* A Dialogue between a Semiotist and a Would-Be Realist", *The American Journal of Semiotics* 20, no. 1/4 (2004), 43.

A Second Wave

It may be no mere coincidence that it is claimed that after the severity of the policies—including the expulsion of the Society of Jesus from Portugal (see above)—of Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo (†1782), also known as Marquis of Pombal, this country lost its standing in the philosophical scene, after the heyday of roughly two hundred years (approximately 1550-1750) during which the nation of Luís de Camões (†*c.*1580) guided Catholic philosophy worldwide, above all thanks to the Coimbra school and the CJC in particular.[412] The conditions for the survival and growth of the effects of philosophical texts written in Portugal suffered such a severe attack that recovery seemed barely possible, but it occurred; it is still occurring. Also in Portugal, Western modernity, in its radical process of transition to vernacular and civilizational transfiguration, has chosen to abandon most of its obligations to its own heritage and has trampled it underfoot as though it could be cut down to almost nil. On the basis of our study, though, we are willing to speak

[412]Pinharanda Gomes, "Prefácio a Ferreira Deusdado", in *A Filosofia Tomista Em Portugal*, by Manuel António Ferreira Deusdado, ed. and trans. Pinharanda Gomes (Porto: Lello & Irmão — Editores, 1978), 22.

of an exception and admit that some of the penetrating insights of the contemporary English-speaking community of inquiry, not to exclude others, are deeply rooted in the international waters of the CJC, especially in matters pertaining to logic, cognition, and other fields of applied semiotics. It may be no coincidence either that it was the CJC that stood out as a fortress—and not just in the Western environment, but all around the planet—that resisted the global depression of not only Portuguese-made philosophy, but Latin philosophy generally, and Catholic philosophy more particularly, nourishing the spirits of thinkers from diverse epochal, cultural, and religious backgrounds. It may also have been no coincidence that the CJC provided the basis—think of Peirce, Poinsot, and all others (see above)—for humankind to arrive at a semiotic consciousness, that is, an understanding of what a sign is in a sense that could indeed lead to the establishment of semiotics as we know it today. Once Western modernity had already taken its time to comfortably take hold at several different spheres of life, ranging from the state apparatus to the thinking and emotions of individuals, it would perhaps seem as if the unbroken line running from sixteenth-century to the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century global stages was really but a faint-fading trail, ready to dissolve entirely. Far

more than that, such a line in the horizon stands before us for a full-blown renaissance: a second tidal wave of Coimbra's global impact. This second tidal wave represents not an emergence out of nowhere, but a high-water mark of a continuity that goes back to the early editorial success of the writings of the authors of the CJC (see *supra)* and everything that made this possible. Awareness of this second wave represents a sea-change in the state of affairs, and it is probably the case that Peirce will be credited as the primary vehicle driving this breathtaking reinvigoration of the exploitation of those valuable resources to be found in the waters of the CJC. While the first wave may have been fuelled primarily by the vibrant community, educational efforts and missionary zeal of the Society of Jesus, the heart of the second wave of Coimbra's global impact, captained by the CJC, may be located somewhere in the vast depths of Peirce's life, works, and those impacted by him.

Tomorrow's Share

Build a Tower

If our hypothesis about the extent of the impact of the CJC on Peirce has been corroborated in this study, constituting a certainly blessed guess at our historiographical riddle, this does not mean that the need to inquire further into the Peirce-CJC relation was exhausted. Our results should, before anything else, act as a wake-up call to how much remains to be addressed. Ours, was an exertion aimed at a truth belonging to the future above all; for we are positive about the fact that "truth consists not only of what has already happened, it consists also of that which has not yet come to be but possibly will (*... a verdade não é apenas o que já aconteceu, mas é também o*

que ainda não foi, mas pode vir a ser)".[413] Many people may still be astounded by the role played by the Scholastic corpus in the circles surrounding the lives and works of major contemporary philosophers such as Peirce, who is not alone in this respect, but step by

[413]João Maria André, "Das utopias do Renascimento à crise das utopias e ao seu renascimento", in *Percursos nas ciências da educação. Lugar para a utopia*, ed. Maria Helena Damião (Imprensa da Universidade de Coimbra, 2022), 31.

Our translation. It is deplorable that this book has not yet been made accessible in English, and André's previous editorial records suggest that, as with Leblanc's recent book (see above), the Italian-speaking community of inquiry will be more rapidly aware of the great value of bringing this work to its readership.

The Portuguese-speaking community can find a review of André, a member of the IEF, the Institute for Philosophical Studies—same as Carvalho, Guidi, Ikeda, Nikitenko, Bernardo Ferro, Catarina Rebelo, Diogo Falcão Ferrer, Emanuele Landi, Fabiana Tamizari, Fernando Sadio Ramos, Fernando Santor, Gilmar Kruchinski Junior, Henrique Jales Ribeiro, Isabel Borges, Isabel Campos, Joana Ramos, João Carvalho, Jimmy Barbosa Pessoa, João Emanuel Diogo, Laura Turano, Joaquim Braga, José Beato, Laiseni Liava'a, Marta Amaral, Zafar Iqbal, Miguel Oliveira, Paulo Alexandre e Castro, Pedro Vilar, João Gonçalves, Joseph Thomas Milburn, Regina Tralhão, Evangelos Kalfopoulos, Rui Gabriel Caldeira, and many other world-class researchers like António Martins, Francisco Teixeira, Camps, Afonso Loureiro, Mahmoud Reza Moghaddam Shad, Cristóvão Marinheiro, Fernanda Bernardo, Filipe Calhau, Francisco da Costa Espada, Luís António Umbelino, Marco Toste, Pedro Laureano, João Francisco Ferreira, Mário Jorge de Carvalho, Nuno Ferro, Samuel Oliveira, Simão Lucas Pires, Snelson, Tom Eric-Krijger, Tomás Fidalgo, Mariana Almeida Pereira, Gianluigi Segalerba, Vasco Cardoso, and William Passarini—, written by an author who is a member of the IEF himself, in Klédson Tiago Alves de Souza, "João Maria André. Renascimento e modernidade: releituras filosóficas, Coimbra, Grácio Editor, 2022, pp. 237", *Revista Filosófica de Coimbra* 31, no. 62 (October 28, 2022): 397–402.

step the community of inquiry and the wider one are growing familiar with the actual continuity of the histories of philosophy, the sciences, and human understanding. Again, it seems as though modernity, or the Age of the Fall of Babel, has been far less effective than it may have hoped in erasing from the face of the planet the long centuries when Latin was the dominant means of philosophical scholarship in the Western traditions and perhaps elsewhere in the world as well. In *Four Ages of Understanding*, referred to a number of times above, John Deely singles out four ages of understanding: the Greek, the Latin, the Modern, and the Postmodern; here we are but keeping in line with the linguistic criterion that John partially abandoned when labeling these ages of understanding. Postmodernity is surfacing and it seems so far fitting to label it the Anglophone Age. We dub Western modernity the Age of the Fall of Babel[414] not just because de Latins reached for the sky, but also

[414]The thought came to us as we were undertaking an inspectional reading, and particularly as we were going through the "Babel" subsection of the "Translation of Languages" section in pages 140-142 of Riccardo Pozzo, *History of Philosophy and the Reflective Society* (De Gruyter, 2021).

About the various levels of reading see Mortimer Jerome Adler and Charles Van Doren, *How to Read a Book*, rev. and updated edition (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1972), first published in 1940.

because the foundations for mutual understanding between large segments of the community of inquiry, grounded in a unifying proficiency in Latin, were undermined either by divine intervention, by the arrival of a multitude of languages in scholarly discourse, or both. In the present day, we may well speak of an English or Anglophone Age in, but a baptism of such a significant historiographical consequence demands, rain or shine, some distance and careful reflection.[415] What we have to do is to learn from the past and put up a fine tower in the wake of authors such as Peirce, but without arrogantly seeking to have it become a physical stairway to heaven. We see now that we should avoid being too tough on the memory of modern philosophers. First of all, because there are exceptions; secondly, because we are not aware of the extent to which the wrongs of philosophical modernity are not owed to a widespread panic felt at the resounding and long-delayed fall of the Latin Babel.

[415]A Thailand-oriented perspective on English as a global or increasingly global language can be found in Budsaba Kanoksilapatham, "Towards Global English Horizons", *LEARN Journal: Language Education and Acquisition Research Network* 9, no. 2 (2016): 44–48.

Map the Web

The impact of the Latin Age on contemporaneity is by no means all down to that of the authors of the CJC on contemporary semiotics, American pragmatism, postmodern authors such as Peirce Peirce, and the growing Anglophone international, global, or globalizing household. The Latin Age, even past the CJC, also left a mark in the nineteenth- to twentieth-century European philosophical circles which had not yet arrived, so to say, in the so-called English Age. The impact of the Latin heritage on such circles remains largely unknown, but there are fine examples of how to move toward mapping such a web of relations. One such example is to be found in the work already carried out by the community of inquiry concerning first of all the relation between Suárez and Alexius Meinong (†1920), a scholar whose theory of objects is thought to owe a lot to Latin Scholasticism. In a recent study authored by Vdovina, it has been argued that Meinong's theory of objects can be regarded as a follow-up and build-up of related insights stemming from Latin Scholasticism; the author also points out how the circumstances and the tasks at hand were different in the cases of Meinong and other inquirers of his time, on the one hand, and

Latin scholars such as Suárez on the second hand. On the Western side of the civilizational screen, no doubt there is no shortage of researchers expecting the study to which we are now referring to be translated.[416] Through people like Peirce and Meinong and their works, the Latin Age—and in Peirce's case, surely the CJC in particular, while the CJC functions as a privileged carrier of the doctrines of the Latin Age (see above)—is expected to have kept impacting different circles of understanding throughout the recent past and up to the present moment, even if many of us are unaware of it. Therefore, as we learn more about the Peirce-CJC relation—and as we have already seen there is infinitely more to be done in comparison to what has already been accomplished—, it becomes more and more meaningful to discover in which respects the impact of the CJC on Peirce may have spilled over into the relations between the latter and those touched by him in one way or another. A fairly extensive list of scholars who have been studying Peirce can be found in the pages of this study, and it would defi-

[416]We mean Galina Vdovina's, "The late-scholastic roots of Alexius Meinong's theory of objects (Позднесхоластические корни теории предметов Алексиуса Майнонга)", *Philosophy Journal* (Философский журнал) 15, no. 1 (March 3, 2022): 5–20.

nitely be worth stepping ahead to find out how much of the CJC came to resonate—courtesy of Peirce, so to say—in their lives and works. We have also already mentioned a number of personalities who were related to Peirce in his lifetime and therefore are worth being linked to Peirce and the CJC in future inquiries. It would be wise to ascertain how much of the impact of the CJC on Peirce may have cascaded down not just on people like Dewey, James, Royce, and others who were impacted by way of their interactions with Peirce, but also on others—such as George Santayana (†1952), Gertrude Stein (†1946), and Thomas Nagel—who are likely to have been gotten caught up in this Peirce-CJC-centered network due to the effect of third parties on them—third parties, understandably, as regards the Peirce-CJC relation strictly construed. An impressive and broad-based investigation, yet insufficiently penetrating as far as the very narrow focus of our doctoral inquiry is concerned, is Collins' 1998 *The Sociology of Philosophies*.[417] It will nevertheless be particularly worthwhile, as we trace the ramifications of the Peirce-CJC relation on a vast diachronic scale, to pay special

[417]Randall Collins, *The Sociology of Philosophies: A Global Theory of Intellectual Change* (Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998).

attention to the sections devoted by the author to Western scholarly circles; of note, though, is the fact that while some attention has been given to Peirce[418] Coimbra in general, not to mention the CJC, remains appallingly overlooked by Collins[419] The same holds for the sources of the CJC and the geographically heterogeneous, historically sustained, and systematically polycentric trajectories of inquiry attempted by the community of inquiry in exploring the international waters of the CJC before Peirce began his lifelong journey over and under these waters. As for the sources of the CJC, we have already touched upon this issue above in relation to Fonseca, but the shoe also fits Toledo, Scotus, Aquinas, not to mention Aristotle and many others. In terms of the multiplicity of navigations undertaken in the volumes of the CJC prior to Peirce's, such as those undertaken by Leibniz, Locke, Poinsot, and Timpler, careful consideration ought for the moment to be devoted to tracking those

[418]Especially pp. 675-680).

[419]This work, same as Adler's book mentioned above, was brought to our attention by John Taylor via email on July 2023, two of those valuable occasions when we have been favored in recent times by the benevolent advice of the author of, *inter alia,* John Taylor, "Adam Smith's Seventeenth-Century Sources", *Terra Economicus* 17, no. 3 (2019): 78–88 and "Teoria Macroeconómica e Ocasionalismo", *Filosofia Ao Minuto* no. 7 (Coimbra and São Petersburgo: Instituto de Estudos Filosóficos and Micrologus Studio, 2021).

authors who were impacted to a significant degree by the CJC while having, in turn, had a significant effect on Peirce. A neat, or a variety of neat Collins-style diagrams (reference above) revealing some details about the ways in which these various Peirce-CJC third-party clusters do or might relate to the CJC, to Peirce, or to both (when applicable), it would no doubt afford the community of inquiry a more global sense of how many blind spots there are in our present-day understanding of the Peirce-CJC relation. How significantly did the Arabic-Islamic Aristotelian impact on the CJC pour into Peirce? How much of the effect of the CJC on the broader British philosophical landscape leaked out on Peirce? Possibly due to the fact that it spans a period of time revolving around Peirce's lifetime—but stretching far into the present as well as the indeterminate future, because of the intergenerational circles of human conviviality and the continuity of human relations—, we are keen to find out to what extent some of the impact of the CJC on Peirce has shone through his dealings with figures engaged in many different areas of human activity throughout his life. Among others, Peirce dealt with Arabists, such as Charles Tyrwhitt Drake (†1874) from the Chiltern Hills; army scientists such as the Marquis of Mulhacén, General Carlos Ibáñez de Ibero (†1891); astronomers, such as Karl

von Littrow (†1877), from Kazan, and the Austrian-Silesian Edmund Weiss (†1917); economists, such as William Stanley Jevons (†1882) from Liverpool; explorers, such as the Cantabrigian Edward Henry Palmer (†1882); mathematicians, such as Augustus de Morgan (†1871), from Madurai, and Ventura Reyes y Prósper (†1922) from La Serena; politicians, such as Peirce's cousin, the Senator of Massachusetts Henry Cabot Lodge (†1924); psychologists, such as the Guingampian Théodule-Armand Ribot (†1916) and the Mannheimer Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt (†1920); publishers, such as William Henry Appleton (†1899) from the Northern Essex; or significians, such as the Londoner Lady Welby. About these and other elements of significant import for drawing a Peirce-centered interpersonal network, it will be important to take Nubiola into account,[420] besides many of the texts referred to above. A large number of names beyond those already mentioned can been found in the literature, among many others those of scientists from the cities of Edinburgh, such as James Clerk Maxwell (†1879), and

[420]Esp. Jaime Nubiola, "Charles Peirce and the Hispanic World", in *Pragmatism in the Americas*, ed. Gregory Fernando Pappas (Fordham University Press, 2011), 53-68.

Postdam, like Hermann von Helmhotz (†1894).[421] All of the names just mentioned are now the lawful targets for future research focusing on the respects of the Peirce-CJC relation, as are those of many others with whom Peirce had dealings in life. So it is, regardless of whether the interactions involved just correspondence, just face-to-face exchanges, or both, in America or during Peirce's travels elsewhere under the sun. With how many people may Peirce have held talks about, for example, signs, cognition, or logic and its history, prior to, during, and after he first took the steamer S.S. Deutschland to London in 1870?[422] How much did Peirce directly or indirectly expose other people to the international waters of the CJC not only after his passing but also in the course of his days, as for instance during the time he spent in the Black Sea, Chambéry, Constantinople, Dresden, Geneva, Sicily, Vienna, and many other places? Assessing how much Peirce or his works propagated the insights of the CJC around their spheres of influence may be

[421] Check for example Nubiola 2011 above.

[422] One can find some elements concerning this vessel and its relatedness to other ocean-going ships, such as the S.S. Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse, in United States Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Report Upon the Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries (U.S. Government Printing Office, 1900), 357.

an unending puzzle, not only given the immense bibliography of Peircean studies available worldwide today, but also considering Peirce's impact everywhere he went while still alive and its further consequences. Assuming that Peirce, in his indefatigable spirit of inquiry, did indeed spread the insights of the CJC over the vast surface of the global West throughout the entirety, or at least the vast majority, of his adult decades, it becomes necessary to attend to the repercussions of those waves that have certainly unfolded and will continue to unfold as echoes of the transmission of a certain Coimbricity, emanating from Peirce to those with whom the semiotician interacted, flow down the channels of their subsequent connections, and so on, virtually *ad infinitum*, in a manner that constantly amplifies and transfigures the web of Peirce-CJC-related involvements. Clearly, whatever Peirce would do and wherever he would go, he would bear the mark of the CJC, so the whole international community of inquiry is expected to pay closer attention to the CJC, to the Coimbra school, as well as to the long centuries of world-class philosophical scholarship in Portugal. In Coimbra, too, more thought will have to be given to Peirce than has been given in the past, although some groundbreaking interdisciplinary research has already been published by those in the community

of inquiry associated with the city which constitutes the academic heartland of the Portuguese scientific ecosystem.[423] Arguably, the most powerful statement to have emerged so far in this study is that the Peirce-CJC relation is far more wide-ranging and complex than hitherto anticipated. The mostly unexplored ocean of avenues of inquiry involving the Peirce-CJC relation is, as it has began to emerge, colossal, and further proceedings on this and related matters can only flourish in the face of such a colossal dose of subaqueous soils, marine life, and water, to stick with the metaphor. While the necessary nerve remains to be found when future inquiries specifically concerning the Peirce-CJC relationship are to be carried out, we can already predict that there will be many such inquiries and that they will also require much in-depth scrutiny of some or all of the volumes of the CJC and the writings of Peirce. Before closing, we are briefly going to mention only a few more re-

[423]Apart from some works authored by António Martins, and Edmundo Balsemão Pires, and Junqueira (see above), think for example of Socorro Viana de Almeida, "Linguagem e simbologia em Ésquilo: um estudo sobre *Persas* e *Sete contra Tebas*" (Tese de Doutoramento, Universidade de Coimbra, 2017), supervised by Maria do Céu Fialho, a doctoral thesis which departs from the categories of firstness, secondness and thirdness (see above) to examine the language and the symbolism in two tragedies written by Aeschylus (†*c.*456 B.C.).

flections about tomorrow's share. Throughout our doctoral path, numerous people—such as Doctor Kemple, to whom we are most appreciative[424]—have been reminding us about the limitations of our approach, while some shortcomings were detected by us regardless of such interactions. We were reminded of how critical it is to go beyond the merely scholarly aspects of the field; this is something we are somewhat pleased to concede, and it is perhaps actually a flattering remark, given that we are writing a doctoral thesis here; moreover, it may be that what we are doing here is a much-needed precursorship to access more profound philosophical and indeed historiographical strata. Another matter: how on Earth did Coimbra 'end up' in the United States of America? Although this question falls within a more general scope than the Peirce-CJC relation, it would nonetheless be important to tackle it carefully so as to achieve a finer understanding of the background of such a relation—hopefully way finer than so far achieved. While there is no need to restore Couto's never-lost independence, like that of the other authors of the CJC, vis-a-vis Fonseca, the intimacy of Fonseca's genealogical ties to the CJC, most of all to Couto (see above),

[424]But many, many others as well, and we wholeheartedly thank you all.

compels us to insist that it is necessary to map out where Fonseca lies in the waters of the CJC, all the more so because then it will be more accurate than hitherto possible to determine what of Fonseca has ended up lying in Peirce's mind.

Convert Leads

Worthy of mention is that improving historiographical accounts on the basis on our results is already feasible and desirable. Future historiographical accounts, primarily those of philosophy and semiotics, need to avoid penalizing their readerships based on a missing piece of writing about the Peirce-CJC relation, as did many of their predecessors so far. Still, a whole universe remains to be explored, and here we did not even get close to hearing the last words, so we are in a hurry to figure out solutions for managing the rising tide of research opportunities that the Peirce-CJC relation is bringing to shore and convert them into valuable findings. As the Viennese politician Wolfgang Schüssel said about the task of "[r]egaining the confidence of the people", we will now express it about the colossal task of studying the Peirce-CJC relation:

> "In so doing, we must make use of all the institutions. (...) We

> are all in the same boat and must keep a firm hold of the oars and row together if we are to gain speed and be able to reach our destination".[425]

Of course, we have only been able to clear the way here for a share of tomorrow's real share; and despite all of the limitations of our study, it has been wholly worthwhile for us to learn more about and contribute to the history of logic broadly construed. However humble, every historiographical blossoming is contributing to the proceedings of scholarly activities broadly construed and the growth of human understanding of reality. To contribute to the history of logic, in particular, is one way or another to add something both to the study of the history of the human mind and to educate ourselves in regarding philosophy, as Peirce said in 1869, "in a cold and scientific eye".[426] It is worth reading what Peirce wrote:

> "... so far as the logic of an age adequately represents the methods of thought of that age, its history is a history of the human

[425]Josep Borrell Fontelles et al., "Results of the European Council - Lisbon Strategy (Debate)", in *Debates of the European Parliament* (European Union: European Parliament, 2006), 7-17.

[426]Charles S. Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 2: 1867-1871*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 310.

> mind [… i.e.,] with reference to its power of investigating truth. But the chief value of the study of historical philosophy is that it disciplines the mind to regard philosophy in a cold and scientific eye and not with passion as though philosophers were contestants" (*Ibid.)*.

Perhaps some philosophers or scientists think of themselves and others as contenders, but surely the relation between Peirce and the CJC is consistent with Peirce's scientific understanding of the history of philosophy: both Peirce and the authors of the CJC were walking the shared path of humankind towards ever greater insights into the significance lying beneath the surface of all there may be to understand, and Peirce was mindful of it.

In Closing

Semiotics at the Edge

General semiotics is the doctrine of signs. It is therefore the doctrine of all signs and that is why it is not concerned simply with signs of one kind or another but rather with signs in general. Given that the commonality of all signs lies in the very fact that all signs consist of a C-A-B relation, general semiotics is the doctrine of such relations, i.e. signs or, unambiguously put, sign-relations. But if relations in general were to be considered, surely a more general doctrine ought to be found? Here is a fine question, mindful of what the signs were eliciting. It seems to us that even if there were a more general doctrine, a doctrine of relations in general, then only through signs, and thus semiotically, could we possibly bring it about and understand it. Breaking through past signs would

mean reaching beyond the threshold of all conceivable human adventures. While signs pervasively extend beyond semiotics and the actual boundaries of human cognition, we are bound to remain on the edge of semiotics, which in and of itself can only discern an unkowable final destination for the future of human understanding. Semiotics may be the most general doctrine humanly deviseable, or perhaps the most general doctrinal angle that has ever been documented on this planet, and hence the attention to its history.

Doubt Lives On

Since the CJC and Peirce hold such eminent seats in this and related fields, the available and arguably worthwhile inquiries centered on the Peirce-CJC relation are seemingly inexhaustible, so let us be satisfied that we have been making our respective contributions to such a universe and call it a day for the moment. Along our way so many doubts popped up that the significance of what Peirce said in 1872 grew somewhat more vivid as we read it together once and again: “Living doubt is the life of investigation. When doubt is

set at rest inquiry must stop".[427] It matters a great deal to the future of the community of inquiry that the doubt lives on, and a scientific intelligence—i.e., as Peirce declared *c.* 1897, an intelligence "capable of learning by experience"[428]—should not put any insistence on ending once and for all the irritation caused by doubt. We are grateful that doubts are left in the air and hope that the community of inquiry will again bring these matters under scrutiny and surpass what has been achieved. We welcome criticism, for, as Gaultier said:

> "If we believe that a given hypothesis should not, for the advance of inquiry, be once again put to the test but, on the contrary, be written on the list of those upon which we can submit other hypotheses to the verdict of experience, (...) we cease to wish to learn anything about the role that should be given to the hypothesis in question in the regulation of inquiry".[429]

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[427]Charles S. Peirce, *Writings of Charles S. Peirce: A Chronological Edition, Volume 3: 1872–1878*, ed. Peirce Edition Project (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 18.

[428]Charles S. Peirce, *Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, ed. Charles Hartshorne, Paul Weiss, and Arthur W. Burks, 8 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1931-1958), vol. 2 para. 227.

[429]Benoit Gaultier, "On Peirce's Claim That Belief Should Be Banished from Science", *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society* 52, no. 3 (2016): 394.

Our Swansong

By now, we already know that Peirce was to a noteworthy extent being intelligently determined by the CJC, yet we do of course remain unaware of the full extent to which Peirce can stand for the CJC. We need to learn more and we can find out more about it, although we should always be aware of how the reconstruction of a city in ruins is not easy and is always a work in progress. The way we spoke of the past right now is taken from Joseph Brent (†2020), who wrote the following:

> "The past is a city in ruins—melancholy debris of the feast. The past haunts us with vague recognitions and inspires in us a musing curiosity about our seamless continuity with it. We guess at the riddle it embodies as we wander its vast reach lost in concepts, hunting for clues, inquiring of our ancestors about the signs of their times, and uncovering symptoms of our own malaise. We are pierced by time's barbed arrow, and from that irresistible otward clash we know that our universe is irreversible. The beauty of the past arises from its permanence, from the impossibility of changing what was done".[430]

[430]Joseph Brent, *Charles Sanders Peirce: A Life* (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-

We bid farewell to this project, having renewed the strength of the hypothesis that led us to this point; after all, it seems that Peirce is a *priman* which is a *secundan* to the CJC and is *tertian* in determining all of us into 'secundanity' to the CJC (see above).

sity Press, 1993). It is certainly true that Brent's book is "scrupulously searched and researched, conservatively empirical in documentation, superbly written, and compulsively readable". Thomas A. Sebeok, "Foreword", in Brent's book quoted above, xi-xii.

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